Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:04-CV-1271-B.
February 15, 2005
MEMORANDUM ORDER
Before the Court are the Motions of Plaintiff Donald Willis ("Willis") or (the "Plaintiff") for Class Certification, filed June 21, 2004 (doc. 3) and the Motion of Willis to Sever Plaintiff Sabrina Carter-Spencer from the lawsuit, filed November 9, 2004 (doc. 39). Having reviewed the pertinent pleadings, for the reasons that follow, the Court DENIES both of the Plaintiff's Motions.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
This is an employment discrimination lawsuit. Willis, moving pro se, and a number of other plaintiffs, labeled "Class Action Plaintiffs" in the Complaint, filed the action on June 10, 2004 pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 against General Motors Corporation ("GM"). Willis alleges that GM discriminated against him "on or about March 7, 2003" and "from July 2001 to Present." Complaint at 2. According to the Complaint, several of the plaintiffs have filed charges with the EEOC in Dallas, Texas alleging discriminatory conduct by GM, including suspension of employment, general harassment, racial and discriminatory overtones, denial of promotions, and forced removal from other jobs as retaliation. ( Id. at 2-3). In committing these alleged acts, Plaintiffs allege that GM engaged and continues to engage in both employment and racial discrimination and harassment. ( Id. at 3). These are the sole allegations in the complaint, without any alleged supporting facts. See generally (Complaint). Willis now seeks certification of this suit as a class action. Additionally, Willis seeks to dismiss Plaintiff Carter-Spencer from the suit.
Although Willis titles his motion as one for severance, the Court will give it liberal construction, given the Plaintiff's pro se status, as one for dismissal.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Legal Standard for Class Action Certification Pursuant to Rule 23(a).Motions for class action are governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a). Under Rule 23(a), plaintiffs seeking certification bear the burden of meeting the Rule's requirements of (1) numerosity, (2) commonality, (3) typicality, and (4) adequacy of representation. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a); Achem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 613-14 (1997). Courts deciding whether to grant class action certification must conduct a rigorous analysis to insure that each of Rule 23(a)'s requirements have been met. General Tel. Co. of Southeast v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 161 (1982).
B. The Plaintiffs Have Not Met the Standard for Class Certification.
In response to the Plaintiffs' motion, GM asserts that Willis "cannot meet any of the Requirements of Rule 23(a), making certification impossible." (Response at 1). The Court agrees. First, GM argues that the named plaintiff, Willis, is not an adequate representative who can "fairly and adequately represent the interests of the class" as the Rule requires. ( Id.); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). GM cites numerous cases, all persuasive authority, finding pro se Plaintiffs to be improper representatives of a class. (Motion at 1-2) (citing Allnew v. City of Duluth, 983 F. Supp. 825, 831 (D. Minn. 1997) (citations omitted); Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405, 1407 (4th Cir. 1975) ("Ability to protect the interests of the class depends in part on the quality of counsel")). The Court finds the reasoning set forth in those cases persuasive, and finds that, as a plaintiff pro se, Willis cannot adequately protect the interests of the class.
Second, GM argues that Willis cannot satisfy Rule 23(c)'s commonality and typicality requirements because he has not identified which "individuals will comprise his alleged class much less explain how these individuals are similarly situated to him," and has therefore failed to demonstrate that he is similarly situated with the other plaintiffs. (Motion at 2); Mooney v. Aramco Servs. Co., 54 F.3d 1207, 1215-16 (5th Cir. 1995); Zachery v. Texaco Exploration Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 238 (W.D. Tex. 1999); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). (Holding that allegations of broad discrimination are insufficient to satisfy the commonality requirement).
Additionally, because the Plaintiff merely indicated that some of the members of the proposed class filed administrative charges (Complaint ¶ 12), the allegations are insufficient to demonstrate exhaustion of administrative remedies, a prerequisite for filing suit in this Court.
Finally, GM points out that Willis has failed to demonstrate, or even make an attempt to demonstrate, that his purported class "`is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable.'" (Motion at 3); FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(1). The Court finds that Willis has failed to meet its burden to satisfy any of the required elements for proceeding as a class, and DENIES the Plaintiff's motion for class action certification.
C. The Plaintiff's Motion to Sever.
Willis has also moved to sever, or rather dismiss, Ms. Carter-Spencer from this case, claiming that she has expressed an interest in withdrawing from the case. Because there is no pleading signed by Ms. Spencer seeking dismissal, the Court DENIES Willis's motion. If Ms. Spencer intends to withdraw from the case, she may file a separate motion with the court bearing her signature. See FED. R. CIV. P. 21.
III. CONCLUSION
For the reasons discussed, the Court DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion for Class Action Certification, and DENIES the Plaintiff's Motion to Sever