Opinion
Case No. 05-70654, (Consolidated with Case No. 05-73093).
December 28, 2005
OPINION AND ORDER
These consolidated lawsuits alleging age and disability discrimination and retaliation arise from Plaintiff Jerry Williamson's employment at and termination from Defendant Lear Corporation ("Lear"). Presently before the Court is Lear's motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, filed November 15, 2005. Plaintiff Jerry Williamson ("Williamson") filed a response to Defendant's motion on December 6, 2005. On December 16, 2005, the Court issued a Notice informing the parties that it is dispensing with oral argument with respect to Lear's motion in accordance with Local Rule 7.1(e)(2).
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In July 1987, Lear hired Williamson, born October 15, 1947, to work at its Romulus II facility in Romulus, Michigan. Initially Williamson worked as a security guard, but he subsequently worked as a maintenance technician and eventually as a production worker. In all of these positions, Williamson was a member of the United Auto Workers Local 174 ("UAW") and the terms and conditions of his employment were governed by a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the UAW and Lear.
In approximately 1993, Williamson suffered a lower back injury. After Williamson underwent surgery for this injury, his physician issued permanent lifting restrictions which have been reissued in the same form over the years. These restrictions permit Williamson to lift up to twenty-five pounds frequently and to lift twenty-five to fifty pounds occasionally. Williamson does not dispute Lear's assertion that it has accommodated Williamson's lifting restrictions with respect to his permanent work assignments.
In August 2002, Lear closed its Romulus II facility and Williamson was laid-off. Williamson subsequently was re-hired to work at Lear's Romulus I facility, where Lear manufactures front and rear seats. Romulus II employees re-hired to work at the Romulus I facility essentially were treated as new hires and thus they lost their prior plant seniority.
In April 2003, the Romulus I facility underwent an economic reduction in force that resulted in the elimination of several positions, including the position Williamson held. When many of Williamson's co-workers were recalled in June 2003, but he was not, Williamson filed a grievance with the UAW. Williamson also filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") on December 10, 2003, alleging that he was not recalled due to his age and disability. See Mot. Ex. 2. In a "Notice of Right to Sue" mailed on February 10, 2004, the EEOC informed Williamson that it was closing his case and that he had ninety days from receipt of the notice to file a lawsuit in state or federal court or his "right to sue based on the above-numbered charge will be lost." See id. Williamson acknowledges receiving the EEOC's right-to-sue letter sometime in February 2004. See Mot. Ex. A at 69.
In February 2004, Williamson was recalled to the Romulus I facility and his UAW grievance subsequently was settled for $9,000. Believing that Lear breached the CBA with respect to the recall, however, Williamson and more than one hundred and sixty other Lear employees filed a lawsuit in federal court on October 13, 2004. See Williamson et al. v. Lear Corp., Case No. 04-74010 (E.D. Mich). That case was assigned to the Honorable Lawrence P. Zatkoff who, on June 8, 2005, granted a motion for summary judgment filed by Lear and dismissed the complaint.
Williamson claims that after he was recalled to the Romulus I facility, supervisors required him to work on several occasions in positions that violated his lifting restrictions. In his deposition, Williamson specifically identified these incidents as occurring on April 18 and 25, May 10, July 2, 2004, and on January 23, 2005. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 138-67.
With respect to the April 18, 2004 incident, Williamson alleges that his supervisor Matt Hampton ("Hampton") indicated that "something happened" and he needed Williamson to report to the end of the assembly line to pick-up seats. See Mot. Ex. A at 138-47 According to Williamson, he and another employee were responsible for lifting seats weighing "60 or 70 pounds" for a few hours. See id. at 143. While generally this job is performed with the assistance of a lift, Williamson testified that the seats were coming off the line at a point where the lift could not be used. See id. at 143-44. He further testified that he and the other employee were not able to lift the seats together because they were coming off the line too quickly. See id. The following shift, Williamson returned to his prior duties. See id. at 143.
On April 25, 2004, Hampton again asked Williamson to leave his assigned duties in order to fill another position — placing headrests onto the body of seats. See id. at 148. While the headrests weighed less than two pounds, Williamson claims there was a problem with the guide posts of the headrests that made their insertion or removal difficult. See id. at 150 148-49. Williams testified that removal of the headrests required "maybe 100 pounds of pressure." See id. at 151. Williamson worked in this position for approximately two and a half hours. See id. at 151.
