Willows Water District v. Mission Viejo Co.

3 Citing cases

  1. City of Englewood v. Ditch

    235 P.3d 1061 (Colo. 2010)   Cited 12 times
    Concluding that an agreement did not constitute a subordination agreement because it did not "suggest a change in the relative priority status of the parties"

    1997); Perdue v. Fort Lyon Canal Co., 184 Colo. 219, 223, 519 P.2d 954, 956 (1974) ("By contract a person can make his priority inferior to another, and the water judge found that this happened here."). The plain terms of the contractual provisions will define the no-call agreement, see USI Props. E., Inc., 938 P.2d at 176, but such provisions are void and unenforceable if contrary to public policy, see Willows Water Dist. v. Mission Viejo Co., 854 P.2d 1246, 1255 (Colo. 1993). In this instance, the plain terms of the Agreement demonstrate that the parties intended to enter into a no-call agreement. Under paragraphs 4.1 and 4.1.1, the Companies expressly agreed to limit the placement of calls under the 1885 Oasis storage right. Specifically, paragraph 4.1 provides that Denver may divert its more junior In-between rights provided that there are 150 cfs of divertible water at the Burlington headgate while the Companies' 1885 Oasis storage right is storing water.

  2. City of Thornton v. Bijou Irrigation

    926 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 106 times
    Holding that the applicant's "actions further support a determination that [it] can and will successfully resolve [the enumerated] contingencies prior to the projected completion date of the project"

    We will not overrule the trial court's evaluation of this evidence on appeal. Willows Water Dist. v. Mission Viejo Co., 854 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Colo. 1993) ("The sufficiency, probative effect, and weight of the evidence before the water court, together with the inferences and conclusions to be drawn therefrom, will not be disturbed unless they are so clearly erroneous as to find no support in the record."). Thornton's expert, water engineer and consultant Dan Ault, testified that the WSSC system is a water-short system without sufficient water available to meet the demands of crops across the entire acreage of the system.

  3. Bayou Land Company v. Talley

    924 P.2d 136 (Colo. 1996)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that Congress did not grant ownership of water along with land grants and the General Assembly's statutory provisions control

    Thus, applicants could only apply for a well permit for nontributary ground water underlying their own land or underlying the land of those who consented. In Willows Water District v. Mission Viejo Co., 854 P.2d 1246, 1251 n. 14 (Colo. 1993), we recognized that Senate Bill 213 required the consent of the owner of the land on which a well was to be drilled as a condition to the issuance of a permit by the state engineer. In 1985, in response to our decision in Southwestern Colorado, the legislature further clarified the requirements for issuance of a well permit and the construction of wells outside a designated basin when it enacted Senate Bill 5 (1985), presently codified at section 37-90-137(4), 15 C.R.S. (1995 Supp.).