Specifically, if an occupier of a premises "has knowledge of the risk which the condition of the premises creates, his duty to [warn] an invitee or a licensee is the same." Wilsey v. Campbell, 255 Or. 420, 422, 467 P.2d 964 (1970). Consequently, in this instance, we need not resolve whether plaintiff was an invitee or a licensee at the time of the accident in order to resolve the issue of whether the trial court erred when it concluded that defendant did not breach a duty to warn plaintiff of the hazard posed by the plastic.

Some recent opinions on common-law liability for unsafe conditions on land have continued to refer to "duties" accompanying the status of a possessor, although the Restatement of Torts did not. See, e.g., Taylor v. Olsen, 282 Or. 343, 578 P.2d 779 (1978); Wilsey v. Campbell, 255 Or. 420, 467 P.2d 964 (1970); cf. Woolston v. Wells, 297 Or. 548, 553, 687 P.2d 144 (1984). Compare Restatement (Second) Torts §§ 328E-387 (1965).

When the possessor of land has knowledge of a risk unknown to the plaintiff which the condition of the land creates, he is under a duty to warn which runs equally to an invitee or licensee. Wilsey v. Campbell, 255 Or. 420, 467 P.2d 964 (1970). 2 Harper James, Law of Torts § 27.9, p. 1472 (1956); Prosser on Torts § 60, p. 391 (3d ed 1964).