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Williamson v. State

Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Jun 1, 2017
NO. 01-16-00001-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 1, 2017)

Opinion

NO. 01-16-00001-CR

06-01-2017

JESSICA ROSE WILLIAMSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee


On Appeal from the 268th District Court Fort Bend County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 14-DCR-066505A

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Jessica Rose Williamson pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony offense of theft of property with a value of $20,000 or more but less than $100,000 from an elderly individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 31.03(a)-(b), (e)(5), (f)(3), 31.09. Williamson did not have an agreed recommendation as to punishment. The trial court conducted a sentencing hearing and sentenced her to 11 years in prison.

Williamson raises three issues on appeal. In her first two issues, she suggests that she actually pleaded guilty to a third-degree felony. Thus, Williamson argues that the trial court erred by accepting her guilty plea to a second-degree felony and by sentencing her to prison within the range of punishment for a second-degree felony. In her third issue, she challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support her conviction.

Because Williamson pleaded guilty to a second-degree felony and her stipulation to the crime was legally sufficient to support her conviction, we affirm.

Background

Jessica Rose Williamson worked as an assistant to a dentist, Dr. Harvel Loveless. During the time that Williamson worked with Dr. Loveless, his office manager of over 30 years retired. Williamson took over responsibilities as office manager, which included dealing with "insurance, check handling, cash," everything that involved "the business part of" the dentist's office. While Williamson was the office manager, Dr. Loveless discovered that checks were missing from the business's checkbooks. He contacted his bank and was informed that Williamson had cashed checks without authorization.

Dr. Loveless confronted Williamson, fired her, and eventually notified the police of the theft. The police and Dr. Loveless conducted further investigation and discovered that Williamson had stolen over $38,000 by way of forged checks and fraudulent debit card transactions over the course of several months.

Williamson was indicted by a grand jury for theft of property with a value of $20,000 or more but less than $100,000 from an elderly individual. The indictment alleged that she:

pursuant to one scheme and continuing course of conduct, did, unlawfully appropriate, by acquiring or otherwise exercising control over, property, namely, money of the aggregate value $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, from Harvell Loveless, the owner thereof, who was then and there an elderly individual, without the effective consent of the owner, and with the intent to deprive the owner of the property.
Williamson pleaded guilty to the offense without an agreed recommendation as to punishment, and she signed plea paperwork entitled: "Defendant's Plea of Guilty or Nolo Contendre: Written Admonitions, Waiver of Statutory and Constitutional Rights, and Written Stipulation and Judicial Confession." This paperwork bore Williamson's initials beside certain admonitions of the court. These admonitions included a description of the alleged offense and the range of possible punishment for it. The paperwork also included a section titled, "Written Stipulation and Judicial Confession," which stated:
I, the Defendant, after consultation with my attorney, sign this "Written Stipulation and Judicial Confession" and have placed my
initials in the brackets beside each, to stipulate and confess to the following:

[ JW ]. That in Fort Bend County, Texas, I (the same individual indicted in this cause) on 6/1/2013-10/1/2013, committed the acts alleged in the indictment in this cause, and that the evidence and testimony would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that acts and allegations in the indictment in this cause are true and correct . . . .

After a sentencing hearing, the trial court sentenced Williamson to 11 years in prison, and she appealed.

Analysis

Williamson raises three issues on appeal. In her first two issues she argues that she actually pleaded guilty to a third-degree felony and that the trial court erred by accepting her guilty plea to a second-degree felony and by sentencing her within the statutory range for a second-degree felony. In her third issue, Williamson contends that the evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction.

I. Acceptance of guilty plea

Williamson challenges the factual basis for the trial court's acceptance of her guilty plea. She contends that she pleaded guilty to a third-degree felony, but the trial court erroneously treated her plea as if she stipulated to having committed a second-degree felony. She also requests that we abate the appeal and remand the case to the trial court to "correct the record" and "reform the plea."

Prior to accepting a plea of guilty, the trial court shall admonish a defendant in accordance with the Code of Criminal Procedure. See Burnett v. State, 88 S.W.3d 633, 634-35 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Article 26.13 requires, among other things, that the court admonish the defendant regarding "the range of the punishment attached to the offense." See Burnett, 88 S.W. 3d at 634-35.

The record refutes Williamson's contention that she actually pleaded guilty to a third-degree felony instead of a second-degree felony. She signed plea paperwork prior to the court accepting her plea. This paperwork contained a section entitled "Court's Written Admonishments." Within this section, the court advised Williamson of the charged offense and the range of punishment for that offense. Specifically, Williamson initialed next to a section which read:

[ JW ]. You are charged with the offense of

Theft of Property = $20,000 < $100,000 - Elderly.

