LF is right that Arlington made no further draw requests, but the point is irrelevant. An anticipatory repudiation "continues in effect until affirmatively retracted by the repudiator." Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill. App. 3d 248, 260, 594 N.E.2d 1177, 1187 (1st Dist. 1992); see also Builder's Concrete Co. of Morton v. Fred Faubel Sons, Inc., 58 Ill. App. 3d 100, 105, 373 N.E.2d 863, 868 (3rd Dist. 1978). Once LF declared unequivocally that it would not lend another nickel, Arlington did not have to try to cajole LF into performing. In re C S Grain Co., 47 F.3d 233, 237 (7th Cir. 1995) (stating that "the non-repudiating party need not make efforts to keep the contract in force").
On appeal, the resolution of the parties' primary disputes turn on whether the trial court's findings and judgment are against the manifest weight of the evidence. E.g., Midwest Environmental Consulting Remediation Services, Inc. v. Peoples Bank, 251 Ill. App.3d 256, 266-67 (1993); Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill. App.3d 248, 256 (1992). "For a judgment to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly evident."
Our resolution of the parties' dispute in the present case turns on whether the manifest weight of the evidence supports the trial court's decision. (See Wilmette Partners v. Hamel (1992), 230 Ill. App.3d 248, 256, 594 N.E.2d 1177.) For the trial court's judgment to be against the manifest weight of the evidence, an opposite conclusion must be clearly evident. (See Hamel, 230 Ill. App.3d at 256.)
"Where a contract does not specify the time for performance, the law implies a reasonable time." Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 594 N.E.2d 1177, 1184 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992). But reasonableness is ultimately a question of fact based on "all the conditions and circumstances that might surround the case." Id.
In Illinois, "[w]here a contract does not specify a time for performance, a reasonable time will be implied" (In re Marriage of Tabassum Younis, 377 Ill.App.3d 761, 773, 881 N.E.2d 396, 408 (2d Dist. 2007)). That concept of a "reasonable time" for performance connotes a time period that "is necessary to do conveniently what the contract requires" (Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill.App.3d 248, 257, 594 N.E.2d 1177, 1184 (1st Dist. 1992)). That determination "depends upon the subject matter of the contract, the circumstances attending performance of the contract, and the situation of the parties to the contract" (Int'l Union, United Auto Workers v. Randall Div. of Textron, Inc., 5 F.3d 224, 230 (7th Cir. 1993) (applying Indiana law)).
"A reasonable time [is] such time as is necessary to do conveniently what the contract requires." Wilmette Parterns v. Hamel, 594 N.E.2d 1177, 1184 (Ill.App.Ct. 1992) (citing Yale Dev. Co. v. Aurora Pizza Hut, Inc., 420 N.E.2d 823 (Ill.App.Ct. 1981)). "What constitutes a reasonable time is determined by all of the conditions and circumstances surrounding the contract and the performance thereof."
In Illinois, "anticipatory repudiation is actionable as a breach of contract when — and only when — the repudiating party unequivocally and without justification renounces its duty to perform the contract on its date of performance." Draper v. Frontier Ins. Co., 265 Ill. App.3d 739, 745, 203 Ill.Dec. 50, 638 N.E.2d 1176 (2d Dist. 1994) ( citing Marriage of Olsen, 124 Ill.2d at 24, 123 Ill.Dec. 980, 528 N.E.2d 684; Lake Shore Michigan Southern Ry. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill. 59, 89-90, 38 N.E. 773 (1894); Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill. App.3d 248, 260, 171 Ill.Dec. 657, 594 N.E.2d 1177 (1st Dist. 1992)). "There is no anticipatory repudiation if a party does no more than make doubtful or indefinite statements that it will not perform." Id.
Once a party anticipatorily repudiates a contract, the non-breaching party may respond in a number of ways. "The promisee may, among others, elect to treat the repudiation as a breach putting an end to the contract for all purposes of performance." Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill. App.3d 248, 260, 171 Ill.Dec. 657, 594 N.E.2d 1177 (1st Dist.), appeal denied, 146 Ill.2d 654, 176 Ill.Dec. 824, 602 N.E.2d 478 (1992) (citing Builders Concrete Co. v. Faubel Sons, Inc., 58 Ill. App.3d 100, 104, 15 Ill.Dec. 517, 373 N.E.2d 863 (3rd Dist. 1978)). "A promisee may pursue such an election by either promptly filing suit or by detrimentally changing his position in reliance on the repudiation." Id. (citing Builder's Concrete, 58 Ill. App.3d at 104, 15 Ill.Dec. 517, 373 N.E.2d 863).
Upon repudiation, the promisee may *** elect to treat the repudiation as a breach putting an end to the contract for all purposes of performance." Wilmette Partners v. Hamel, 230 Ill.App.3d 248, 260 (1992). If the party who repudiated the contract subsequently sues the non-repudiating party for failing to perform, the first party's repudiation is a defense.
Over a century ago, in Mamerow v. National Lead Co. , 206 Ill. 626, 634, 69 N.E. 504 (1903), our supreme court held "where the guaranty is a continuing one, and is unlimited as to duration and amount for which the guarantor will be liable, such time and amount must be reasonable, under the circumstances of the particular case." See also Wilmette Partners v. Hamel , 230 Ill. App. 3d 248, 257, 171 Ill.Dec. 657, 594 N.E.2d 1177 (1992) (stating what is "a reasonable time is a matter of proof under all the * * * circumstances" and is "a question of fact").