It can be seen, then, that the approach referred to by Mrs. Holt is actually a multistep process.See generally Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 93-95 (1978); Hood, Oklahoma's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 51 Okla.B.J. 2537, 2538 (1980). 10 O.S.Supp. 1980 § 1608[ 10-1608](A) (mandatory).

It need not mean a violation of a legal right or duty, but conduct that is so objectionable that a court of equity cannot in good conscience allow that party access to its jurisdiction. See Commissioners' Note, UCCJA § 8, 9 U.L.A. 252 (Master Ed. 1988); Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 94, n. 1 (1978). Circumstances that are relevant to that determination, and hence to the propriety to decline jurisdiction by reason of conduct, include the length of time the child was in the jurisdiction used as the forum, the effect on the child of the antics of the wrongful retention, and whether the conduct is a subterfuge to find a friendly forum. In all of this, the bad faith of the petitioner is decisive.

Commissioners' Note, supra note 28.See Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 137, 581 P.2d 91, 96 (1978). Nancy claims that Williams supports her contention that her residence in California with Nash for six consecutive months as of the date her motion was heard is a relevant factor under § 822.07(3)(a), Stats. [UCCJA § 7(c)(1)].

In child custody proceedings, the question of clean hands of the parents should be subordinated to the court's primary concern — the child's best interest. ( Bosse v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 440, 444-445 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 665]; In re Marriage of Leonard, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d 443, 466-468; see also Woodhouse v. District Court, etc. (1978) 196 Colo. 558 [ 587 P.2d 1199, 1200]; In re Marriage of Verbin (1979) 92 Wn.2d 171 [ 595 P.2d 905, 909, 910], Williams v. Zacher (1978) 35 Or. App. 129 [ 581 P.2d 91, 96], Nehra v. Uhlar (1977) 43 N.Y.2d 242 [401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8-9].) The Supreme Court of Washington reasoned: "We note, however, that even under section 8 of the Uniform Act [California Civ. Code, § 5157] our court would not have been required to decline jurisdiction.

Some state other that Alabama may now be the child's home state as defined by Section 3. Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (1978). Cases construing the uniform act and the invaluable commissioner's notes pertaining thereto are collected in 9 U.L.A. 116 (Master Ed. 1979).

If a proceeding concerning the custody of a child is pending in another state, but not in substantial conformity with the U.C.C.J.A., an Indiana court may assume jurisdiction [3] notwithstanding the pending foreign proceeding. Williams v. Zacher, (1978) 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91. Respondents argue that the courts of Texas do not exercise jurisdiction in child custody matters in substantial conformity with the U.C.C.J.A. because of the law in Texas as stated in Best v. Best, (1959) Tex. Civ. App., 331 S.W.2d 364. In the Best case, the Court of Civil Appeals held that an Ohio court did not have jurisdiction to grant custody of children to the father when both the mother and children were residents of Texas.

When a petition is filed under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act to modify the custody decree of a court of another state two separate and distinct questions are presented which must be resolved in order: (1) Does the Oregon court have jurisdiction under the Act, and (2) if so, should the Oregon court exercise its jurisdiction. Settle and Settle, 276 Or. 759, 764-65, 556 P.2d 962 (1976), Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (1978). While there are overlapping considerations involved in answering both questions, the first one may be answered with less information than may the second.

See: Matter ofD.L.S., supra. See also: Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or.App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (1978). The trial court erred in refusing to exercise its jurisdiction to consider the merits of appellant's petition for custody.

Subsection (a) extends the clean hands principle to cases in which a custody decree has not been rendered in any state. . . . "Wrongfully" taking under this subsection does not mean that a "right" has been violated — both husband and wife as a rule have a right to custody until a court determination is made — but that one party's conduct is so objectionable that a court in the exercise of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience permit that party access to its jurisdiction.Id. at 142-43; accord Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 132-33, 581 P.2d 91, 93-94 (1978). Having concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error in exercising jurisdiction, we turn to appellant's second contention: that the trial court erred in considering appellee's gender and superior financial situation in determining which parent should have custody.

We conclude that for conduct to be wrongful or similarly reprehensible, it is not necessary that a child be taken in violation of an outstanding order or decree, nor is it a defense that no order or decree has been entered. It is sufficient when the conduct is "so objectionable that a court . . . cannot in good conscience permit the party access to its jurisdiction." Id. See Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 94 (1978). We hold that this same standard applies to the instant case.