We affirm the Worker's Compensation Appellate Commission (WCAC) decision that only the modifications to a van constitute appliances within the meaning of subsection 315(1) of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act (WDCA), MCL 418.315(1). Furthermore, we overrule Wilmers v. Gateway TransportationCo. (On Remand), 227 Mich. App. 339; 575 N.W.2d 796 (1998). II
Tyler v Livonia Public Schools, 459 Mich. 382, 390-391; 590 N.W.2d 560 (1999). See also Wilmers v Gateway Transportation Co (On Remand), 227 Mich. App. 339, 352; 575 N.W.2d 796 (1998) (Young, P.J., dissenting). Accordingly, the term "authority" must be viewed in light of the other terms employed in the OMA definition of "public body," which provide guidance regarding what "authority" means in this context.
In Manpower Temporary Services v. Sioson, 529 N.W.2d 259, 264 (Iowa 1995), the court found the van to be an "appliance, not greatly different from crutches or a wheelchair," and found that a van "is necessary in order to make [the] wheelchair fully useful." The court in Wilmers v. Gateway, 575 N.W.2d 796 (Mich. App. 1998), found that under the particular set of facts before them, the "entire specially equipped van and not just its special modifications, may be considered a reasonably necessary `appliance.'" The Wilmers Court found that the clear purpose of their Workers' Compensation Act, which is similarly worded to Missouri's statute, is "to provide the injured employee with such services and products as are reasonably necessary to cure or relieve the effects of injury," and the evidence indicated that one of the effects of plaintiff's injury was a loss of mobility.
Leave to Appeal Denied June 2, 1998: reported below: ( On Remand) 227 Mich. App. 339. BOYLE, WEAVER, and TAYLOR, JJ.
For example, the Arizona statute at issue in Grantham, Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 23-1062(A), provided that "every injured employee shall receive medical, surgical and hospital benefits or other treatment, nursing, medicine, surgical supplies, crutches and other apparatus, including artificial members, reasonably required at the time of the injury, and during the period of disability." Similarly, in Wilmers v. Gateway Transp. Co., 575 N.W.2d 796 (Mich.Ct.App. 1998), the relevant statute, Mich. Comp. Laws § 418.315(1), provided that "[t]he employer shall also supply to the injured employee dental service, crutches, artificial limbs, eyes, teeth, eyeglasses, hearing apparatus, and other appliances necessary to cure, so far as reasonably possible, and relieve from the effects of the injury."Brawn v. Gloria's Country Inn, 698 A.2d 1067 (Me. 1997) involved a statute, Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 39-A, § 206(8), that extended benefits to "other physical aids made necessary by the injury." {6} In our view, our Legislature's reference to teeth and eyes suggests that the Legislature intended "artificial member" to refer to prosthetic devices that are attached to, or used in immediate proximity to, the injured worker's body.