Opinion
24A-CR-135
08-29-2024
Jaquan Cordell Willis, Appellant-Defendant v. State of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Eric Grzegorski Kokomo, Indiana ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Courtney Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case.
Appeal from the Howard Superior Court The Honorable Hans S. Pate, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 34D04-2006-F1-1759.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Eric Grzegorski Kokomo, Indiana
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE Theodore E. Rokita Indiana Attorney General Courtney Staton Deputy Attorney General Indianapolis, Indiana
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Altice, Chief Judge.
Case Summary
[¶1] Jaquan Cordell Willis appeals his convictions for Level 5 felony criminal recklessness and Class A misdemeanor carrying a handgun without a license. Willis contends that the trial court exhibited judicial bias when it suggested that the State use a map as demonstrative evidence to orient the jury to the streets and locations being referenced during witness testimony.
[¶2] We affirm.
Facts & Procedural History
[¶3] Willis's convictions arose from shootings during the Road Knights biker rally in Kokomo on June 20, 2020, around 10:00 p.m. The scene encompassed Studebaker Park and several surrounding streets and residences. Two eyewitnesses with different vantage points - Sandra Rollins from her home north of the park and Omi Avery from his apartment southwest of the park -testified at Willis's jury trial. Each of them had seen Willis with a firearm earlier in the evening.
[¶4] At some point, while Avery was outside of his apartment, he observed Willis driving at the end of a procession of vehicles coming toward him off Purdum Street and onto Havens Street, a one-way street. Avery noticed that Willis was holding a firearm against the side of his head while "vibing to the music." Transcript at 176. Willis pointed his firearm at Avery when he saw him, which caused Avery to walk toward his residence. As Avery reached the inside of his doorway, Willis jumped out of his vehicle, yelled something, and began shooting. Avery escaped unharmed and sheltered in his apartment with his mother until the shooting ceased.
[¶5] In the meantime, from her front porch, Rollins heard shooting coming from the southwest. She then saw Willis driving northbound in an alleyway that runs along the west side of the park, connecting Havens Street and Elm Street. When Willis pulled into a parking lot directly across from Rollins's Elm Street residence, she witnessed him fire three or four shots to the east toward Locke Street, while individuals on Locke Street were firing back. Shots were also coming from the alleyway from which Willis had just emerged. Rollins described the scene as "just gunfire everywhere." Id. at 145. Willis then sped away driving through grass in the park with a blown-out tire.
[¶6] Shortly thereafter, police located Willis in his backyard, standing outside of his shot-up vehicle. He admitted to being involved in the shooting, and police recovered his firearm, which was on the ground near the vehicle. In a recorded statement, Willis acknowledged firing several shots at Avery as he ran inside. Willis said he was trying to kill Avery and implied that it was in retaliation for prior events.
[¶7] Willis's jury trial on charges of attempted murder, carrying a handgun without a license, and criminal recklessness commenced on November 3, 2023. During Rollins's direct testimony, several streets (Elm, Locke, Havens, Jay, and Purdum), two alleyways, and three nearby venues (the park, a community center, and an apartment complex) were referenced. On cross examination, Willis asked Rollins to "describe the specific gunfire and the best you can the timing from where things were coming from[.]" Id. at 150. At this point, the trial court interjected: "Sorry, freeze there just for a second. Did anyone print of[f] a map? I know they're going to ask for a map. I've printed of[f] a map from Google maps right now. Do you guys wanna use a map for this?" Id. After the State responded affirmatively, trial court continued:
I mean I don't know if you can pull up Google maps up there then we have to print it to preserve it. This is kinda small. I don't know um not everyone is that familiar with that area including me. I just want to make sure that jurors [are] not confused by all these references. And if we had something that she could mark, then we can make a photocopy of it for the jurors to look at it so that it number one, show[s] . . . where her house is looking into the park area and what field of vision there was. Otherwise I'm getting confused. And I feel like [if] I'm getting confused, they're getting confused. And so um I don't usually do this, but I think we're confusing the jurors at this point. I'll give everyone an opportunity both sides to fully . . . go[] through it.Id. at 150-51.
