But in claims brought under the Eighth Amendment, "[i]t is the denial of treatment for [the prisoner's] serious medical need, and not the unfortunate physical consequences of that failure, that is the basis of the underlying alleged constitutional violation." Wilson v. Groze, 800 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing Heard, 253 F.3d at 318). Accordingly, in cases alleging the denial of medical treatment, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has stated that "[e]very day that [a defendant] prolonged [a prisoner's] agony by not treating his painful condition marked a fresh infliction of punishment that caused the statute of limitations to start running anew."
Such a violation accrues for "as long as a defendant knows about a prisoner's serious medical condition, has the power to provide treatment, and yet withholds treatment." Wilson v. Groze, 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-20); Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed. Appx. 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is a continuing violation that accrues when the defendant has notice of the untreated condition and ends only when treatment is provided or the inmate is released."); Smetzer v. Newton, No. 1:10-CV-93, 2012 WL 6681702 at *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2012). 2.
The Court recognized in its opinion denying Hardy's motion to dismiss on statute of limitations grounds that "[a] plaintiff's claim that defendants refused to treat his condition is deemed to have 'continued for as long as the defendants had the power to do something about his condition, which is to say until he left the jail.'" Ruiz v. Williams, 144 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1016 (N.D. Ill. 2015) (citing Heard, 253 F.3d at 318); Wilson v. Groze, 800 F. Supp. 2d 949, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2011)). However, in this case, Plaintiff was provided with medical treatment by Dr. Carter in December 2011. There is no evidence that Whitfield—a correctional officer, not a warden or other supervisory employee like Hardy—had any power to do anything about Plaintiff's medical condition beyond letting Plaintiff use his pass for the HCU when Plaintiff requested on September 22, 2011.
” (Doc. No. 15 at 2-3 (emphasis added)); “[d]eliberate indifference to a serious medical need is a continuing violation that accrues when the defendant has notice of the untreated condition and ends only when treatment is provided or the inmate is released.” (Id. at 3 (emphasis in original)) (quoting Wilson v. Groze, 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2011), and Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed.Appx. 3, 5-6 (7th Cir. 2007)). After the plaintiff's release from the Maury County Jail into state custody, when the Maury County defendants no longer had the power to provide treatment, any “continuing ill effects” from their conduct that lingered until state officials referred him to surgery on April 16, 2021 “do not make out a continuing violation” of his rights by those defendants.
See Wilson v. Groze, 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2011). The statute of limitations begins to run the day an injury accrues unless a plaintiff experiences a continuing violation.
(internal citations omitted); Wilson v. Groze, 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2011)(holding that “dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) on the basis of a limitations defense may be appropriate when plaintiff effectively pleads h[im]self out of court by alleging facts that are sufficient to establish the defense”).
Behavioral Institute of Indiana, LLC, v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 923, 929 (7th Cir. 2005). Generally, the statute of limitations runs from the date of the injury. Pitts v. City of Kankakee, Ill., 267 F.3d 592, 595 (7th Cir. 2001); Wilson v. Groze, 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 955 (ND Ill. 2011)(citing Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 318-20 (7th Cir. 2001); Smetzer v. Newton, 2012 WL 6681702 * 10 (ND Ind. Dec. 21, 2012). Mr. Mikel moved to amend his complaint to add claims against NP Perkins on May 1, 2017, and Mr. Mikel's claims against her are based on acts that took place in October of 2014 and January of 2015. Because Mr. Mikel's claims against NP Perkins are based on acts that took place in January of 2015 at the latest, he had until January 2017 to raise them. Because he did not move to amend his complaint to add NP Perkins as a defendant until May of 2017, his claims against her are barred by the statute of limitations.
Such a violation accrues for "as long as a defendant knows about a prisoner's serious medical condition, has the power to provide treatment, and yet withholds treatment." Wilson v. Groze, 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 955 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Heard, 253 F.3d at 318-20); Jervis v. Mitcheff, 258 Fed. Appx. 3 (7th Cir. 2007) ("Deliberate indifference to a serious medical need is a continuing violation that accrues when the defendant has notice of the untreated condition and ends only when treatment is provided or the inmate is released."); Smetzer v. Newton, No. 1:10-CV-93, 2012 WL 6681702 at *10 (N.D. Ind. Dec. 21, 2012). B. Claim against Megan Miller
E.g., Hasty v. Cty. of Montgomery, No. CIV.A. 12-4335, 2014 WL 830282, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 4, 2014) (denying motion to dismiss claims against medical staff where the plaintiff suffered three days with a priapism before he was ultimately examined and taken to the hospital, but left permanently impotent); Campbell v. Broward Sheriff's Office, No. 08-61916-CIV, 2011 WL 1134322, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 28, 2011) (denying motion to dismiss where plaintiff suffered with priapism for five days and was left permanently impotent); cf. Wilson v. Groze, 800 F. Supp. 2d 949, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2011) ("[T]he alleged denial of medical care for [plaintiff's] uncontrolled erection is far from trivial.").
. See also Wilson v. Groze , 800 F.Supp.2d 949, 955 (N.D.Ill.2011) (“As Heard suggests, an Eighth Amendment violation arising out of a defendant's deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs is a continuing violation, and thus can accrue for as long as a defendant knows about a prisoner's serious medical condition, has the power to provide treatment, and yet withholds treatment.”).