Opinion
Case No. C-2-99-1300
December 18, 2000
OPINION AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons that follow, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss.
I. BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Marcus Wilson ("Plaintiff") brings the instant action under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 ("ADA") and various provisions of state law. The facts alleged in the Complaint are generally summarized below.
Plaintiff worked for Defendant Buckeye Steel Castings ("Defendant") for approximately six years as a welder. Compl. at ¶ 4. While employed by Defendant, plaintiff was a member of a union and his employment was coverned by a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at ¶ 10, 15.
Plaintiff contends that while employed by Defendant, he suffered damage to his hand as a result of an on-site injury. Id. at ¶ 5. According to Plaintiff, he underwent several surgeries in 1992 and 1993 to correct the injury. Id. at ¶ 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant would not approve one of the necessary surgeries for approximately one year. Id. at ¶ 7. After receiving the surgery, Plaintiff was able to return to work within one month. Id. Plaintiff contends that he was unable to work while awaiting approval of the surgery. Id. at ¶ 8.
Plaintiff also contends that in March of 1998, he suffered from kidney stones and was hospitalized on several occasions. Id. at ¶ 9. Ultimately, Plaintiff underwent a surgical procedure to remove one of the stones. Id. According to Plaintiff, he informed Defendant of his condition and that he would be hospitalized. Id. at ¶ 10-11. Plaintiff asserts that Defendant initiated disciplinary proceedings against him during his absence and terminated his employment. Id. at 13. Plaintiff then provided Defendant with appropriate medical documentation regarding his condition and Defendant agreed to rehire Plaintiff. Id. at ¶ 10-11. Thereafter, Defendant notified Plaintiff by letter that he would be terminated if he missed any more work within the next ninety days. Id. at ¶ 13-14. Three days after Plaintiff received the letter, Defendant terminated his employment despite the fact that Plaintiff had not been absent at any time after receiving the letter.Id. at 15.
Based upon the above allegations, Plaintiff filed the instant action on December 1, 1999. In his Complaint, Plaintiff sets forth six causes of action. In Count I, Plaintiff contends that Defendant violated the ADA because it terminated him on the basis of his disabilities. In Count II, Plaintiff asserts a cause of action for promissory estoppel. In Count III, Plaintiff alleges a cause of action for fraud. In Count IV, Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress. In Count V, Plaintiff attempts to state a claim for handicap discrimination in violation of Ohio law. Finally, in Count VI, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated Ohio's public policy based upon the Family Medical Leave Act.
On April 4, 2000, Defendant filed the instant motion to dismiss. That motion is currently before the Court for consideration.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In this case, Defendant seeks dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Where a defendant seeks dismissal for failure to state a claim, a court may not dismiss a plaintiff's complaint unless "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1971) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In determining whether the facts presented in a complaint support a claim upon which relief can be granted, a court "must accept as true all factual allegations in the complaint." Kerasotes, 854 F.2d at 136; see also Windsor v. The Tennessean, 719 F.2d 155, 158 (6th Cir. 1983) ; 5A Charles A. Wright Arthur Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 304 (2d ed. 1990).
Although the court must accept the plaintiff's factual allegations as true, the court "need not accept as true legal conclusions or unwarranted factual inferences." Morgan v. Church's Fried Chicken, 829 F.2d 10, 12 (6th Cir. 1987). The essence of the court's inquiry is to determine whether the allegations contained in the complaint satisfy the mandate of the Federal Rules that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). As such, extrinsic evidence may not be considered by the court. See Minatsis v. Brown, 713 F. Supp. 1056, 1059 (S.D. Ohio 1989).
III. ANALYSIS
In its motion to dismiss, Defendant first contends that Plaintiff cannot state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA or Ohio law because he is not disabled within the meaning of those statutes. Next, Defendant contends that plaintiff's remaining state law claims are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. The Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.
Plaintiff alleges that he was discriminated against on the basis of his disabilities under both the ADA (Count I) and Chapter 4112 of the Ohio Revised Code (Count V). In reviewing claims under Chapter 4112, Ohio uses the same standard that is used in reviewing claims under the ADA.See Little Forest Medical Ctr. of Akron v. Ohio Civ. Rights Comm'n, 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 609-10 (1991). Accordingly, the Court reviews Plaintiff's federal and state disability discrimination claims simultaneously and with reference to the ADA.
A. Plaintiff's Disability Discrimination Claims
The ADA prohibits discrimination by employers against qualified individuals with a disability. See Sutton v. United Airlines, 527 U.S. 471, 477. Specifically, the ADA provides that no employer "shall discriminate against a qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions, and privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a).
In order to state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA, a plaintiff must establish that: (1) he is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA; (2) he is otherwise qualified to perform the job requirements, with or without reasonable accommodation; and (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision with respect to the position in question. See Holiday v. City of Chattanooga, No. 98-5169, 2000 WL 263350, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 10, 2000); Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 882. In this case, Defendant asserts that Plaintiff cannot establish the first requirement — that he is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA.
An individual is "disabled" within the meaning of the ADA if he meets one of the three statutory definitions of disability. See Sutton, 471 U.S. at 478. In particular, the ADA defines "disability" as follows:
The term 'disability' means, with respect to an individual —
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
In this case, Plaintiff argues that he meets the definition of disability contained in both subsection (A) and (C). (Doc. # 8 at 3-4.) That is, Plaintiff first argues that his kidney condition and his hand injury substantially limited his ability to perform the major life activity of working. (Id. at 3.) In the alternative, Plaintiff contends that even if his kidney and hand conditions were not substantially limiting impairments, Defendant perceived them as such and therefore, he satisfies the "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability. (Id. at 4.) The Court will consider each of these definitions in turn.
The Court directs Plaintiff's attention to Local Rule 5.1 which sets forth the "general format of papers presented for filing" with the Court. Specifically, the Court directs Plaintiff's attention to Rule 5.1 (a) which provides, in pertinent part, that "[e]ach page shall be numbered consecutively . . . Because Plaintiff failed to follow this local rule, all references to page numbers within Plaintiff's memorandum in opposition to Defendant's motion to dismiss are based on the Court's own calculation."
1. Substantially limited
In order to state a claim under the frst definition of disability, a plaintiff must allege facts that will support a finding that he suffers from a physical or mental impairment that "substantially limits" one or more of his major life activities. See Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2000). The regulations designed to implement the ADA provide that a "physical or mental impairment" is "[a]ny physiological disorder, or condition" affecting one or more of various body systems. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (h)(1). The determination of whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity requires a consideration of (1) the nature and severity of the impairment; (2) the duration or expected duration of the impairment; and (3) the permanent or long term impact, or the expected permanent or long term impact of or resulting from the impairment. See Roush v. Weastec Inc., 96.F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2 (j)(2)). In this circuit, temporary impairments are not considered to be substantially limiting. See id. (citing Hamm v. Runyon, 51 F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 1995)).
In this case, Plaintiff claims that his kidney and hand conditions substantially limited his major life activity of working such that he had a disability under the ADA. This Court does not agree. Although Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from both a kidney and hand impairment, he does not allege that these impairments presently substantially limit any of his major life activities. In this respect, this case is similar to Roush v. Weastec, Inc., 96 F.3d 840 (6th Cir. 1996). In Roush, the plaintiff alleged that she had a congenital kidney condition that although presently corrected, could recur and cause substantial limitation in her major life activities. The Sixth Circuit held that the plaintiff could not state a claim for disability discrimination under the ADA because her kidney condition did not constitute a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Specifically, the Sixth Circuit noted as follows:
We do not doubt that the plaintiff suffered from a kidney condition and had a physical impairment. . . . However, there is no evidence that this impairment presently substantially limits a major life activity within the meaning of the ADA. Although plaintiff underwent a number of surgeries and medical procedures to correct her condition and her ability to work was substantially limited during that period, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that plaintiff presently has a disability. . . Further, the mere possibility that a kidney [condition] will recur or that further surgery will be needed is not sufficient to establish that her condition is substantially limiting.Id. at 844 (citing Katz v. City Metal Co., Inc., 87 F.3d 26, 32 (1st Cir. 1996)
Likewise, in the instant case, Plaintiff does not allege that his kidney and hand conditions were anything other than temporary in nature and completely corrected by surgery. To be sure, Plaintiff alleges that he underwent a number of surgeries and medical procedures to correct both conditions and his ability to work was substantially limited during that period. This allegation, however, even when viewed in a light most favorable to Plaintiff, does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that he presently has a disability. Furthermore, like the Sixth Circuit inRoush, this Court concludes that the mere possibility that future problems will recur or that further surgery will be needed is insufficient to establish that his conditions are substantially limiting. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to this definition of disability. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Defendant's motion with respect to this claim.
