Opinion
23-cv-10891
03-01-2024
ANDREW WILLSON, Plaintiff, v. VICTORIA JANOWIECKI, Defendant.
Honorable Shalina D. Kumar, Judge.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION TO SUA SPONTE DISMISS THE CASE
ELIZABETH A. STAFFORD, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. Introduction
Plaintiff Andrew Willson, a pro se prisoner of the Michigan Department of Corrections, sues Defendant Victoria Janowiecki under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that she was deliberately indifferent to his medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. ECF No. 1. The Honorable Shalina D. Kumar referred the case to the undersigned for all pretrial matters under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). ECF No. 6. The Court RECOMMENDS that the action be sua sponte DISMISSED.
Willson agreed to dismiss his claims against all other defendants. ECF No. 49.
II. Background
Willson alleges that he has bilateral clubbed feet, which makes him susceptible to ingrown toenails. ECF No. 1, PageID.3. In July 2020, Willson began receiving care for a recurrent infection from ingrown toenails. Id., PageID.3-4. Janowiecki, a nurse practitioner, allegedly spoke with Willson in September 2020 and ordered antibiotics, foot soaks, and Motrin. Id., PageID.5. Although Willson was allegedly supposed to follow up with Janowiecki in three weeks, that appointment did not take place. Id. Willson saw Janowiecki again in October 2020, and she told him that his toenail would be removed. Id., PageID.6. The nail was only partially removed, which Janowiecki said was intentional. Id. Willson received care from other healthcare providers for recurrent infections over the next eight months. Id., PageID.6-9.
In June 2021, Willson saw Janowiecki about his foot, and she allegedly said that she would give him Tylenol, order blood work, and refer him to a podiatrist. Id., PageID.9. But no referral was made. Id., PageID.10. Willson says that his foot pain “was so debilitating that it prevented [him] from doing his daily routine,” and caused his preexisting depression to worsen. Id., PageID.10. Yet Willson alleges that he continued to receive treatment from other providers, though he claims that care was inadequate. Id., PageID.11-12.
III. Analysis
A.
Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), courts are required sua sponte to dismiss complaints that are frivolous, fail to state a claim, or seek monetary relief from an immune defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b). “[A] complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). The Iqbal Court explained, “[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. The complaint's allegations “must do more than create speculation or suspicion of a legally cognizable cause of action; they must show entitlement to relief.” League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Bredesen, 500 F.3d 523, 527 (6th Cir. 2007).
In deciding whether a plaintiff has set forth a “plausible” claim, the Court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations. Id. But “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and the Court has no duty to create a claim not spelled out in the pleadings, Freightliner of Knoxville, Inc. v. DaimlerChrysler Vans, LLC, 484 F.3d 865, 871 n.4 (6th Cir. 2007). Pleadings filed by pro se litigants are entitled to a more liberal reading than would be afforded to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, but such complaints still must plead a plausible claim for relief. Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 437-38 (6th Cir. 2012); Thomas v. Eby, 481 F.3d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 2007).
B.
The Eighth Amendment protects against the infliction of “cruel and unusual punishments.” U.S. Const. amend. VIII; Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 101 (1976). Because the government must provide medical care for those it has incarcerated, “[d]eliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,” and thus violates the Eighth Amendment. Estelle, 429 U.S. at 10304. But a plaintiff must show more than a mere failure to provide adequate medical care to prove a constitutional violation. Rhinehart v. Scutt, 894 F.3d 721, 737 (6th Cir. 2018). “A constitutional violation arises only when a prison official exhibits deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious illness or injury that can be characterized as obduracy and wantonness rather than inadvertence or” good-faith error. Id. (cleaned up).
To prevail on a deliberate indifference claim, an inmate must satisfy both an objective and subjective component. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994). For the objective component, Willson must allege facts showing that Janowiecki's acts or omissions deprived him of “the minimal civilized measure of life's necessities” and posed “a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. The subjective component requires that the prison official acted with deliberate indifference, meaning that the official knew of but disregarded “an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Mingus v. Butler, 591 F.3d 474, 480 (6th Cir. 2010).
