Opinion
CLAIM NO. E005392
OPINION FILED NOVEMBER 28, 1994
Upon review before the FULL COMMISSION in Little Rock, Pulaski County, Arkansas.
Claimant represented by JOSEPH SELF, Attorney at Law, Fort Smith, Arkansas.
Respondent represented by CONSTANCE G. CLARK, Attorney at Law, Fayetteville, Arkansas.
Decision of Administrative Law Judge: Reversed.
OPINION AND ORDER
Claimant appeals an opinion of the Administrative Law Judge filed on January 18, 1994.
On March 16, 1990, claimant sustained a compensable injury when her apron got caught in a conveyor bELT and she was flipped over onto the concrete floor. Claimant has not worked since her compensable injury because her foot turns inward, swells and is painful.
An Administrative Law Judge found that her psychological condition (conversion reaction) was not causally related to the compensable injury. The Full Commission affirmed the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge. However, in Wellman v. Allen Canning Co., 38 Ark. App. 105, 828 S.W.2d 868 (1992), the Arkansas Court of Appeals reversed the Commission and "remanded this case for a determination of the workers' compensation benefits to which appellant is entitled as a result of the conversion reaction she suffered as a result of the compensable injury sustained on March 16, 1990." In subsequent proceedings, an Administrative Law Judge found that claimant was entitled to temporary total disability benefits until March 27, 1991.
Claimant requested a hearing on the issues of whether she was entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits subsequent to March 27, 1991 and medical expenses for her physical and psychological conditions. The Administrative Law Judge decided to revisit the question of whether claimant suffered from a psychological condition and, if so, whether it is causally related to the employment. However, the fact that claimant is suffering from a psychological condition that is causally related to her employment is res judicata as a result of the decision by the Court of Appeals. Claimant had been seen by Dr. Joe H. Dorzab for a psychological evaluation. As a result of this evaluation, which cast some doubt on the existence of a psychological condition, the Administrative Law Judge found that claimant was not entitled to any additional benefits.
As stated above, the fact that claimant's psychological condition is causally related to the employment is res judicata. That means, at the least, that claimant is entitled to reasonable and necessary treatment for this condition. Respondent has steadfastly refused to provide any benefits, unless it was ordered to do so by the Commission. Thus, claimant never did receive adequate treatment for the psychological condition. What little treatment claimant has received since respondent suspended benefits has been at her own expense and understandably sporadic as a result of limited finances. Further, Dr. Dorzab did not completely rule out the existence of a psychological or psychiatric disorder or the need for additional treatment. Dr. Dorzab simply stated that based on his limited one-time evaluation of claimant, he could not diagnose a psychological or psychiatric disorder. Dr. Dorzab went on to state that:
The lack of diagnosable psychiatric disorders suggest either that the original conversion impression may not have been correct or the patient's psychological problems are quite difficult to ferret out. The next step from a psychiatric viewpoint, would anyone wish us to continue with this evaluation,, would be to interview both the patient's oldest daughter and the patient's husband and perhaps do a more extensive psychological testing battery. We will not see this patient further unless asked to do so.
Based on the above evidence, we find that claimant is still entitled to at least additional testing for her condition and any treatment that may be reasonably necessary.
We also find that claimant's temporary total disability should not have been suspended on the arbitrary date of March 27, 1991. No physician has released claimant to return to work and claimant testified that her condition prevents her from working. She is still within her healing period because there are additional evaluation or diagnostic procedures that might further delineate her condition and point toward treatment for it. Therefore, we find that claimant is entitled to additional temporary total disability benefits from March 27, 1991 to an uncertain future date.
Accordingly, respondents are directed to comply with the award set forth herein. All accrued benefits shall be paid in a lump sum without discount and with interest thereon at the lawful rate from the date of the opinion of the Administrative Law Judge. For prevailing on this appeal before the Commission, claimant's attorney is hereby awarded an additional attorney's fee in the amount of $250.00.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Commissioner Tatum dissents.