Williamson again was assigned to a temporary position that he claims violated his work restrictions on May 10, 2004. On that date, due to difficulties with employee attendance, Dawn Werner assigned Williamson to "DR front seat finals" and assigned a younger employee, Howard Jones, to Williamson's position. See id. at 106-113. Williamson concedes that Jones could not perform the DR front seat finals job because he was on probation. See id. at 111-12. Williamson returned to his regular work assignment the following shift. See id. at 110.
On May 19, 2004, Williamson filed an EEOC charge. See Mot. Ex. 5. In this charge, Williamson claims that Lear refused to honor his medical restrictions on April 18 and 25, and May 3 and 10, 2004, in retaliation for filing his previous EEOC charge on December 10, 2003. See id. While Williamson only checked the "retaliation" box on the EEOC charge form, he states that Lear discriminated against him on those dates due to his age and disability. Williamson provides: "I believe that I was denied a reasonable accommodation in retaliation for filing the above charge, in violation of the [ADEA] . . . and Title I of the [ADA] . . ." See id. Williamson further states that a younger, probationary employee was given his regular position during these re-assignments. See id. The EEOC mailed a right-to-sue letter to Williamson on July 1, 2004, indicating that the EEOC was closing the case and that Williamson must file a lawsuit within 90 days of receipt of the notice or his right to sue will be lost. See id. Williamson acknowledges receiving this notice sometime in July 2004. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 75.
Although this EEOC charge refers to an incident on May 3, 2004, the parties have not provided the Court with details of an incident on that date.
In July 2004, Lear relocated the operations of the Romulus I facility to its Romulus II plant. On July 2, 2004, Lear superintendent Larry Eason asked Williamson to perform rear seat steaming duties — a job that Williamson claims also violated his work restrictions. See id. at 155. This job required Williamson to lift a seat, set it on a table, steam and finesse the seat, and then set the seat back onto the assembly line. See id. at 158. Rear seat steaming was a position specifically listed as a position complying with Williamson's job restrictions, see Mot. Ex. 4; but Williamson claims the position was listed based on how it was performed in Romulus I where the seats did not have to be lifted off the conveyer belt for steaming. See id. Ex. 1 at 159-61. Williamson also testified, however, that each seat only weighs about 15 pounds. See id. at 158.
Williamson did not file an EEOC charge with respect to the July 2 incident, although on August 11, 2004, he filed a grievance with the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB) in which he referred to this incident. See Mot. Ex. 6. In his NLRB grievance, Williamson alleged that the UAW refused to file grievances on his behalf with respect to Lear's violations of his job restrictions. See id. The NLRB dismissed the charge on September 28, 2004, finding with respect to the July 2 incident that "Williamson's assertion that the July 2 assignment was improper is contradicted by evidence furnished by both the Employer and Union that the assignment was among those expressly identified to comply with his medical restrictions." See id.
On October 14, 2004, Williamson filed an EEOC charge alleging age and disability discrimination and retaliation. See Resp. at 40. On the charge form, Williamson identifies the date the discrimination took place as August 24, 2004. See id. On November 19, 2004, the EEOC mailed a right-to-sue letter to Williamson, indicating that it was closing the case. See id. at 41.
On January 23, 2005, Williamson's supervisor Ken Kolb ("Kolb") asked Williamson for assistance getting a seat "unstuck" from the assembly line. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 164-66. In the process of assisting Kolb, Williamson injured his back. See id. Williamson nevertheless returned to work after the incident and worked through the first week of February 2005. See id. at 166-67.
On February 6, 7, and 8, however, Williamson was absent from work. See id. On those occasions, he followed Lear's procedures for reporting absences on the company's "Attendance Tracking System." See Mot. Ex. 13 and Ex. 14. Williamson continued to be absent from work from February 9 through 18; however, on those dates he failed to call the Attendance Tracking System, otherwise contact Lear, or provide Lear with any medical documentation regarding those absences. See id.
