Opinion
Case No. 1:07-cv-1004.
January 11, 2008
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This is a civil rights action brought by a state prisoner pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court has granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis, and Plaintiff has paid the initial partial filing fee. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act, PUB. L. No. 104-134, 110 STAT. 1321 (1996), the Court is required to dismiss any prisoner action brought under federal law if the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The Court must read Plaintiff's pro se complaint indulgently, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), and accept Plaintiff's allegations as true, unless they are clearly irrational or wholly incredible. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992). Applying these standards, I recommend that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Discussion
I. Factual allegationsPlaintiff Eric D. Wills is currently incarcerated at Bellamy Creek Correctional Facility. In his pro se complaint, he sues the Michigan State Treasurer. According to his complaint, Plaintiff has been assessed a tax deficiency of $91,920.00. (Compl. at 4.) Plaintiff was sued by the Michigan Attorney General, representing the Michigan State Treasurer, under the State Correction Facility Reimbursement Act to recover $1,500.00 that Plaintiff has accumulated in his account from his prison work assignment. (Id.) The Michigan State Treasurer was awarded the full $1,500.00 by Wayne County Circuit Judge John Gillis. (Id. (citing State Treasurer v. Eric Wills, No. 05-527296).) Plaintiff now seeks reimbursement of the $1,500.00 because is "was not the result of a `windfall' or `inheiritance [sic]'" (Id.)
II. Failure to state a claim
Giving the most liberal construction to Plaintiff's complaint, see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), he appears to raise a claim under the Due Process Clause. Such a claim must be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Therefore, the Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as brought pursuant to § 1983.
A complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations of the complaint. Jones v. City of Carlisle, 3 F.3d 945, 947 (6th Cir. 1993). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the federal Constitution or laws and must show that the deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Street v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 102 F.3d 810, 814 (6th Cir. 1996). Because § 1983 is a method for vindicating federal rights, not a source of substantive rights itself, the first step in an action under § 1983 is to identify the specific constitutional right allegedly infringed. Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994).
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and Plaintiff has the burden of proving the Court's jurisdiction. United States v. Horizon Healthcare, 160 F.3d 326, 329 (6th Cir. 1998). Even where subject matter jurisdiction is not raised by the parties, the Court must consider the issue sua sponte. See City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511 (1973); Norris v. Schotten, 146 F.3d 314, 324 (6th Cir. 1998); Mickler v. Nimishillen Tuscarawas Ry. Co., 13 F.3d 184, 189 (6th Cir. 1993).
This Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's claims. A federal district court has no authority to review final judgments of state court judicial proceedings. District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 (1983); Gottfried v. Med. Planning Servs., Inc., 142 F.3d 326, 330 (6th Cir. 1998). Even constitutional claims which are inextricably intertwined with the state court decisions are not reviewable. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483 n. 16; Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923); Patmon v. Michigan Supreme Court, 224 F.3d 504, 509-10 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Owens, 54 F.3d 271, 274 (6th Cir. 1995). A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state-court judgment "`if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the issues before it. Where federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong, it is difficult to conceive the federal proceeding as, in substance, anything other than a prohibited appeal of the state-court judgment.'" Peterson Novelties, Inc. v. City of Berkley, 305 F.3d 386, 391 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting Catz v. Chalker, 142 F.3d 279, 293 (6th Cir. 1998)) (other internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994) (under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, "a party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights."); Tropf v. Fid. Nat'l Title Ins. Co., 289 F.3d 929, 937 (6th Cir. 2002); Anderson v. Charter Township of Ypsilanti, 266 F.3d 487, 492-93 (6th Cir. 2001); Patmon, 224 F.3d at 506-07. A defendant who loses in state court and then sues in federal court is asserting injury at the hands of the state court and his federal suit is making an impermissible attempt to obtain federal collateral review. Garry v. Gels, 82 F.3d 1362, 1367-68 (7th Cir. 1996); Stewart v. Fleet Financial Group, No. 96-2146, 129 F.3d 1265, 1997 WL 705219, *1 (6th Cir. Nov. 4, 1997).
Plaintiff's claims are "inextricably intertwined" with decisions of the state courts because they amount to nothing more nor less than a "prohibited appeal" from the decisions of the Michigan state courts. Peterson Novelties, 305 F.3d at 390. The recourse available to plaintiff in response to adverse state-court decisions was to pursue timely appeals in the Michigan Court of Appeals, thereafter seek leave to appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court, and if necessary apply for a writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court. Gottfried, 142 F.3d at 330 ("[L]ower federal courts do not have jurisdiction to review a case litigated and decided in state court; only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction to correct state court judgments.").
Because the Rooker — Feldman doctrine clearly precludes a lower federal court from reviewing state-law decisions, Plaintiff's case is dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. A claim dismissed the basis of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine is legally frivolous and constitutes a dismissal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). See Alpern v. Lieb, 38 F.3d 933, 934 (7th Cir. 1994); Parker v. Phillips, No. 01-5325, 2001 WL 1450704 (6th Cir. 2001) (holding action to be frivolous under § 1915(g) where one ground for dismissal is Rooker-Feldman); Carlock v. Williams, No. 98-5545, 1999 WL 454880 (6th Cir. June 22, 1999) (same).
Recommended Disposition
Having conducted the review now required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, I recommend that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A(b), and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). Should this report and recommendation be adopted, the dismissal of this action will count as a strike for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g).
I further recommend that the Court find no good-faith basis for appeal within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3). See McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 611 (6th Cir. 1997).
NOTICE TO PARTIES
Any objections to this Report and Recommendation must be filed and served within ten days of service of this notice on you. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). All objections and responses to objections are governed by W.D. Mich. LCivR 72.3(b). Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any further right of appeal. United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir. 1981); see Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985).