This peril can either arise internally, such as where the driver's own erratic operation of the vehicle places the passenger on notice of a potential risk of harm, or externally, such as where an oncoming vehicle or road hazard poses a danger to the vehicle in which the passenger is riding. (See Wilson v. Don LaCost, Inc. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 314 N.E.2d 27.) In this setting, the passenger, once on notice, is under a duty to warn the driver of the then-existing peril.

Contrary to defendant's assertion, the cases he cites do not stand for the proposition a codefendant's self-serving hearsay statement rises to the level of reliability necessary for its admission into evidence. See People v. Blan, 392 Ill.App.3d 453, 459, 913 N.E.2d 23, 28 (2009) (finding the defendant's self-serving testimony constituted" 'very slight'" evidence supporting the defendant's right to a lesser-included offense jury instruction); Wilson v. Don LaCost, Inc., 20 Ill.App.3d 624, 627, 314 N.E.2d 27, 30 (1974) (explaining it was for the jury to decide what version of the events to believe even when one side's evidence was self-serving but not inherently improbable on the facts presented). Additionally, McClendon's statement is significantly less reliable than the videotaped interview of the young girl in Kubsch.

"A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary, and not based on the evidence." ( Wilson v. Don LaCost, Inc. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 628, 314 N.E.2d 27, 30.) If there is sufficient evidence to support at least one of the theories upon which a complaint is based, then the verdict conforming with that theory will not be set aside. Moore v. Jewel Tea Co. (1970), 46 Ill.2d 288, 294, 263 N.E.2d 103, 106; Ill. Rev. Stat. 1979, ch. 110, par. 68(4).

Foresman relies on several cases from Illinois which indicate that a passenger has a duty to warn a driver of excessive speed. E.g., Schultz v. Stephan (1956), 8 Ill. App.2d 563, 132 N.E.2d 30 (abstract); Wilson v. LaCost (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 314 N.E.2d 27; Hayes v. Alsburg (1978), 72 Ill.2d 560, 382 N.E.2d 239. In Hayes, the supreme court ruled the issue of contributory negligence of a plaintiff-passenger who was asleep at the time of the collision was properly before the jury.

A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the opposite conclusion is clearly evident or where the findings of the jury are unreasonable, arbitrary and not based upon the evidence. ( Wilson v. Don LaCost, Inc. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 314 N.E.2d 27.) In determining the necessity of a new trial, neither the trial court nor the reviewing court "should sit as a second jury to consider the nuances of the evidence or the demeanor and credibility of the witnesses."

• 2, 3 There is no quarrel concerning whether the plaintiff was contributorily negligent. It may be assumed that she was not since she was merely a passenger, who by law is not imputed with the contributory negligence, if any, of her driver. ( Roth v. Nauman, 90 Ill. App.2d 44, 234 N.E.2d 346; Wilson v. Don LaCost, Inc., 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 314 N.E.2d 27; Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 72.03 (2d ed. 1971).) However, it is fundamental that she may not recover from defendant if her driver's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the collision.

The first jury also came in with a verdict in favor of all defendants. Courts are reluctant to disturb successive verdicts in favor of the same party. Wilson v. LaCost, Inc. (1974), 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 314 N.E.2d 27. II

A verdict is against the manifest weight of the evidence only when the opposite conclusion is clearly apparent or the findings appear to be unreasonable, arbitrary and not based on the evidence. ( Wilson v. Don LaCost, Inc., 20 Ill. App.3d 624, 314 N.E.2d 27 (4th Dist. 1974).) The jury alone must determine the weight of the evidence and credibility of the witnesses on controverted questions of fact. ( Brayfield v. Johnson, 62 Ill. App.2d 59, 210 N.E.2d 28 (5th Dist. 1965).