To extend the time to answer a complaint and to compel the plaintiff to accept late service of an answer pursuant to CPLR 3012(d), a defendant must provide a reasonable excuse for the default and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action (seeSadowski v. Windsor Vil. Apts. Co., LLC, 200 A.D.3d 816, 817, 155 N.Y.S.3d 120 ; Hoffman v. 461 Arlington Props., LLC, 195 A.D.3d 1000, 1001, 146 N.Y.S.3d 790 ; Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947, 949, 140 N.Y.S.3d 712 ). The determination of what constitutes a reasonable excuse for a default lies within the sound discretion of the trial court (seeWilmington Trust, N.A. v. Pape, 192 A.D.3d at 949, 140 N.Y.S.3d 712 ; Cumanet, LLC v. Murad, 188 A.D.3d 1149, 1153, 137 N.Y.S.3d 412 ; Nationstar Mtge., LLC v. Farrell, 172 A.D.3d 1077, 1077, 98 N.Y.S.3d 479 ).
"To defeat a facially sufficient CPLR 3215 motion, a defendant must show either that there was no default, or that it had a reasonable excuse for its delay and a potentially meritorious defense" (National Loan Invs., L.P. v Bruno, 191 A.D.3d 999, 1001; see Browne v Lyft, Inc., 219 A.D.3d 443, 444). Similarly, "[a] defendant who has failed to timely answer a complaint and who seeks leave to file a late answer must provide a reasonable excuse for the delay and demonstrate a potentially meritorious defense to the action" (Wilmington Trust, N.A. v Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947, 949 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Baldwin Rte. 6, LLC v Bernad Creations, Ltd., 158 A.D.3d 659, 660).
Defendant further articulated how plaintiff failed to voluntarily discontinue that action or otherwise "revoke [its] election to accelerate... by an affirmative act... within six years of the election to accelerate," and argued that this action, commenced over nine years after the commencement of the first action, was therefore untimely (Freedom Mtge. Corp. v Engel, 37 N.Y.3d at 28-29 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Defendant accordingly set forth a facially viable statute of limitations defense and, in view "of the strong public policy that actions be resolved on their merits,... defendant's lack of willfulness, and the absence of prejudice to... plaintiff resulting from the" delay, Supreme Court did not abuse its discretion in granting that part of the cross-motion seeking leave to serve a late answer (Wilmington Trust, N.A. v Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947, 949 [2d Dept 2021]; see Pennymac Corp. v Shelby, 190 A.D.3d 759, 761 [2d Dept 2021]).
ant's omission of any reference to the 2007 stipulation had no relation to the plaintiff's ability to oppose the defendant's motion, it did not constitute extrinsic fraud (seeWells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Plaut, 206 A.D.3d 953, 955, 171 N.Y.S.3d 143 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Walker, 201 A.D.3d 795, 797, 162 N.Y.S.3d 82 ). Instead, the defendant's omission constituted intrinsic fraud, or presenting false statements or information to a court, which required the plaintiff to establish a reasonable excuse for its default and a potentially meritorious opposition to the defendant's motion (seeWells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Plaut, 206 A.D.3d at 954, 171 N.Y.S.3d 143 ; HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. Walker, 201 A.D.3d at 797, 162 N.Y.S.3d 82 ). Contrary to the defendant's assertions, the plaintiff established a reasonable excuse for failing to oppose the defendant's motion based on a calendaring error made by the plaintiff's counsel (seeMuhammed v. Federal Express Corp., 199 A.D.3d 695, 696, 153 N.Y.S.3d 908 ; Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947, 949, 140 N.Y.S.3d 712 ; Jackson v. Kothuru, 183 A.D.3d 707, 708–709, 121 N.Y.S.3d 893 ). The plaintiff also demonstrated a meritorious opposition to the defendant's motion by showing that the 2007 stipulation would have changed the outcome of the motion.
Here, in light of the relatively short delay between when the defendant's time to answer expired and when the defendant moved for leave to file and serve a late answer, the absence of prejudice to the plaintiffs, the defendant's lack of willfulness, the existence of a potentially meritorious defense to the action, and the strong public policy that actions be resolved on the merits, the Supreme Court should have granted the defendant's motion, in effect, pursuant to CPLR 3012(d) for leave to file and serve a late answer (see Wilmington Trust, N.A. v Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947, 949; P & H Painting, Inc. v Flintlock Constr. Servs., LLC, 179 A.D.3d 1086, 1087; Arias v First Presbyt. Church in Jamaica, 97 A.D.3d 712, 712). BRATHWAITE NELSON, J.P., CHAMBERS, WOOTEN and ZAYAS, JJ., concur.
Here, Defendant MMM established a reasonable excuse, unintentional oversight resulting from law office failure, that the default was not willful and that delay in answering was relatively minor (see Wilmington Trust, N.A. v. Pape, 192 A.D.3d 947 [2d Dept 2021]). Further, MMM demonstrated that vacating its default would not surprise or prejudice Plaintiff.