Opinion
C.A. No. 02A-07-014-JRJ.
Date Submitted: July 7, 2003.
Date Decided: July 23, 2003.
Court Below-Court of Commom Pleas of the State of Delaware, in and for New Castle County
ORDER
This 23rd day of July, 2003, upon consideration of the briefs on appeal and the record below, it appears to the Court that,
1. On March 16, 2001, Appellant Shirley Wilson ("Wilson") acting pro se brought a debt action in against Appellees, Joe Mackiewicz ("Mackiewicz") and Christine Meyer ("Meyer") in the Justice of the Peace Court No. 13. On July 16, 2001, after a trial on the merits, the Justice of the Peace Court granted judgment in favor of Meyer and dismissed the case against Mackiewicz. On July 17, 2001, Wilson filed a motion for reargument pursuant to Justice of the Peace Civil Rule 59(d). On July 19, 2001, the Justice of the Peace Court denied the motion.
March 16, 2001 Compl., Wilson v. Mackiewicz, C.A. No. J0103033813.
2. On July 23, 2001, Wilson acting pro se brought a second debt action against Mackiewicz and Meyer in the Justice of the Peace Court No. 13. On September 24, 2001, the Justice of the Peace Court determined that Wilson was collaterally estopped from again suing Mackiewicz and Meyer regarding the same issues that had been litigated and decided in the earlier case. Furthermore, the court held that Wilson violated Rule 11(b)(1), (2) by filing the July 23, 2001 complaint. On October 31, 2001, the Justice of the Peace Court held a hearing to determine if sanctions should be imposed against Wilson pursuant to Rule 11(c). On November 14, 2001, the court entered an Order awarding no sanctions.
July 23, 2001 Compl., Wilson v. Mackiewicz, C.A. No. J0107044013.
3. On December 3, 2001, Wilson filed a pro se notice of appeal to the Court of Common Pleas.
4. On May 29, 2002, Mackiewicz filed a pro se Motion to Dismiss alleging that Wilson's appeal was untimely. On June 14, 2002, the Court of Common Pleas granted Mackiewicz's pro se motion to dismiss with prejudice holding that the time for purposes of appeal started to run on July 19, 2001, the date of the denial of Wilson's motion for new trial, and thus the Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction to hear the appeal.
Hr'g Tr. at 10, Wilson v. Mackiewicz, Del. Com. Pl., C.A. No. 01-12-001, Smalls, J. (June 14, 2002).
5. On July 15, 2002, Wilson filed a pro se notice of appeal to this Court.
6. The only issue before this Court is whether the Court of Common Pleas erred in dismissing the appeal. This is a question of law, which this Court reviews de novo on appeal from a Court of Common Pleas decision.
Wilson v. Sico, 713 A.2d 923, 924 (Del. 1998); Ensminger v. Merritt Marine Const. Inc., 597 A.2d 854, 855 (Del.Super. 1988).
7. The appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Common Pleas is defined by statute. An appeal from the Justice of the Peace Court to the Court of Common Pleas must be filed and perfected within 15 days of the final order from the Justice of the Peace Court. This statute is jurisdictional and, if it is not complied with, the appellate court has no jurisdiction over the appeal.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10 Del. C. § 9571(b). DEL. COM. PL. Civ. R. 6(a) states,
"[i]n computing any period of time prescribed or allowed . . . by statute, the day of the act, event, or default after with the designated period of time begins to run shall not be included. The last day of the period so computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday or Sunday, or other legal holiday, or other day on which the office of the Clerk of the Court is closed, in which event the period shall run until the end of the next day on which the office of the Clerk of the Court is open. When the period of time prescribed is less than 11 days, intermediate Saturdays, Sundays, and other legal holidays shall be excluded in the computation."
Dzedzej v. Prusinski, 259 A.2d 384, 386 (Del.Super. 1969) (citing Williams v. Singleton, 160 A.2d 376 (Del. 1960)).
8. When making the determination of whether an appeal is untimely, the Court must look at the record to determine the date, which the appeal period started to run. In the case before this Court, Wilson chose not to take an appeal from the July 19, 2001 judgment of the Justice of the Peace, and instead, filed a second complaint. On September 24, 2001, the Justice of the Peace held that Wilson was collaterally estopped from going forward with the July 23, 2001 complaint because it concerned the same parties and the same issues that had previously been litigated, and dismissed the action. The September 24, 2001 dismissal was final on that date, thus, the time for appeal began to run at that time. However, instead of filing an appeal, Wilson waited until the Justice of the Peace made a determination as to the sanctions, which became final on November 14, 2001. As of November 14, 2001, Wilson's time to appeal the September 24, 2001 dismissal had run and the sanction hearing, unlike a motion for reargument or a motion for new trial, did not toll the time for appeal.
9. For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that Wilson's appeal from judgment of the Justice of the Peace to the Court of Common Pleas was untimely. As a result, the Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction and properly dismissed the appeal. The judgment of the Court of Common Pleas is AFFIRMED.