To satisfy the objective component, an inmate who received treatment but claims that it was inadequate must allege that his care was “so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness.” Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 737 (cleaned up). That is because when “the dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort law.” Westlake v. Lucas, 537 F.2d 857, 860 n.5 (6th Cir. 1976) (cleaned up). Mere negligence or malpractice is not enough, as “[o]rdinary individuals outside a prison's walls and inmates within those walls both face a risk that their doctors will perform incompetently.” Phillips v. Tangilag, 14 F.4th 524, 535 (6th Cir. 2021).
Willson does not allege facts showing that Janowiecki's care was grossly inadequate or shocking to the conscience. She allegedly gave Willson antibiotics and Motrin in September 2020. ECF No. 1, PageID.5. Although the follow-up appointment with Janowiecki allegedly did not take place, Willson was seen by other nursing staff. Id. And Willson does not claim that Janowiecki cancelled the appointment or refused to see him. Thus, Willson has not alleged that Janowiecki was personally involved in determining his follow up care. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (holding that to succeed on a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege “that each Governmentofficial defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution”).
Next, Willson alleges that Janowiecki saw him again in October 2020 and partially removed his toenail. ECF No. 1, PageID.6. Willson was unhappy that the nail was not completely removed, but disagreement with the course of treatment is not cognizable under the Eighth Amendment. Jennings v. Al-Dabagh, 275 F.Supp.2d 863, 870 (E.D. Mich. 2003).
Last, Janowiecki allegedly failed to follow through with referring Willson to a podiatrist in June 2021. ECF No. 1, PageID.9-10. But Willson also alleges that Janowiecki gave him Tylenol and ordered blood work and that he received care from other providers in the following months. Id., PageID.9-12. And Willson has not alleged that Janowiecki's alleged failure to refer him was anything more than an oversight. Such “an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute an unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain or to be repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” See Reilly v. Vadlamudi, 680 F.3d 617, 624 (6th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up).
Nor do Willson's pleadings satisfy the subjective element. Again, a provider's “errors in medical judgment or other negligent behavior do not suffice to establish deliberate indifference. Rhinehart, 894 F.3d at 738. Willson does not allege that Janowiecki's alleged acts were anything more than negligent oversights or that she subjectively inferred that her actions could cause serious harm.
C.
Willson also asserts a state-law claim of negligence against Janowiecki. ECF No. 1, PageID.13. Because Willson's constitutional claim fails, the case does not retain a federal character. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), the court should decline to extend supplemental jurisdiction over Willson's state-law claim and dismiss it without prejudice. See Brown v. Cuyahoga Cnty., Ohio, 517 Fed.Appx. 431, 436 (6th Cir. 2013) (“[Twentyeight] U.S.C. § 1367 allows a district judge to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims if the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction.” (cleaned up)).
IV. Conclusion
The Court RECOMMENDS that this action be sua sponte DISMISSED.
NOTICE TO THE PARTIES ABOUT OBJECTIONS
Within 14 days of being served with this report and recommendation, any party may serve and file specific written objections to this Court's findings and recommendations. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2). If a party fails to timely file specific objections, any further appeal is waived. Howard v. Secretary of HHS, 932 F.2d 505 (6th Cir. 1991). And only the specific objections to this report and recommendation are preserved for appeal; all other objections are waived. Willis v. Secretary of HHS, 931 F.2d 390, 401 (6th Cir. 1991).
Each objection must be labeled as “Objection #1,” “Objection #2,” etc., and must specify precisely the provision of this report and recommendation to which it pertains. Within 14 days after service of objections, any non-objecting party must file a response to the objections, specifically addressing each issue raised in the objections in the same order and labeled as “Response to Objection #1,” “Response to Objection #2,” etc. The response must be concise and proportionate in length and complexity to the objections, but there is otherwise no page limitation. If the Court determines that any objections lack merit, it may rule without awaiting the response.