Pursuant to the CBA between the UAW and Lear, an employee "shall be terminated . . . if . . . (3) The employee is absent for three (3) consecutive work days without notification to the Company and without a justifiable reason for absence." See Mot. Ex. 7 Art. 5 § 17. The collective bargaining agreement further provides the following with regard to medical leave of absence:
An employee who is absent from work, because of illness, injury or disability, for a period in excess of three (3) working days, and who submits satisfactory medical evidence to the Company to show that he or she is unable to work because of such illness, injury, or disability, shall be granted a medical leave of absence, upon application on a form provided by the Company. In the event of a request for a medical leave of absence, the employee must provide the Company with a written statement signed by a physician indicating:
(A) The date on which the medical leave of absence is expected to begin;
(B) The date on which it is expected that the medical leave of absence will terminate if the doctor can provide same; and
(C) The medical basis for the leave of absence.
See id. Art. 13 § 1. Rule 5 of the "Shop Rules" for the Romulus I facility further lists failure to notify Lear of an absence prior to the start of the employee's shift as an infraction that "will be sufficient grounds for disciplinary action ranging from verbal warning up to and including termination . . ." See id. Ex. 8.
On February 18, 2005, after Williamson was absent for ten days without notifying Lear, its Human Resources Manager Richard Wong ("Wong") sent Williamson a termination letter. See id. Ex. 10. In the letter, Wong states that Lear is terminating Williamson, effective February 18, 2005, because he has not called the company "at any time since February 9, 2005 to report the necessity for your time off, request approval for any of your time off, nor have you provided any documentation to substantiate your necessity for time off as required by the Shop Rules as well as the Labor Agreement." See id. Williamson retrieved Lear's termination letter from the post office on February 22, 2005. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 52.
In the meantime, on February 18, Williamson had filed a complaint in this Court alleging age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34, and disability discrimination in violation of the Americans with Disability Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101- 12213. Williamson v. Lear, Case No. 05-70654 (the "first lawsuit"). After receiving Lear's termination letter, Williamson filed a second complaint in this Court alleging retaliation in violation of the ADEA and ADA. Williamson v. Lear, Case No. 05-73093 (the "second lawsuit"). Pursuant to an order issued on September 2, 2005, both cases were consolidated before this Court.
II. Applicable Law and Analysis
A. Discrimination
Lear seeks summary judgment with respect to Williamson's age discrimination and disability claims, contending inter alia that those claims are time-barred because Williamson failed to file his first lawsuit within ninety days of receiving the EEOC's right-to-sue letters or because he failed to file a timely EEOC charge with respect to the alleged incident of discrimination.
Under the ADA and ADEA, before filing a complaint in the district court, a plaintiff must exhaust his or her administrative remedies by filing a charge of discrimination with the EEOC or the appropriate state agency. See 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a) (incorporating by reference the enforcement mechanisms set out in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for ADA claims); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (setting forth Title VII requirements); 42 U.S.C. § 626(d) (setting forth ADEA's requirements); The plaintiff's EEOC charge must be filed within 180 days of the alleged discriminatory acts, or within 300 days if the charge is first filed with a state agency. See id. The charge must be "sufficiently precise to identify the parties, and to describe generally the action or practices complained of." Jones v. Sumser Ret. Vill., 209 F.3d 851, 853 (6th Cir. 2000). If the EEOC issues a right-to-sue letter to the plaintiff, the plaintiff must file suit in state or federal court within ninety days; a complaint filed beyond this period is time-barred. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Peete v. Am. Std. Graphic, 885 F.2d 331, 331-32 (6th Cir. 1989).
In his first lawsuit, Williamson claims age and disability discrimination but he fails to allege any specific acts to support his claims. It appears to the Court, however, based on Lear's motion, Williamson's deposition testimony, and the EEOC charges Williamson attached to his complaint, that his age and disability discrimination claims are premised upon Lear's failure to recall him in June 2003, and on Lear's assigning him to jobs which he alleges violated his medical restrictions on the following dates: 4/18/04; 4/25/04; 5/10/04; 7/2/04; and 1/23/05.