[¶8] At Willis's suggestion, the trial court and the parties addressed the matter further outside the presence of the jury. Willis argued that by indicating that a map should be used, the trial court was "leading the State to help fix issues in their case." Id. at 151. The trial court clarified its intention as follows:
[T]he jurors are squinting their eyes back there and I saw that they were confused that's why I brought it up. And I didn't bring it up to hurt anybody's case or help anybody's case. If they're going to write a question out in 10 minutes or 15 minutes from now after she's off or ready to be done we're going to have to go through all of this stuff anyway. And so that's, that's my view on it. We're going through all this stuff and the State should've had a map. I don't know why you didn't have a map, okay. It kinda pisses me off you didn't have map. You're talking about all these streets I mean, I'm familiar with Kokomo. I've driven through the area, but you're asking about directions and things like that and these people don't know where these things are. They don't hang out there.Id. at 152.
[¶9] Further, the court rejected the idea that its actions were prejudicial to Willis because, as suggested by Willis, juror confusion generally benefits the defense. The court explained:
[The jurors] are not going to sit there confused.... There's intelligent people on the jury, there's engineer types on the jury. They're going to want a map and yeah. I don't want to do this for two days. You guys said you could get it done in one day but there's no map. And they're sitting [there] looking, straining, trying to listen to her about this. I didn't know we were going to call a witness who was going to talk about all the layout of the park. I would have gone over this with you guys ahead of time.Id. at 153.
[¶10] The parties and the court then worked together to select and print off an appropriate map from the internet to use a demonstrative exhibit. After Willis's additional brief cross examination of Rollins, the State introduced the map (Exhibit 2) into evidence during its redirect examination of her. Willis then utilized Exhibit 2 during his recross examination of Rollins, as well as during his cross examination of Avery.
[¶11] At the close of the evidence, the jury acquitted Willis of attempted murder but found him guilty of criminal recklessness and carrying a handgun without a license. The trial court subsequently sentenced Willis to an aggregate term of seven years, with five years executed in the Indiana Department of Correction (DOC), one year executed in the Howard County Jail, and one year in the DOC suspended to supervised probation.
Discussion & Decision
[¶12] On appeal, Willis argues that the trial court exhibited judicial bias by insisting that the State use a map as evidence. He suggests that the trial court "actively aid[ed] the State" and "interjected personal feelings and trial strategy into the case, which was to the detriment of Willis." Appellant's Brief at 13. Willis also notes that the trial court expressed displeasure with the State for not having a map, which could cause the trial to run longer.
[¶13] A judge is presumed under Indiana law to be unbiased and unprejudiced. S.E. v. State, 929 N.E.2d 1281, 1287 (Ind. 2010). "To rebut this presumption, a defendant must establish from the judge's conduct actual bias or prejudice that places the defendant in jeopardy." Id. "Bias and prejudice violate a defendant's due process right to a fair trial only where there is an undisputed claim or where the judge expressed an opinion of the controversy over which the judge was presiding." Id. at 1288.
[¶14] On appeal, we consider both the trial judge's actions and demeanor to determine whether the judge "crossed over the bounds of partiality." Timberlake v. State, 690 N.E.2d 243, 257 (Ind. 1997). We also keep in mind a judge's "need for latitude to run the courtroom and maintain discipline and control of the trial." Id. at 1288 (observing that remarks displaying a degree of impatience may be permissible to promote an orderly progression of events at trial if they do not impart an appearance of partiality); see also Ind. Evidence Rule 611(a)(1) ("The court should exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of examining witnesses and presenting evidence so as to . . . make those procedures effective for determining the truth[.]").
[¶15] Here, the trial court remained impartial and did not reveal any bias against Willis. It simply tried to aid in the fact-finding process once it became clear that the jury was confused by all the different street and location references during Rollins's testimony. Indeed, the map, which was ultimately selected by the parties, aided in the jurors' understanding of the evidence and was even used by the defense when cross examining Rollins and Avery.
[¶16] We conclude that the trial court's sensible and neutral suggestion that a map be used as a demonstrative exhibit to avoid juror confusion did not amount to judicial bias. Cf. Ward v. State, 138 N.E.3d 268, 277 (Ind.Ct.App. 2019) (finding no judicial bias where trial court's extensive questioning of witness "did not reveal any bias" and simply "aided in the fact-finding process of establishing the reliability and the foundation to admit the surveillance tape").
[¶17] Judgment affirmed.
Bailey, J. and Mathias, J., concur.