Opinion
1:22-cv-875
10-30-2024
DWAYNE WILSON, #258602, Plaintiff, v. UNKNOWN ALLEN, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
PHILLIP J. GREEN, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. (ECF No. 44). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), the undersigned recommends that Defendants' motion be granted and this matter terminated.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff initiated this action against ten individuals employed at the Carson City Correctional Facility (DRF) where the events in question occurred. At this juncture, however, the only claim remaining is a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendant Jared Allen. (ECF No. 7-8). Regarding this claim, Plaintiff alleges that in retaliation for filing a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) complaint against another officer, Allen falsely charged him with a misconduct violation. Defendant Allen now moves for summary judgment. Plaintiff has responded to Defendant's motion. The Court finds that oral argument is unnecessary. See W.D. Mich. LCivR 7.2(d).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD
Summary judgment “shall” be granted “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). Whether a fact is “material” depends on “whether its resolution might affect the outcome of the case.” Harden v. Hillman, 993 F.3d 465, 474 (6th Cir. 2021).
A party moving for summary judgment can satisfy its burden by demonstrating that the non-moving party, “having had sufficient opportunity for discovery, has no evidence to support an essential element of his or her case.” Minadeo v. ICI Paints, 398 F.3d 751, 761 (6th Cir. 2005). Once the moving party makes this showing, the nonmoving party “must identify specific facts that can be established by admissible evidence, which demonstrate a genuine issue for trial.” Amini v. Oberlin College, 440 F.3d 350, 357 (6th Cir. 2006). The existence of a mere “scintilla of evidence” in support of the nonmoving party's position, however, is insufficient. Daniels v. Woodside, 396 F.3d 730, 734-35 (6th Cir. 2005).
While the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, that party “must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.” Amini, 440 F.3d at 357. The non-moving party “may not rest upon [his] mere allegations,” but must instead present “significant probative evidence” establishing that “there is a genuine issue for trial.” Pack v. Damon Corp., 434 F.3d 810, 813-14 (6th Cir. 2006). Likewise, the non-moving party cannot merely “recite the incantation, ‘credibility,' and have a trial on the hope that a jury may disbelieve factually uncontested proof.” Fogerty v. MGM Group Holdings Corp., Inc., 379 F.3d 348, 353-54 (6th Cir. 2004).
Accordingly, summary judgment is appropriate “against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Daniels, 396 F.3d at 735. Stated differently, the “ultimate question is whether the evidence presents a sufficient factual disagreement to require submission of the case to the jury, or whether the evidence is so one-sided that the moving parties should prevail as a matter of law.” Harden, 993 F.3d 465 at 474.
ANALYSIS
Defendant Allen charged Plaintiff with threatening behavior on August 6, 2021. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19). Plaintiff alleges that Allen charged him with a misconduct in retaliation for filing a Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) complaint against another officer. To prevail on his retaliation claim, Plaintiff must satisfy three elements: (1) he was engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) Defendant took adverse action against him which would deter a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in protected conduct; and (3) the adverse action was motivated by Plaintiff's protected conduct. See Holzemer v. City of Memphis, 621 F.3d 512, 520 (6th Cir. 2010). Before assessing whether Plaintiff can satisfy these elements, the Court must first determine whether the factual findings made by the Hearing Officer who adjudicated Plaintiff's threatening behavior charge are entitled to preclusive effect.
A. Preclusive Effect of Hearing Officer's Factual Findings
The Sixth Circuit has articulated four criteria which must be satisfied before a hearing officer's factual findings are afforded preclusive effect. The first three criteria are: (1) the hearing officer must have been acting in a judicial capacity; (2) the hearing officer must have resolved a disputed issue of fact properly before him or her; and (3) the prisoner had an adequate opportunity to litigate the factual dispute. Peterson v. Johnson, 714 F.3d 905, 912-13 (6th Cir. 2013). If these three criteria are satisfied, the hearing officer's factual findings are afforded “the same preclusive effect [they] would be given in state courts.” Id. at 913.
As the Sixth Circuit has clarified, “Peterson is not a blanket blessing on every factual finding in a major-misconduct hearing.” Roberson v. Torres, 770 F.3d 398, 404 (6th Cir. 2014). Rather, “the question of preclusion cannot be resolved categorically, as it turns on case-specific factual questions such as what issues were actually litigated and decided, and whether the party to be precluded had sufficient incentives to litigate those issues and a full and fair opportunity to do so - not just in theory, but in practice.” Id. at 404-05.
Defendant Allen charged Plaintiff with threatening behavior, a charge adjudicated by Hearing Officer ALJ Hawkins. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.19-21). ALJ Hawkins found that Plaintiff stated to Defendant Allen, “if you don't open this yard I am going to kill you” and “you better hope they don't open this up because I am going to fucking kill you...why don't you come down to my cell so I can beat your ass like a man.” (Id., PageID.19-20). The ALJ further found that Plaintiff, while being escorted out of the unit, stated, “Now I'm really going to kill you when I see you.” (Id., PageID.20).