As set forth above, Williamson filed EEOC charges based on most of those incidents. On December 10, 2003, he filed a charge alleging age and disability discrimination based on Lear's failure to recall him in June 2003. See Mot. Ex. 2. On February 2, 2004, the EEOC mailed a right-to-sue letter with respect to that filing. See id. On May 19, 2004, Williamson filed an EEOC charge alleging retaliation for filing the earlier charge, as well as age and disability discrimination. See id. Ex. 5. The EEOC mailed a right-to-sue letter to Williamson with respect this charge on July 1, 2004. See id. Williamson did not file his first lawsuit within ninety days of his receipt of the EEOC's right-to-sue letters. The Court therefore concludes that his claims based on the June 2003 recall or his assignments on April 18 and 25 and May 3 and 10, 2004 — the incidents specifically described in those charges — are time-barred.
In response to Lear's motion for summary judgment, Williamson argues that he timely filed suit in federal court because he "cancelled" his previous charges with the EEOC and filed a new EEOC charge on October 14, 2004. See Resp. at 1. The EEOC mailed a right-to-sue letter to Williamson with respect to that charge on November 19, 2004; and Williamson thereafter filed his lawsuit within ninety days — that is on February 18, 2005. The Court believes, however, that the statutes' ninety day filing requirement would be rendered meaningless if a plaintiff could — as Williamson asserts — avoid the deadline simply by re-filing his or her claims in a later charge.
As to his claims of discrimination based on the incidents occurring on July 2, 2004 and January 23, 2005, the Court concludes that Williamson has failed to exhaust his administrative remedies by first filing an EEOC charge complaining about discrimination with respect to those incidents. While Williamson filed a complaint with the NLRB with regard to the July 2, 2004 incident, it does not appear that he included this incident in any of his EEOC charges. While Williamson's October 14, 2004 EEOC charge was filed within 180 days of the July 2 incident, he identifies the date of discrimination in that charge as August 24, 2004. Additionally, he only alleges that Lear denied him a position(s) because of his age and disability — not that Lear assigned him to positions violating his work restrictions. As to the incident on January 23, 2005, there is no evidence that Williamson ever filed an EEOC charge after that date. But even if Williamson complied with the statutory filing requirements with respect to his discrimination claims, the Court still finds that Lear is entitled to summary judgment.
In describing the particulars of his charge, Williamson wrote in part:
I have reason to believe that I have been discriminated against on the basis of my age (56) and disability. I also believe that I have been retaliated against for filing previous charges of discrimination. I believe that I have been harassed by my supervisor because of my condition. I believe that position for which I should have been assigned to because of my condition was given to another individual who is younger than myself.See Resp. at 40.
Williamson identifies two incidents of age discrimination: (1) Lear's failure to recall him from the layoff in April 2003; and (2) the incident on May 10, 2004, when he was asked to perform the DR front seat finals position and a younger employee filled his usual position. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 94-113. With respect to the 2003 layoff, Williamson presents no evidence to suggest that he was treated differently than similarly-situated younger employees. With respect to the May 10 incident, Williamson cannot establish that this temporary job assignment constituted a materially adverse employment action, as he suffered no loss in benefits, title, or responsibility. See Kocsis v. Multi-Care Mgmt, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (describing adverse employment actions). Furthermore, while Williamson believes this incident constituted age discrimination because a younger employee temporarily filled his duties, see Mot. Ex. 1 at 110-112, he concedes that Lear had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for assigning Williamson to the temporary job while the younger employee filled his position. Specifically, Williamson acknowledges that the younger employee was a probationary employee who was not permitted to work in the position Williamson was asked to perform. See id.
Williamson identifies only one employee who he believes should not have been rehired or recalled before him — Byron Culver. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 95-96. While Culver was younger than Williamson, there is no dispute that Culver was hired to perform direct duties — duties Williamson concedes he could not perform due to his medical restrictions. See id. 98 and 134-37.