The Court recognizes, however, that Plaintiff's failure to allege that his conditions were not temporary in nature may be the result of inadequate pleading on the part of his attorney. Therefore, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint with respect to this claim. If Plaintiff so chooses, he must file the Amended Complaint within 30 days of the issuance of this Opinion and Order. Defendant will then have 30 days following the filing of the Amended Complaint to move or plead. If Plaintiff chooses not to amend his Complaint, the Court will dismiss this portion of Plaintiff's ADA claim with prejudice.
2. Regarded As
The "regarded as" prong of the definition of disability is "designed to protect against erroneous stereotypes some employers hold regarding certain physical or mental impairments that are not substantially limiting in fact." Kocsis, 97 F.3d at 884 (citing Schluter v. Industrial Coils, Inc., 928 F. Supp. 1437, 1448-49 (W.D. Wis. 1996)). Under this definition, an individual is "regarded as" having a disability if he has an impairment that does not substantially limit any of his major life activities but is perceived by his employer as causing such limitation.See 29 C.F.R. § 1630, App. B (1999). To be "regarded as" having a disability, the employer must not only perceive an impairment, "the employer must perceive that the impairment substantially limits a major life activity." Cook v. Rhode Island, 10 F.3d 17, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1993). That is, "[t]he use of the limiting adjectives 'substantial' and 'major' indicate that the perceived impairment must be significant." Pouncy v. Vulcan Materials Co., 920 F. Supp. 1566, 1579 (N.D. Ala. 1996)
Moreover, where, as here, the plaintiff alleges that the employer perceived him to be substantially limited in the major life activity of working, the plaintiff must show that the employer perceived that the impairment limited employment generally rather than just a particular job. See Pouncy, 920 F. Supp. at 1580 (N.D. Ala. 1996) (citing Byrne v. Board of Educ. School of West Allis, 979 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1992))
In this case, Plaintiff's Complaint is not exactly filled with specific allegations supporting his "regarded as" claim of disability discrimination. However, this Court must keep in mind that in order to satisfy the mandate of the Federal Rules, a plaintiff's complaint need only contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Moreover, a court may not dismiss a plaintiff's complaint unless "it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1971) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). Applying that standard to this case, the Court finds that Plaintiff states a claim for disability discrimination under the regarded as definition of disability. Plaintiff alleges that he suffered from two separate conditions that both required surgery, returned to work after the surgeries, and was terminated shortly thereafter. It is possible that a reasonable jury could conclude, based on these allegations, that Defendant terminated Plaintiff because it perceived him as suffering from a disability within the meaning of the ADA. Therefore, the Court DENIES Defendant's motion to dismiss in this regard.
B. Plaintiff's State Law Claims
Defendant argues that Plainiff's remaining state law claims should be dismissed because they are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LIMIRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 185. According to Defendant, these claims are preempted because proof of these claims would require the Court to interpret the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement that governed the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment. In order to determine the merits of Defendant's argument, the Court will examine the relevant law with respect to § 301 preemption.
1. The Relevant Law
As the Supreme Court noted in Alls-Chambers Corporation v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985), "Congressional power to legislate in the area of labor relations, of course, is long established." Id. at 208. As an extension of that power, Congress enacted § 301 of the LMRA to insure that collective bargaining agreements ("CBA's") are interpreted in a uniform and predictable manner.
Section 301 provides, in pertinent part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the parties. . . .29 U.S.C. § 185 (a). Under this provision, breach of contract actions arising under a CBA must be brought under § 301 and be resolved with reference to federal law. See Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 209-10 (finding that § 301 is "a congressional mandate to the federal courts to fashion a body of federal common law" that will apply uniformly to all disputes arising out of labor contracts).
In Allis-Chambers, the Supreme Court extended the preemptive reach of § 301 so that it applies to certain tort claims as well. In particular, the Supreme Court held that when resolution of a tort claim is substantially dependent upon an analysis of the terms of a CBA, that claim "must either be treated as a § 301 claim or dismissed as preempted by federal labor-contract law." Id. at 220 (internal citations omitted) Thus, a court can determine questions of state law involving labor-management relations only if such questions do not require the court to construe the provisions of a CBA. See Workman v. United Fixtures Co., 116 F. Supp.2d 885, 892-93 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (citing Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1988)).
In DeCoe v. General Motors Corp., 32 F.3d 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994), the Sixth Circuit developed a two-prong test for determining whether a plaintiff's state law claim is preempted by § 301. As set forth inDeCoe, a court must first determine "whether proof of the state law claim requires interpretation of collective bargaining terms." Id. Second, a court must ask "whether the right claimed by the plaintiff is created by the collective bargaining agreement or by state law." Id. Under this test, "if neither or only one [prong] is satisfied, [§] 301 preemption is warranted." Id.
With respect to the first prong of the DeCoe test, a court "is not bound by the 'well-pleaded complaint' rule" when determining whether the court will have to examine the provisions of the CBA. Id. Rather, the court must look "to the essence of the plaintiff's claim, in order to determine whether the plaintiff is attempting to disguise what is essentially a contract claim as a tort." Id. If the plaintiff can prove all of the necessary elements of his claim without the need to examine the CBA, then "his claim is independent of the labor agreement." Id. Moreover, a "tangential relationship" to the CBA "will not turn an otherwise independent claim into a claim dependant on the labor contract." Id.
2. Application to the instant matter
In this case, Defendant argues that the resolution of Plaintiff's state law claims will require the Court to interpret the provisions of the CBA, which govern the terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment. Specifically, Defendant contends that "Plaintiff's claims for promissory estoppel, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violation of public policy under the FMLA, all fail for the same essential reason — because the claims are premised upon the administration of work rules and policies governed by the [CBA]." (Doc. # 5 at 8.)
Plaintiff, on the other hand, contends that his claims are not preempted by § 301. According to Plaintiff, "[n]o interpretation of the [CBA] is necessary to recognize the fact that Plaintiff was wrongfully terminated." (Doc. # 8 at 7.) The Court will now examine Plaintiff's state law claims in order to determine whether § 301 preemption applies.
a. Promissory Estoppel and Fraud
In Counts II and III of the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts causes of action for promissory estoppel and fraud. According to Plaintiff, his promissory estoppel claim is based on a ninety-day letter that he received from Defendant. (Doc. # 8 at 7.) Plaintiff asserts that the letter informed him that he would be terminated if he was absent at any time within the next ninety days. (Id.) Plaintiff contends that he was terminated three days later despite the fact that he had not been absent during that period. (Id.)
With respect to his fraud claim, Plaintiff contends that Defendant fraudulently informed him that he "needed to provide medical documentation for his time off work, and that providing said documentation would negate any potential pending disciplinary action against [him]." Compl. at ¶ 26. Plaintiff contends that Defendant terminated him "[d]espite the fact that [he] provided the necessary medical documentation to cover his absence" and therefore, Defendant is liable for fraud. Id. at ¶¶ 27-29.