MDOC Policy defines threatening behavior as “words, actions or other behavior which expresses an intent to injure or physically abuse another person.” MDOC Policy Directive 03.03.105, Att. A (eff. July 3, 2015). The ALJ concluded that Plaintiff's statements expressed “an intent to injure or physically abuse staff” which satisfied the definition of threatening behavior articulated in MDOC policy. (ECF No. 1-1, PageID.20). Accordingly, Plaintiff was found guilty of the misconduct charge. (Id.).
In response, Plaintiff asserts that the “evidence” attached to his complaint justifies denying Defendant's motion. The Court is not persuaded. The items attached to Plaintiff's complaint are as follows: (1) the Misconduct Hearing Report; (2) requests by Plaintiff to participate in a lie detector test; (3) grievances Plaintiff filed concerning various matters; (4) the results of an investigation into Plaintiff's PREA allegations; (5) an evaluation of Plaintiff's work performance; and (6) selected portions of Plaintiff's medical record. (ECF No. 1, PageID.16-46). None of this evidence is relevant to the question whether ALJ Hawkins' factual findings are entitled to preclusive effect.
In sum, the undersigned finds that the first three elements of the Peterson analysis, identified above, are satisfied. The Hearing Officer was acting in a judicial capacity. Plaintiff was afforded an adequate opportunity to argue whether he made the statements in question. Finally, the Hearing Officer resolved this factual dispute. Having satisfied the initial Peterson criteria, the question becomes whether the Hearing Officer's factual findings would be afforded preclusive effect in state court.
This analysis is similar and considers the following factors: (1) was the fact in question actually litigated and essential to the Hearing Officer's decision; (2) did the parties have a full and fair opportunity to litigate the matter; (3) is there mutuality of estoppel; (4) was the decision by the Hearing Officer adjudicatory in nature; (5) did Plaintiff have the right to appeal the Hearing Officer's decision; and (6) did the Michigan legislature intend for the Hearing Officer's decision to be final absent an appeal. See Peterson, 714 F.3d at 913-14. These requirements are all satisfied here. Ibid. Accordingly, the question whether Plaintiff made the statements quoted above has been resolved and the Hearing Officer's findings regarding such are entitled to preclusive effect.
B. Causal Connection
With respect to causation, courts recognize that retaliation is easy to allege and “is often very difficult to prove with direct evidence.” King v. Zamiara, 680 F.3d 686, 695 (6th Cir. 2012). Nonetheless, “bare allegations of malice” are insufficient to state a constitutional claim, as Plaintiff must instead establish “that his protected conduct was a motivating factor” behind the allegedly retaliatory action taken. Thaddeus-X, 175 F.3d at 399 (citations omitted). Conclusory allegations of retaliatory motive are insufficient, however. See Skinner v. Bolden, 89 Fed.Appx. 579, 579-80 (6th Cir., Mar. 12, 2004). Instead, Plaintiff must, at a minimum, allege a chronology of events from which retaliation can plausibly be inferred. See Desmone v. Adams, 1998 WL 702342 at *3 (6th Cir., Sep. 23, 1998); Muhammad v. Close, 379 F.3d 413, 417-18 (6th Cir. 2004).
On summary judgment, the causation element is analyzed under the burdenshifting framework articulated in Mount Healthy City School District Board of Education v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977). See Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 441-42 (6th Cir. 2007). Plaintiff must first present evidence that his protected conduct was a motivating factor in the defendant's action. Even if Plaintiff makes this showing, Defendant is entitled to summary judgment if he demonstrates that he “would have taken the same action even without the protected activity.” Eby, 481 F.3d at 441-42.
MDOC policy mandates that if a prison official “has knowledge” that a prisoner engaged in threatening behavior, the prisoner “shall” be charged with a misconduct violation. MDOC Policy Directive 03.03.105 ¶ D (eff. Apr. 9, 2012). The Hearing Officer specifically found that Plaintiff made the various threatening comments quoted above which expressed “an intent to injure or physically abuse staff.” Thus, Defendant was obligated to charge Plaintiff with a misconduct violation.
Defendant Allen has also submitted an affidavit in which he asserts that he charged Plaintiff with threatening behavior because Plaintiff was “yelling threats at him” which “is a violation of MDOC rules.” (ECF No. 45-6, PageID.356). Plaintiff has presented no evidence suggesting that he was charged with a misconduct violation for any other reason. Thus, Defendant has established that his actions were motivated by Plaintiff's improper behavior and MDOC Policy rather than any protected activity in which Plaintiff may have been engaged. Thus, Plaintiff cannot establish the requisite causation element of his claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons articulated herein, the undersigned recommends that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 44) be granted and this matter terminated. For the same reasons the undersigned makes this recommendation, the undersigned finds that an appeal of such would be frivolous. Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). Accordingly, the undersigned further recommends that an appeal of this matter by Plaintiff would not be in good faith.
OBJECTIONS to this Report and Recommendation must be filed with the Clerk of Court within fourteen days of the date of service of this notice. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). Failure to file objections within the specified time waives the right to appeal the District Court's order. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).