Opinion
CV 24-02605 DDP (PVCx)
06-11-2024
FAITH WILSON, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF POMONA, Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT CITY OF POMONA'S MOTION TO DISMISS [DKT. 15]
DEAN D. PREGERSON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Presently before the court is Defendant City of Pomona (“The City”)'s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint. Having considered the submissions of the parties and heard oral argument, the court grants the motion and adopts the following Order.
I. Background
On March 30, 2022, Plaintiff Faith Wilson was at home with her two children, K.W. and E.O., when City of Pomona Police Officer Defendant A. Chavez (“Officer Chavez”) arrived at the house with Joel Raul Orozco (“Orozco”). Complaint ¶ 19. According to the Complaint, Orozco had sexually abused K.W. and was subject to a restraining order restraining him from approaching Plaintiff, K.W., E.O., and the house. Compl. ¶¶ 18-19. Plaintiffs watched Officer Chavez and Orozco through an outdoor surveillance camera and E.O. began to cry as Officer Chavez and Orozco approached through the front yard. Id. When Officer Chavez and Orozco knocked on the front door, Plaintiff informed Officer Chavez through the door about the restraining order and informed him that her children were inside the house. Id. ¶ 20. Plaintiff told Officer Chavez multiple times that Orozco was restrained from approaching her, the children, and the house. Id. Officer Chavez nevertheless “demanded” that Plaintiff exit the house. Id. ¶ 21. Plaintiff K.W. became upset and begged Plaintiff to stay inside. Id. Officer Chavez then told Orozco to get into his car. Id. Once Orozco was in the car, Plaintiff went outside. Id.
Although the Complaint appears to make reference to both a K.W. and a K.O., these appear to be the same minor child. Compl. ¶¶ 4, 19.
While outside, Officer Chavez began asking Plaintiff about her social media posts regarding Orozco “being a registered sex offender and his criminal convictions.” Compl. ¶ 22. Officer Chavez “accused Plaintiff of harassing and misusing information about Orozco.” Id. Officer Chavez also repeatedly told Plaintiff “that she was a liar and that he had snapshots of her criminal activity,” and accused her of being “malicious.” Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiff again informed Officer Chavez that Orozco was subject to a restraining order, which had issued because Orozco “was found guilty of molesting her two children.” Id. ¶ 23. Officer Chavez then “instructed Plaintiff Wilson to go to the front yard by the street, where Orozco was in sight.” Id. ¶ 25. While Plaintiff was standing near Orozco, Officer Chavez cited Plaintiff with a “Misdemeanor Notice to Appear (City of Pomona), Citation No. P485166, for violation of California Penal Code 290.46(i).” Id. ¶ 26-27.
Section 290.46(i) states, “Any person who is required to register pursuant to Section 290 who enters an internet website established pursuant to this section shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one thousand dollars ($1,000), imprisonment in a county jail for a period not to exceed six months, or by both that fine and imprisonment.” Cal. Penal Code § 290.46(i). Section 290.46(j) provides that “[a] person is authorized to use information disclosed pursuant to this section only to protect a person at risk.” Cal. Penal Code § 290.46(j)(1).
On May 16, 2022, the City of Pomona Police Department sent written notice to Plaintiff Wilson that the citation “was rejected,” and that “[t]his arrest was determined to be a detention only.” Compl. ¶ 29. The Police Department later sent another letter to Plaintiff informing her that the department's Internal Affairs Unit sustained an allegation against Officer Chavez for unsatisfactory performance. Id. ¶ 30.
Plaintiff, on her own behalf and as guardian ad litem of Plaintiff K.W., brought the instant suit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the City of Pomona, the Pomona Police Department, Officer Chavez, and several doe defendants. Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges Fourth Amendment claims for unlawful detention and excessive force, a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate fabrication of evidence, and municipal liability claims. Defendant City of Pomona now moves to dismiss all claims.
