Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Mendocino County Super. Ct. No. SCUK CVG 99-81769
Reardon, J.
Appellant Sanctuary Investments, Inc. (Sanctuary) appeals from an order denying its motion to aside a void judgment. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
This case is all about easements. In 1999, respondents Derek and Elizabeth Wilson (Wilsons) filed an action against Coastal View Associates, LLC (CVA) to quiet title to certain easement claims of CVA. That action resulted in a stipulated judgment entered in 2000 (the 2000 judgment).
The 2000 judgment stated: “[¶ 1] [CVA] is the owner of two non-exclusive right-of-way easements across the Wilson Property: a 20 foot easement along the north line and a 40 foot easement along the east line. The easements are described in that deed from Palle H. Andersen to Virgil A. Winter and Cora A. Winter and recorded at Book 681 OR 139 [the Andersen deed] and are appurtenant to the CVA Property as described in Exhibit B [real property description of CVA holdings]. The parties acknowledge that they remain in dispute as to the specific location and extent of any deviation out of the 20 ft. easement along the north boundary of the Wilson property ‘where necessary to by-pass a gulch en route through the southwest quarter of the southeast quarter of Section 21, Township 16 North, Range 17 West, Mount Diablo Meridian’ as described in that deed from Andersen to Winter. This judgment is not intended and shall not be construed to restrict or limit the right of either party to try to determine the location of the easement where necessary to by-pass the described gulch. [¶ 2] Except as set forth above in Paragraph 1, neither [CVA], nor any other defendant has any right, title or interest in or easement on or across the Wilson Property either over that road known locally as the Cabin Road or by virtue of that deed from Foster Rowe and Nancy Rowe to Albion Lumber Company [ALC] which was recorded February 8, 1901 at 79 Deeds 613.”
The Andersen deed describes the reserved easements this way: “Reserving a non-exclusive right of way only, over a non-exclusive right of way 20 feet in width along the North boundary of the Northeast quarter of Section 28, Township 16 North, Range 17 West, Mount Diablo Meridian, except where necessary to by-pass a gulch enroute through the Southwest quarter of the Southeast quarter of Section 21, Township 16 North, Range 17 West, Mount Diablo Meridian, to the above described property. [¶] Also reserving a non-exclusive right of way of 40 feet for roadway purposes along the Eastern boundary of the above described property which begins at the Northeast corner of Section 28, Township 16 North, Range 17 West, Mount Diablo Base and Meridian, and extends 400 feet in a Southerly direction along the section line of Section 28, Township 16 North, Range 17 West, Mount Diablo Base and Meridian.”
Emphasis added to highlight the disputed language.
CVA conveyed a portion of its property to Sanctuary in March 2004. That October the Wilsons filed a quiet title action against Sanctuary (the 2004 action), alleging that Sanctuary claimed the right to use a right of way across their property that was not encompassed within the 2000 judgment. Sanctuary cross-complained, asserting a number of theories to support an easement over an existing road known locally as the “River Road.” Notably, Sanctuary claimed that the River Road was the 20-foot easement described in the Andersen deed. (See fn. 1, ante.) Sanctuary also asserted that the River Road was the right of way “constructed within” the Rowe deed.
The trial court ruled against Sanctuary on all theories and entered judgment in 2007 in favor of the Wilsons. Among other matters, the judgment reiterates that Sanctuary has no easement, right-of-way, title or interest in the Wilsons’ property except for the rights-of-way reserved in the Andersen deed.
Meanwhile, during the course of the litigation in the 2004 action, Sanctuary collaterally attacked the 2000 judgment with a motion to set it aside as void. The trial court denied that motion and this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION
Code of Civil Procedure section 473, subdivision (d) empowers the trial court, upon motion of an injured party, to set aside a void judgment. The rule in California with respect to a judgment affecting real property is clear: “ ‘ “[T]he rule is that the description in a judgment affecting real property should be certain and specific, and that an impossible, wrong, or uncertain description, or no description at all, renders the judgment erroneous and void.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Lechuza Villas West v. California Coastal Com. (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 218, 242.) With this authority Sanctuary contends it properly launched a collateral attack on the 2000 judgment because it was void on its face. Sanctuary’s proposed solution is to excise the void portion (highlighted above), leaving the remainder enforceable.
We are at a loss to understand Sanctuary’s theory of voidness. Indeed, every argument Sanctuary makes points in favor of the judgment’s validity.
First, Sanctuary maintains that the contested phrases are simply identifiers, “not intended to provide a land description at all.” Sanctuary posits that perhaps the contested phrases were intended to guide the reader to the correct paragraph describing the reserved easements in the Andersen deed. From this we surmise it is Sanctuary’s position that phrases in a judgment affecting real property cannot function as an identifier or pointer to language in a recorded instrument which in turn provides the pertinent real property description. This is an astonishing proposition for which there is no legal authority.
Next, Sanctuary contends that if the contested phrases are considered land descriptions, they are surplusage because they provide no additional information beyond the description of the easements set forth in the Andersen deed. Again, where is the legal authority for the proposition that one can collaterally attack a judgment as void simply because the judgment contains language that might be characterized as surplusage? How many judgments would be safe from collateral attack if this were the rule?
Additionally, Sanctuary claims the contested phrases are “uncertain on their face.” Sanctuary goes on to parse the word “along” as used in paragraph 1 and within the context of the Andersen deed. It concludes that the term directs the reader to examine the chain of title, which in turn would identify a preexisting right-of-way “along the North boundary” as specified in the Andersen deed. Finally, Sanctuary reveals the real purpose of this exercise in obfuscation, contending that the right-of-way provided by the Rowe to ALC conveyance—which is the River Road—is “along” the northern boundary, but “is not in contact with, or ‘hard against’ ” that boundary.
We fail to grasp Sanctuary’s point. If the disputed terms make the 2000 judgment fatally uncertain, then the Andersen deed is also fatally uncertain, but Sanctuary does not attack the deed. Whether a line “along” the “north line” (judgment) or “Northern boundary” (Andersen deed) means a line that is hard against, adjacent to, or something else, the 2000 judgment makes it abundantly clear—and not at all uncertain—that (1) the only easements conveyed to Sanctuary’s predecessor in interest are the easements described in the Andersen deed; and (2) except for the Andersen easements, Sanctuary’s predecessor has no interest in or easement across the Wilson property over the Cabin Road or by virtue of the Rowe deed. The official record location of the Andersen deed is accurately set forth in the judgment, as is the official record location of the Rowe deed.
Moreover, Sanctuary stretches beyond recognition the notion that the word “along” contributes to the purported terminal uncertainty of the 2000 judgment. The preposition “along” is defined similarly as “in a line parallel with the length or direction of” or “[o]n a line or course parallel and close to; continuously beside.” This preposition is a straightforward term of location such that a road which, according to maps in the record, at certain points veers substantially from the northern boundary of the Wilson parcel could not possibly fit the location of an easement running “along” that boundary. We take judicial notice that the ruling after the court trial in the 2004 action indicates that the River Road “at some locations on the Wilson property meanders hundreds of feet away from the north boundary line.” (Italics added.)
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary (2002) at page 60.
American Heritage Dictionary (4th ed. 2000) at page 50.
III. CONCLUSION AND DISPOSITION
The 2000 judgment is not fatally uncertain on its face and will not be stricken, in whole or part, as void. Accordingly, we affirm the order.
We concur: Ruvolo, P.J. Rivera, J.