After considering the allegations supporting Plaintiff's claims for promissory estoppel and fraud, the Court finds that those claims are preempted by § 301. Plaintiff is essentially asking this Court to review the propriety and reasonableness of certain managerial decisions affecting his employment in order to determine whether he was wrongfully terminated. In order to make such a determination, the Court would need to analyze Defendant's disciplinary process and other terms and conditions of Plaintiff's employment, all of which are inextricably intertwined with the terms of the CBA. Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendant that "[t]he propriety and reasonableness of these managerial decisions cannot be determined without reference to an interpretation of the CBA." Doc. # 10 at 6. Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Counts II and III of the Complaint and finds that they are preempted by § 301 of the LMRA.
b. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress
In Count IV of the Complaint, Plaintiff contends that Defendant is liable for intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED"). According to Plaintiff, Defendant "failed to approve Plaintiff's [hand] surgery for approximately one (1) year" and "[d]uring that time, Plaintiff endured constant pain and suffering." Compl. at ¶ 31-32.
The Supreme Court of Ohio, in Yeager v. Local Union 20 Teamsters, 6 Ohio St.3d 369 (1983), set forth the elements of a successful claim for IIED. According to the Ohio Supreme Court, "[o]ne who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress. . . ." Id. at 374 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46(1) (1965)). Emotional distress is severe if "a reasonable person, normally constituted, would be unable to cope adequately with the mental distress engendered by the circumstances of the case." See Paugh Hanks, 6 Ohio St.3d 72, 78 (1983). Examples of serious emotional distress "include traumatically induced neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression, or phobia." Id. Liability for IIED has been found "only were the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Yeager, 6 Ohio St.3d at 374-75.
After considering the essence of Plaintiff's IIED claim, the Court finds that it is also preempted by § 301. Plaintiff bases his claim on the fact that Defendant decided to deny his hand surgery for approximately one year and that as a result, he suffered from severe emotional distress. In order to prevail on this claim, Plaintiff must show that the decision to deny his surgery was "so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community." Yeager 6 Ohio St.3d at 374-75. In order to make this determination, the Court would need to analyze the reasonableness of Defendant's decision in light of the terms of the CBA that govern the approval of medical procedures and pertain to Plaintiff's healthcare coverage generally. Therefore, because the Court would need to examine the CBA, the Court finds that Count IV is preempted by § 301 and hereby DISMISSES that count.
c. Ohio's Public Policy
In Count VI, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant violated Ohio's public policy based on the Family Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601. In its Notion to Dismiss, Defendant first contends that Plaintiff fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted with respect to this claim. In the alternative, Defendant contends that Count VI is preempted by § 301. For the reasons that follow, this Court agrees that Plaintiff fails to state a claim for a violation of Ohio's public policy based on the FMLA.
In Greeley v. Miami Valley Maintenance Contractors, Inc., 49 Ohio St.3d 228, ¶ 3 of the syllabus (1990), the Supreme Court of Ohio first recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy. This action is an exception to the common-law employment-at-will doctrine. See Greely, 49 Ohio St.3d at 234 ("The right of employers to terminate employment at will for 'any cause' no longer includes the discharge of an employee where the discharge is in violation of a statute and thereby contravenes public policy."). See also Painter v. Graley, 70 Ohio St.3d 377, 639 N.E.2d 51, 55 (Ohio 1994) ("We thus expressly acknowledge an exception to the traditional employment-at-will doctrine in Ohio common law."). Because this cause of action is an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine, "where a plaintiff is a member of a union, and therefore not an employee at will, he may not bring a cause of action" for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio's public policy. Mitchell v. Continental Plastic Containers, Inc., No. C-1-97-412, 1998 Lexis 21465, *16 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 1998) (citing Haynes v. Zoological Society of Cincinnati, 73 Ohio St.3d 254, 652 N.E.2d 948, 950-51 (Ohio 1995)).
In this case, Plaintiff was a member of a union while employed by Defendant and the terms and conditions of his employment were governed by a CBA. Therefore, Plaintiff is precluded from asserting an Ohio common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. See Mitchell, 1998 Lexis 21465, at *17 (dismissing union employee's public policy claim based on the FMLA because the plaintiff was not an at-will employee). Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES Count VI of the Compliant.
IV. CONCLUSION
Therefore, upon consideration and being duly advised, the Court DENIES IN PART and GRANTS IN PART Defendant's motion to dismiss.
IT IS SO ORDERED.