The range of punishment for that offense is 2-20 years TDCJ and a fine not to exceed $10,000. (CR 341)
Following this section, the document contained the remainder of the court's required admonitions, waivers of Williamson's rights, and a section in which she signed and initialed to indicate that she was pleading guilty to the offense as described in the indictment.

The offense described in the plea paperwork matched the offense charged in the indictment. Williamson was charged with, and pleaded guilty to, theft, pursuant to one scheme and continuing course of conduct, of property with an aggregate value of $20,000 or more but less than $100,000 from a person who was an elderly individual at the time of the offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 31.03, 31.09. Theft of property with a value of $20,000 or more but less than $100,000 from an elderly individual is a second-degree felony punishable by 2 to 20 years in prison and a fine not to exceed $10,000. Id. §§ 12.33, 31.03(e)(5), 31.03(f)(3). Additionally, during the punishment hearing, Williamson's trial counsel stated the punishment range, and it matched the punishment range for a second-degree felony.

Based on the plea paperwork she signed, the indictment, and her trial counsel's statements during the punishment hearing, Williamson pleaded guilty to the second-degree felony of theft of property with a value of $20,000 or more but less than $100,000 from an elderly individual, and she was aware of the possible range of punishment. Thus, we conclude there are no apparent inconsistencies in the trial court record requiring an abatement and remand, and that the trial court did not err by accepting her guilty plea. Accordingly, we overrule this issue and deny Williamson's requests for abatement. See TEX. R. APP. P. 44.4.

II. Sufficiency of evidence to support conviction

In her third issue, Williamson argues that the State's evidence was legally insufficient to support her conviction. Specifically, she argues that the State did not produce sufficient evidence to support a finding that the victim in this case was elderly and that the value of the property stolen was $20,000 or more but less than $100,000.

When a felony conviction is based on a guilty plea the State must "introduce evidence into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and . . . in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15. "The statute expressly provides that the defendant may consent . . . to an oral or written stipulation of what the evidence against him would be." Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

A stipulation of evidence "will suffice to support the guilty plea so long as it embraces every constituent element of the charged offense." Id. A stipulation that incorporates the indictment by reference will satisfy this requirement. See Keller v. State, 125 S.W.3d 600, 605 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. dism'd). Additionally, a stipulation to "the indictment as true and correct will constitute a judicial confession sufficient to support a judgment of conviction." Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 16 n.30.

Williamson signed a stipulation in which she admitted that she "committed the acts alleged in the indictment in this cause, and that the evidence and testimony would prove beyond a reasonable doubt that acts and allegations in the indictment in this cause are true and correct." The indictment alleged that Williamson, "pursuant to one scheme and continuing course of conduct, did, unlawfully appropriate, by acquiring or otherwise exercising control over, property, namely, money of the aggregate value $20,000.00 or more but less than $100,000.00, from Harvell Loveless, the owner thereof, who was then and there an elderly individual, without the effective consent of the owner, and with the intent to deprive the owner of the property." A person commits the second-degree felony of aggregated theft against an elderly individual if she unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of the property pursuant to one scheme or continuing course of conduct, the value of the property stolen is $20,000 or more but less than $100,000, and the owner of the property appropriated was at the time of the offense an elderly individual. See TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 31.03(a)-(b), (e)(5), (f)(3), 31.09. The indictment alleged all of the constituent elements of the charged offense. Williamson's stipulation served as sufficient evidence to support her conviction as a result of her guilty plea. See Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 13, 16 n.30; Keller, 125 S.W.3d at 605-06. Thus, the trial court had sufficient evidence to convict Williamson. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 1.15.

We overrule Williamson's third issue.

III. Sentencing

Consistent with her factual challenge to the category of offense to which she pleaded guilty, Williamson contends that the trial court erred by sentencing her outside the statutory range of punishment for a third-degree felony. But as explained above, the record demonstrates that Williamson pleaded guilty to a second-degree felony.

A trial court's sentencing determination is reviewed under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Tapia v. State, 462 S.W.3d 29, 46 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015). As long as the sentence is within the statutory range of punishment, it will not be disturbed on appeal. Jackson v. State, 680 S.W.2d 809, 814 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).

A second-degree felony is punishable by 2 to 20 years in prison and a fine not to exceed $10,000. TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 12.33. The trial court's sentence of 11 years for this offense fell within the range of possible punishment. Because the trial court imposed a sentence within the statutory guidelines, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. See Jackson, 680 S.W.2d at 814. We overrule Williamson's second issue.

Conclusion

We deny Williamson's request for an abatement and affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Michael Massengale

Justice Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle. Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).


Summaries of

Williamson v. State

Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas
Jun 1, 2017
NO. 01-16-00001-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 1, 2017)
Case details for

Williamson v. State

Case Details

Full title:JESSICA ROSE WILLIAMSON, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court:Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas

Date published: Jun 1, 2017

Citations

NO. 01-16-00001-CR (Tex. App. Jun. 1, 2017)