II. Legal Standard
A complaint will survive a motion to dismiss when it “contain[s] sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must “accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000). Although a complaint need not include “detailed factual allegations,” it must offer “more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 678. Conclusory allegations or allegations that are no more than a statement of a legal conclusion “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. In other words, a pleading that merely offers “labels and conclusions,” a “formulaic recitation of the elements,” or “naked assertions” will not be sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 678 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
“When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement of relief.” Iqbal,556 U.S. at 679. Plaintiffs must allege “plausible grounds to infer” that their claims rise “above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555-56. “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
III. Discussion
The City's motion to dismiss raises a number of different arguments, including the arguments that (1) Plaintiff K.W. lacks standing to bring any claim (Mot. at. 3); (2) Plaintiff Wilson's excessive force claim fails, as the Complaint does not allege that any force was used (Id. at 5); (3) Plaintiff's failure to allege a deprivation of liberty is fatal to her deliberate fabrication of evidence claim (Id. at 6); and (4) Plaintiffs' Monell claims fail (Id. at 7.) Plaintiffs' opposition does not address any of these arguments. “[F]ailure to respond in an opposition brief to an argument put forward in an opening brief constitutes waiver or abandonment in regard to the uncontested issue.” Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., 802 F.Supp.2d 1125, 1132 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citation omitted); See also Jenkins v. Cnty. of Riverside, 398 F.3d 1093, 1095 n.4 (9th Cir. 2005) (deeming claims abandoned where plaintiff's opposition did not discuss moving party's arguments). Accordingly, all of Plaintiff K.W.'s claims, as well as Plaintiff Wilson's Second, Third, Fourth, and Fifth Causes of action are dismissed for failure to oppose, with leave to amend.
The City also seeks to dismiss Plaintiff Wilson's First Cause of Action for Unlawful Detention. Specifically, the City contends that Plaintiff Wilson has failed to adequately allege an unlawful detention because Defendant Chavez had reasonable suspicion to believe that Plaintiff Wilson was making unlawful social media posts about Orozco's sex offender status. (Mot. at 5.)
“In order to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's strictures, an investigatory stop by the police may be made only if the officer in question has a reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that criminal activity may be afoot.” United States v. Montero-Camargo, 208 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989)). By the same token, “[i]t is well established,” and Plaintiffs do not dispute, “that law enforcement officers may detain an individual and conduct a brief investigative detention if there is reasonable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.” United States v. Cole, 948 F.Supp.2d 1251, 1254 (W.D. Wash. 2013) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). Instead, citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) and United States v. Nora, 765 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2014), Plaintiffs appear to suggest that something beyond reasonable suspicion was required here because “when Officer Chavez ordered Plaintiff Wilson out of her home, Plaintiff was arrested inside of her home.” (Opposition at 7.).
“The [Supreme] Court held in Payton that the Fourth Amendment forbids arresting a suspect inside his home unless the police first obtain an arrest warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement applies.” Nora, 765 F.3d at 1054. For purposes of the Payton rule, a person may be arrested inside the home even before she is taken into physical custody. In United States v. Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1985), for example, an arrest was effectuated when “the police had completely surrounded appellee's trailer with their weapons drawn and ordered him through a bullhorn to leave the trailer and drop to his knees.” Al-Azzawy, 784 F.2d at 893. Similarly, in Nora, "some 20 to 30 officers arrived and surrounded the house with weapons drawn,” and, aided by a hovering helicopter, “used a public address system to order the occupants of the house to come out.” Nora, 765 F.3d at 1052. And in Fisher v. City of San Jose, 558 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc), over sixty police officers surrounded a suspect's apartment before shutting off the power to apartment, using “bullhorns and other voice magnifying equipment," and ultimately driving an armored vehicle onto the suspect's patio. Fisher, 558 F.3d at 1072-73.
Here, however, the court need not determine whether Defendant Chavez's actions resulted in an in-home arrest because, quite simply, Plaintiffs have not alleged any such fact. Notwithstanding Plaintiffs' invocation of the Payton rule in their opposition to the instant motion, Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff Wilson was arrested, either inside or outside of her home, at any point. Rather, the Complaint alleges that Wilson was unlawfully detained. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-32). And, as stated above, Plaintiffs do not dispute either that reasonable suspicion is sufficient to justify an investigatory detention or that Defendant Chavez had reasonable suspicion to suspect Plaintiff Wilson of unlawful activity.
Accordingly, Plaintiff's First Cause of action is dismissed, with leave to amend.
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons stated above, the City's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. All claims are dismissed, with leave to amend. Any amended complaint shall be filed within twenty days of the date of this Order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.