As to his disability discrimination claim, Williamson fails to demonstrate that he is an individual with a disability. "Merely having an 'impairment' does not make one disabled for purposes of the ADA." Toyota Motor Mfg., Kentucky Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 195, 122 S. Ct. 681, 690 (2002). The plaintiff also must demonstrate that the impairment "limits a major life activity" and that the limitation is "substantial." Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A)). Pursuant to Sixth Circuit precedent, a lifting restriction — in and of itself — does not constitute a disability under the ADA. See McKay v. Toyota Motor Mfg, USA, Inc., 110 F.3d 369, (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that the plaintiff's weight lifting restrictions due to carpal tunnel syndrome are not a disability under the ADA where there was no evidence that the condition restricted the plaintiff from performing a broad class of jobs or any other major life activity); Gerton v. Verizon South Inc., 145 Fed. Appx. 159, 165-66 (6th Cir. 2005) (unpublished op.) (same); Gayer v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 21 Fed. Appx. 347, 350 (6th Cir. 2001) (unpublished op.) (holding that the plaintiff's inability to lift over 40 pounds did not, alone, render her disabled); Law v. City of Scottsville, No. 98-6335, 2000 WL 799742, at * (6th Cir. June 15, 2000) (unpublished op.) (holding that the plaintiff, who was under a forty pound lifting restriction, was not disabled as defined by the ADA). Williamson concedes that his lifting restriction due to his back injury does not impair his ability to work. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 119. There is no evidence that his back injury otherwise substantially impairs him from engaging in a major life activity.
These unpublished opinions are attached as Exhibit A to this Opinion and Order.
The Court therefore concludes that Lear is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Williamson's age and disability discrimination claims.
B. Retaliation
In order to establish his retaliation claim under the ADA or ADEA, Williamson must demonstrate that: (1) he engaged in protected activity; (2) Lear took an adverse employment action against him; and (3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action. Weigel v. Baptist Hosp. of East Tenn., 302 F.3d 367, 381 (6th Cir. 2002); Penny v. United Parcel Serv., 128 F.3d 408, 417 (6th Cir. 1997). If Williamson establishes a prima facie case of retaliation, a presumption of retaliation arises. Lear can rebut this presumption by setting forth a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. Weigel, 302 F.3d at 381; Penny, 128 F.3d at 417. Williamson then must present evidence to show that Lear's proffered reason was a mere pretext for discrimination. Id.
Williamson's retaliation claim in the second lawsuit is premised on his termination. See Mot. Ex. 1 at 170. Williamson believes he was discharged on February 18, 2005, in retaliation for his prior complaints of age and disability discrimination and his federal lawsuits. Lear contends that it is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Williamson's claim of retaliation because there is no causal connection between his alleged protected activities and his discharge. Lear further argues that it had legitimate, non-discriminatory reasons for Williamson's discharge that he cannot rebut.
The Court agrees that even if Williamson can establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Lear articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him that Williamson fails to rebut. The undisputed evidence establishes that Williamson failed to report to work from February 9 through 18, 2005, without notifying Lear or providing Lear with sufficient medical documentation concerning his absence. The undisputed evidence further establishes that this violated Lear's Shop Rules, as well as the CBA governing Williamson's employment.
To demonstrate that Lear's reason for terminating him was pretextual, Williamson states in his response that he believed Lear had been informed of the reason for his absence through his workmen's compensation claim adjuster. See Resp. at II-III (citing Ex. 2006). The evidence he presents to support this contention, however, is a notice from Michigan's Worker's Compensation Agency dated January 19, 2005. See Ex. 2006. As Williamson returned to work after that date, the Court cannot understand how this notice informed Lear as to why Williamson subsequently failed to report to work.
Williamson further argues that he presented medical documentation to Lear after he received Wong's termination letter. See id. at III (citing Dep. Ex. 8 at p. 44 of Resp.). Not only was this doctor's note presented to Lear after it made the decision to terminate Williamson, but Williamson's doctor merely states: "[patient] has been off work since 2/7/05 . . . He remains off work." See Resp. at 44. As Lear argues, this note did not provide the information necessary to excuse Williamson's absence. See Mot. Ex. 7 at Art. 13 § 1.
Finally to demonstrate pretext, Williamson asserts that he was told by another Lear employee that, on June 16, 2005, Wong was on the production floor discussing Williamson and Judge Zatkoff's dismissal of the breach of contract case against Lear. See Resp. at VI (citing Ex. 2012 at p. 46 of Resp.). This evidence, however, is insufficient to demonstrate that Lear's decision to terminate Williamson almost four months earlier was based on that lawsuit.
The Court therefore concludes that Williamson fails to present evidence to rebut Lear's legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating him. The Court thus holds that Lear is entitled to summary judgment with respect to Williamson's retaliation claim.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED, that Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is GRANTED.