Opinion
Record No. 0759-93-4
August 31, 1993
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION.
(Roger A. Ritchie, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting on brief.
No brief for appellees.
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis.
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not designated for publication.
Bonnie Sue Willis appeals from a decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission rejecting the petition and settlement order submitted by Willis and her employer. Willis contends that the commission erred in rejecting the settlement on the basis that it contained a provision that prorated the lump sum settlement over her life expectancy. Finding no error, we affirm.
In rejecting the proposed petition and order, the commission stated:
Except in cases that involve benefits under § 65.2-503(C), lifetime benefits for permanent and total loss, the Workers' Compensation Act limits benefits to 500 weeks. The adequacy of a settlement is judged against that and several other factors, none of which are the claimant's life expectancy. Therefore, the proposed language that the lump sum settlement represents a payment over the claimant's life expectancy is inaccurate and should not be included in a workers' compensation settlement.
Code § 65.2-701(C) specifically provides the commission with the authority to approve "the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment" provided in any settlement agreement made by and between the employee and the employer. The commission refused to approve the settlement because it determined that the settlement was not in accordance with the provisions of the Act. In reviewing the commission's ruling, we are guided by the principle that the commission's construction of the Act is entitled to great weight on appeal. City of Waynesboro v. Harter, 1 Va. App. 265, 269, 337 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1985). Willis alleges that the commission abused its discretion, exceeded its statutory authority, and acted arbitrarily in refusing to allow the lump sum settlement to be prorated over her life expectancy. The record contains no support for these allegations. Pursuant to the authority of Code § 62.5-701(C) the commission refused to approve the time and manner of payment. The commission's refusal was based upon its reasoned determination of the policy supporting the Act. Its decision was not arbitrary. Furthermore, we find no abuse of discretion in the commission's determination that a settlement, to be approved, must conform to the structure of the Act.
For the reasons stated, the commission's decision is affirmed.
Affirmed.