Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-3187-12T2
06-09-2014
DEBRA WILSON, Appellant, v. BOARD OF REVIEW, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR and BERGEN REGIONAL MEDICAL CENTER, Respondents.
Debra Wilson, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Donna Arons, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Respondent Bergen Regional Medical Center has not filed a brief.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Waugh & Nugent.
On appeal from the Board of Review, Department of Labor, Docket No. 393,714.
Debra Wilson, appellant pro se.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Board of Review, Department of Labor (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Donna Arons, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
Respondent Bergen Regional Medical Center has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM
Appellant Debra Wilson appeals from the final decision of the Board of Review, which affirmed the decision of an Appeal Tribunal finding her ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits because she left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work. We affirm.
Appellant, a certified nursing assistant, worked for Bergen Regional Medical Center in Paramus from February 22, 2011 through May 12, 2012. She applied for and was denied unemployment benefits. In a letter informing appellant that her claim had been denied, a deputy director explained why appellant was ineligible: "You left your job voluntarily to relocate and care for your sick daughter. Although this is a compelling reason for leaving work, it is personal."
Appellant appealed the deputy's determination. In sworn testimony before the Appeal Tribunal, appellant explained that she resigned from her job to care for her daughter, who had become seriously ill. Appellant acknowledged that the sole reason she left her job was to care for her daughter. Appellant was having no problems at work, no one had asked her to leave, and had she not resigned to care for her daughter, the job would have remained available to her.
Based on appellant's testimony, the Appeals Examiner determined that she was disqualified for benefits under N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a). That statute states in pertinent part:
An individual shall be disqualified for benefits:
(a) For the week in which the individual has left work voluntarily without good cause attributable to such work, and for each week thereafter until the individual becomes reemployed and works eight weeks in employment . . . and has earned in employment at least ten times the individual's weekly benefit rate, as determined in each case.
The Appeals Examiner found that "[w]hile [appellant] had a compelling reason for quitting her job, because she needed to provide care for her daughter who was ill; that reason was not related to the work."
Appellant timely appealed the Appeal Tribunal's decision to the Board of Review. The Board affirmed the Appeal Tribunal's decision, stating:
On the basis of the record below, we agree with the decision reached except that the claimant is disqualified for benefits until she becomes reemployed and works eight weeks employment and earns ten times her weekly benefit rate.
The Appeals Tribunal had disqualified appellant until she became employed, worked for four weeks, and earned at least six times her weekly benefit rate. Those figures were from a previous version of N.J.S.A. 43:21-5(a), which had been amended before appellant filed her claim.
Appellant appealed the Board's decision. In her brief, she states that she "had to turn in her [r]esignation due to health illness and calling out sick. Not only because of her own health, but the illness and sickness of her daughter." She argues that she left her job "in order to help [i]n taking care of her sick daughter, and the nature of her own health."
Our scope of review of the Board's final decision is limited. See In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011). We will not disturb an agency's ruling unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. Brady v. Bd. of Review, 152 N.J. 197, 210 (1997). When we "'review[] the factual findings made in an unemployment compensation proceeding, the test is not whether [we] would come to the same conclusion if the original determination was [ours] to make, but rather whether the factfinder could reasonably so conclude upon the proofs.'" Ibid. (quoting Charatan v. Bd. of Review, 200 N.J. Super. 74, 79 (App. Div. 1985)). We "must . . . give due regard to the opportunity of the one who heard the witnesses to judge their credibility." Logan v. Bd. of Review, 299 N.J. Super. 346, 348 (App. Div. 1997) (citation omitted). For those reasons, "[i]f the factual findings of an administrative agency are supported by sufficient credible evidence, [we] are obliged to accept them." Self v. Bd. of Review, 91 N.J. 453, 459 (1982) (citation omitted).
Having considered appellant's argument in light of the record and controlling law, we find that the decision of Board of Review is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record as a whole. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). Appellant's arguments require no further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We add only that we agree with the Board of Review and the Appeal Tribunal that appellant had compelling reasons to leave work, but the governing statute does not support an award of benefits for that reason.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION