Opinion
4:23-cv-691-HEA
05-30-2023
BEVERLY ANN WILLIAMSON, Plaintiff, v. CAMI BRAY, Defendant.
OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
HENRY EDWARD AUTREY UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court on the motion of pro se litigant Beverly Ann Williamson for leave to commence this civil action without prepayment of the required filing fee. ECF No. 2. Having reviewed the motion, the Court finds that the motion will be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Additionally, for the reasons discussed below, the Court will dismiss this action without prejudice.
Legal Standard on Initial Review
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), the Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To state a claim, a plaintiff must demonstrate a plausible claim for relief, which is more than a “mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. at 678. Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense. Id. at 679. The court must “accept as true the facts alleged, but not legal conclusions or threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.” Barton v. Taber, 820 F.3d 958, 964 (8th Cir. 2016). See also Brown v. Green Tree Servicing LLC, 820 F.3d 371, 372-73 (8th Cir. 2016) (stating that court must accept factual allegations in complaint as true, but is not required to “accept as true any legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation”).
When reviewing a self-represented complaint under § 1915(e)(2), the Court must give it the benefit of a liberal construction. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A “liberal construction” means that if the essence of an allegation is discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework. Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even self-represented complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980). See also Stone v. Harry, 364 F.3d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 2004) (stating that federal courts are not required to “assume facts that are not alleged, just because an additional factual allegation would have formed a stronger complaint”). In addition, affording a self-represented complaint the benefit of a liberal construction does not mean that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation must be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993).
The Complaint
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who has filed the instant action on the Court's ‘Civil Complaint' form. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff indicates she is bringing this action pursuant to federal question jurisdiction under “USC 18 @ 241 and 246.” Id. at 3. She writes “n/a' under the section to assert diversity of citizenship. Id. The sole defendant, Cami Bray, is identified as a homeless individual. Id. at 2.
Attached to the complaint is a seven-page typed ‘Statement of Claim.' Id. at 6-12. Within the attachment, plaintiff provides a narrative of her relationship with defendant Bray from April of 2022 to the present. Plaintiff claims defendant Bray has been stalking her, harassing her, and calling her derogatory names. She describes encounters with defendant Bray which has led to verbal arguments. Plaintiff claims she has reported defendant Bray to the police.
For relief, plaintiff seeks a “criminal order of protection due to disability” and “civil contempt of court.” No monetary amount for damages is requested.
Discussion
Plaintiff is a self-represented litigant who brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 241 and 246 against defendant Cami Bray. For the reasons discussed below, this action must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court's power to decide a certain class of cases. LeMay v. U.S. Postal Serv., 450 F.3d 797, 799 (8th Cir. 2006). “Federal courts are not courts of general jurisdiction; they have only the power that is authorized by Article III of the Constitution and the statutes enacted by Congress pursuant thereto.” Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986). See also Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013) (“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, possessing only that power authorized by Constitution and statute”). The presence of subject matter jurisdiction is a threshold requirement that must be assured in every federal case. Kronholm v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 915 F.2d 1171, 1174 (8th Cir. 1990). See also Sanders v. Clemco Indus., 823 F.2d 214, 216 (8th Cir. 1987) (“The threshold requirement in every federal case is jurisdiction and we have admonished the district court to be attentive to a satisfaction of jurisdictional requirements in all cases”). As such, the issue of subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time, by any party or the court. Gray v. City of Valley Park, Mo., 567 F.3d 976, 982 (8th Cir. 2009).
Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction over both federal question cases and diversity of citizenship cases. See Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Tribal Court of Spirit Lake Indian Reservation, 495 F.3d 1017, 1020 (8th Cir. 2007) (finding that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking if neither diversity of citizenship nor federal question jurisdiction applies); McLaurin v. Prater, 30 F.3d 982, 984-85 (8th Cir. 1994) (noting that Congress has directed that district courts shall have jurisdiction in both federal question and diversity cases). The burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction belongs to the plaintiff. V S Ltd. P'ship v. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 235 F.3d 1109, 1112 (8th Cir. 2000). In this case, plaintiff asserts the existence of federal question jurisdiction only.
Even if plaintiff had asserted diversity jurisdiction, she does not allege damages in excess of the jurisdictional threshold nor has she demonstrated diversity of the parties. Both parties appear to be located in or live in Missouri. See Ryan ex rel. Ryan v. Schneider Nat. Carriers, Inc., 263 F.3d 816, 819 (8th Cir. 2001) (“Under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), district courts have original diversity jurisdiction over civil actions when the matter in controversy exceeds $75,000, without considering interest and costs, and when the citizenship of each plaintiff is different from the citizenship of each defendant.”).
Federal question jurisdiction gives district courts “original jurisdiction over civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” Griffioen v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 785 F.3d 1182, 1188 (8th Cir. 2015). See also 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Whether a claim arises under federal law is determined by reference to the “well-pleaded complaint.” Great Lakes Gas Transmission Ltd. P'ship v. Essar Steel Minn. LLC, 843 F.3d 325, 329 (8th Cir. 2016). The well-pleaded complaint rule provides that jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on the face of a plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint. Markham v. Wertin, 861 F.3d 748, 754 (8th Cir. 2017). See also Thomas v. United Steelworkers Local 1938, 743 F.3d 1134, 1139 (8th Cir. 2014) (“Under the well-pleaded complaint rule, a federal question must exist on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint in order to establish federal question subject matter jurisdiction”).
Plaintiff's complaint must establish “either that federal law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on the resolution of a substantial question of federal law.” Williams v. Ragnone, 147 F.3d 700, 702 (8th Cir. 1998). See also Northwest South Dakota Production Credit Ass'n v. Smith, 784 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that “[a] non-frivolous claim of a right or remedy under a federal statute is sufficient to invoke federal question jurisdiction”). “If the asserted basis of federal jurisdiction is patently meritless, then dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is appropriate.” Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc., 407 F.3d 905, 907 (8th Cir. 2005).
Plaintiff asserts two potential sources of federal question jurisdiction, 18 U.S.C. § 241 and 18 U.S.C. § 246, against a private individual. ECF No. 1 at 3. Neither of these, however, present a proper jurisdictional basis. The two statutes cited by plaintiff are both criminal statutes, neither of which by their terms or structure provides a private right of action. See U.S. v. Wadena, 152 F.3d 831, 846 (8th Cir. 1998) (“Courts have repeatedly held that there is no private right of action under [18 U.S.C.] § 241, even though the statute allows federal authorities to pursue criminal charges”); Cok v. Cosentino, 876 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989) (stating that only a United States prosecutor can bring a complaint under 18 U.S.C. §§ 241-242, and that the “statutes do not give rise to a civil action for damages”); Storm-Eggink v. Gottfried, 409 Fed.Appx. 426, 427 (2nd Cir. 2011) (stating that “nothing in the language or structure of [18 U.S.C] § 241 suggests that Congress intended to create a private right of action”); Howard v. United States, 2015 WL 4243246, at *2 (E.D. Mich. July 13, 2015) (“there is no private right of action” under Title 18 U.S.C. § 246”) (citing Dugar v. Coughlin, 613 F.Supp. 849, 852 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)).
Plaintiff has failed to properly allege federal question jurisdiction, which she has the burden of doing. V S Ltd. P'ship, 235 F.3d at 1112. As a result, the Court finds that plaintiff's action is subject to dismissal for lack of federal question jurisdiction. An individual may not bring criminal charges against someone by filing a complaint in this Court. Rather, the individual should report alleged crimes to the local police or prosecutor.
Motion to Appoint Counsel
Plaintiff has filed a motion to appoint counsel. ECF No. 3. This motion will be denied as moot as this action is being dismissed without prejudice.
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis [ECF No. 2] is GRANTED.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [ECF No. 3] is DENIED AS MOOT.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED without prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3). A separate Order of Dismissal shall accompany this Memorandum and Order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that an appeal from this dismissal would not be taken in good faith.