It can be seen, then, that the approach referred to by Mrs. Holt is actually a multistep process.See generally Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 93-95 (1978); Hood, Oklahoma's Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act, 51 Okla.B.J. 2537, 2538 (1980). 10 O.S.Supp. 1980 § 1608[ 10-1608](A) (mandatory).

In child custody proceedings, the question of clean hands of the parents should be subordinated to the court's primary concern — the child's best interest. ( Bosse v. Superior Court (1979) 89 Cal.App.3d 440, 444-445 [ 152 Cal.Rptr. 665]; In re Marriage of Leonard, supra, 122 Cal.App.3d 443, 466-468; see also Woodhouse v. District Court, etc. (1978) 196 Colo. 558 [ 587 P.2d 1199, 1200]; In re Marriage of Verbin (1979) 92 Wn.2d 171 [ 595 P.2d 905, 909, 910], Williams v. Zacher (1978) 35 Or. App. 129 [ 581 P.2d 91, 96], Nehra v. Uhlar (1977) 43 N.Y.2d 242 [401 N.Y.S.2d 168, 372 N.E.2d 4, 8-9].) The Supreme Court of Washington reasoned: "We note, however, that even under section 8 of the Uniform Act [California Civ. Code, § 5157] our court would not have been required to decline jurisdiction.

We conclude that for conduct to be wrongful or similarly reprehensible, it is not necessary that a child be taken in violation of an outstanding order or decree, nor is it a defense that no order or decree has been entered. It is sufficient when the conduct is "so objectionable that a court . . . cannot in good conscience permit the party access to its jurisdiction." Id. See Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 94 (1978). We hold that this same standard applies to the instant case.

We conclude that for conduct to be wrongful or similarly reprehensible, it is not necessary that a child be taken in violation of an outstanding order or decree, nor is it a defense that no order or decree has been entered. It is sufficient when the conduct is "so objectionable that a court . . . cannot in good conscience permit the party access to its jurisdiction." Id. See Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 94 (1978). Because these cases arise in a myriad of contexts, no single formula can resolve the issue whether jurisdiction should be declined by reason of conduct.

hild Custody Jurisdiction Act and thus have exercised jurisdiction. See, e.g., Allison v. Superior Court, 99 Cal.App.3d 993, 160 Cal.Rptr. 309 (Cal.Ct.App. 1979) (California could assert jurisdiction where Texas had not adopted the act, service of process gave only 3-day notice, not 10-day notice, as required by the act, and court found that visitation and custody should be determined in one proceeding); State ex rel. Larner v. Martin Circuit Court, 456 N.E.2d 395 (Ind. 1983) (Indiana asserted jurisdiction when Colorado was found to lack jurisdiction because custody was awarded in ex parte divorce proceedings), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 138 (1984); Sharp v. Aarons, 101 Misc.2d 323, 420 N.Y.S.2d 1013 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1979) (New York court, not Wisconsin court, had jurisdiction because New York jurisdiction is in the best interest of the child and no other court has jurisdiction under other subsections of New York's domestic relations law despite fact that Wisconsin suit was filed first); Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (Or.Ct.App. 1978) (Oregon court, not Colorado, has jurisdiction where Colorado was not the child's home state, contacts with Colorado were insufficient, and mother had failed to meet notice requirements). A number of courts have scrutinized another state's basis for jurisdiction before finding that the other state was "substantially in conformity" with the act.

Hence, the "home state" provision of 2(5) of the act [Ark. Stat. Ann. 34-2702(5)] would have little meaning. See In Re Marriage of Steiner, 89 Cal.App.3d 969, 152 Cal.Rptr. 612 (1979); Wheeler v. District Court of Denver, 186 Colo. 218, 526 P.2d 658 (1974); Williams v. Zacker, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91 (1978); 96 A.L.R. 3d 959; "The Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act: A Legislative Remedy for Children Caught in the Conflict of Laws," 22 V and. L. Rev. 1207, at page 1236. Therefore, while Texas in this case had jurisdiction initially over these parties when granting the divorce there is no "pending proceeding" there to qualify that state for jurisdiction over this cause under 34-2706(b).

Subsection (a) extends the clean hands principle to cases in which a custody decree has not been rendered in any state. . . . "Wrongfully" taking under this subsection does not mean that a "right" has been violated — both husband and wife as a rule have a right to custody until a court determination is made — but that one party's conduct is so objectionable that a court in the exercise of its inherent equity powers cannot in good conscience permit that party access to its jurisdiction.Id. at 142-43; accord Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 132-33, 581 P.2d 91, 93-94 (1978). Having concluded that the trial court did not commit reversible error in exercising jurisdiction, we turn to appellant's second contention: that the trial court erred in considering appellee's gender and superior financial situation in determining which parent should have custody.

If a proceeding concerning the custody of a child is pending in another state, but not in substantial conformity with the U.C.C.J.A., an Indiana court may assume jurisdiction [3] notwithstanding the pending foreign proceeding. Williams v. Zacher, (1978) 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91. Respondents argue that the courts of Texas do not exercise jurisdiction in child custody matters in substantial conformity with the U.C.C.J.A. because of the law in Texas as stated in Best v. Best, (1959) Tex. Civ. App., 331 S.W.2d 364. In the Best case, the Court of Civil Appeals held that an Ohio court did not have jurisdiction to grant custody of children to the father when both the mother and children were residents of Texas.

It need not mean a violation of a legal right or duty, but conduct that is so objectionable that a court of equity cannot in good conscience allow that party access to its jurisdiction. See Commissioners' Note, UCCJA § 8, 9 U.L.A. 252 (Master Ed. 1988); Williams v. Zacher, 35 Or. App. 129, 581 P.2d 91, 94, n. 1 (1978). Circumstances that are relevant to that determination, and hence to the propriety to decline jurisdiction by reason of conduct, include the length of time the child was in the jurisdiction used as the forum, the effect on the child of the antics of the wrongful retention, and whether the conduct is a subterfuge to find a friendly forum. In all of this, the bad faith of the petitioner is decisive.

It does not change the facts that the children's residence changed, Wisconsin became their home state, and they developed significant connections here. Cf. Marriage of Settle, 556 P.2d 962 (Or. 1976) (Oregon home state 20 months after mother secreted children there); Howard v. Gish, 373 A.2d 1280 (Md.App. 1977) (Maryland home state after 11 months although father remained in Georgia and custodial mother had died); Dowhanik v. Dowhanik, 602 P.2d 1127 (Or.App. 1979) (children in Oregon with noncustodial father for more than a year); Williams v. Zacher, 581 P.2d 91, 96 A.L.R.3d 959 (Oregon home state after more than a year since abduction from Colorado). See also Graton v. Graton, 537 P.2d 31 (Ariz.App. 1975), where the court, after stating the rule that the child's domicile follows legal custody, noted a possible exception where children brought into a state illegally have continued for such an extended period of time that, in fact, domicile has attached.