Opinion
Civil Action 3:20-CV-02449
08-05-2022
SANFORD WILLIAMS, JR., Petitioner, v. KEVIN R. WINTER, et al., Respondents.
MARIANI, J.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
KAROLINE MEHALCHICK CHIEF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Before the Court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus (the “petition”) filed by Sanford Williams, Jr. (“Williams”) on December 28, 2020, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 1). In his petition, Williams asserts claims for malicious prosecution, false arrest, negligence, conspiracy, illegal search and seizure, and illegal sentence against Respondents Police Officer Kevin R. Winter, “other police officers of the Silver Spring Township Police Department,” a Walmart store employee Corbin Fuller, and the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (collectively, “Respondents”). (Doc. 1, at 5-14; Doc. 2, at 1-2). For the foregoing reasons it is recommended that Williams's petition be denied. (Doc. 1).
I. Background and Procedural History
Through this petition, Williams attempts to challenge his conviction following a sentence beginning on August 27, 2019. (Doc. 1, at 1). On March 21, 2019, Williams was arrested for conspiracy to commit retail theft. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.).On August 27, 2019, Williams plead guilty to conspiracy to commit retail theft and was sentenced to a minimum of six months and a maximum of twelve months incarceration to run concurrent with any other sentence he was currently serving at the time. (Doc. 1, at 1); Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). On October 2, 2019, Williams filed a motion for post-conviction collateral relief and a memorandum of law. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). Additionally, Williams filed various supplements and motions in the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County between October 3, 2019, and October 22, 2020. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.).
This is a matter of public record of which the Court may properly take judicial notice. See Sands v. McCormick, 502 F.3d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 2007).
On December 28, 2020, Williams filed the instant petition along with a memorandum. (Doc. 1; Doc. 2). On January 19, 2021, Williams filed a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis, which the Court granted on March 17, 2021. (Doc. 5; Doc. 9). In the same Order, the Court advised Williams of his rights under the Antiterrorism Effective Death Penalty Act and provided him with the opportunity to elect whether to have the petition construed and ruled upon under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or to withdraw the petition. (Doc. 9, at 1-2). Williams failed to complete and file the election form that was provided to him within the timeframe required, thus his petition will be ruled upon under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (Doc. 9, at 2). Although Respondents have not filed a response to Williams's petition, the Court finds that Williams was not in custody when he filed his petition and that his claims are either not cognizable on habeas review or are inadequately alleged and recommends that the petition be denied.
II. Habeas Claims Presented
Williams presents the following grounds for relief in his federal habeas petition:
1) Malicious Prosecution
2) False Arrest
3) Negligence
4) Conspiracy
5) Illegal Search and Seizure
6) Illegal Sentence(Doc. 1, at 5-14; Doc. 2, at 1-2)
III. Discussion
Williams brings his petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which permits federal courts to issue habeas corpus relief for persons in state custody. (Doc. 1). While a prisoner may properly challenge the “fact or duration” of his confinement through a § 2254 petition, the statute sets “several limits on the power of a federal court to grant an application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a state prisoner.” Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 181 (2011); see also Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 498-99 (1973). Further, “it is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on state-law questions.” Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991); see also Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41 (1984) (“A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.”); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 120 n.19 (1982) (“If a state prisoner alleges no deprivation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable.”). Rather, federal habeas review is limited to claims based “on the ground that [petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. As such, a writ of habeas corpus is an “‘extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were ‘grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings.” See Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderonv. Coleman, 525 U.S. 141, 146 (1998)).
The statutory text of § 2254 additionally requires that federal courts give the appropriate deference to the legal rulings and factual findings of state courts made during criminal proceedings, and provides in pertinent part:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim -
(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Thus, given these deferential standards of review, federal courts frequently decline invitations by habeas petitioners to disturb the considered views of state courts. See Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 338-39 (2006); see also Warren v. Kyler, 422 F.3d 132, 139-40 (3d Cir. 2006); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222, 228 (3d Cir. 2002).
With respect to § 2254(d)(1), the Supreme Court defines “clearly established federal law” as “holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of [the Supreme] Court's decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412 (2000). Further, to warrant relief under § 2254(d)(1), a state court's “unreasonable application of those holdings must be objectively unreasonable, not merely wrong; even clear error will not suffice.” White v. Woodall, 134 S.Ct. 1697, 1702 (2014). Regarding 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), “a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct” unless a petitioner can show, by clear and convincing evidence, that the finding was erroneous. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see also Simmons, 590 F.3d 223, 231 (3d Cir. 2009) (“Under the § 2254 standard, a district court is bound to presume that the state court's factual findings are correct, with the burden on the petitioner to rebut those findings by clear and convincing evidence.”). Moreover, habeas relief will not be granted pursuant to § 2254(d)(2) if a reasonable basis existed for the state court to make its factual finding. See Burt v. Titlow, 571 U.S. 12, 18 (2013).
A. Williams is no longer “in custody” for his disputed crime.
One of the basic tenets of Article III of the Constitution mandates that federal courts may only consider cases or controversies. U.S.. const. art. iii, § 2, cl. 1. At all times, the parties must continue to have a “personal stake in the outcome” of the lawsuit. Spencer v. Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1988) (quoting Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S.. 472, 477-78 (1990)). The federal habeas corpus statute requires that the applicant must be “in custody” when the application for habeas corpus is filed. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S.. 234, 238 (1968). Where a petitioner challenges the validity of his or her conviction, however, a petitioner's subsequent release prior to adjudication of a habeas petition on the merits may terminate the petitioner's status as “in custody” for the purposes of habeas relief. Vasquez v. Aviles, 639 Fed.Appx. 898, 902 (3d cir. 2016) (citing DeFoy v. McCullough, 393 F.3d 439, 442 (3d cir. 2005)). once a petitioner is no longer “in custody,” the case or controversy requirement of Article iii may be nullified as a favorable judicial decision would not provide relief. See Spencer, 523 U.S.. at 7.
In order to maintain standing as an “in custody” petitioner after release, the petitioner must be subject to conditions as a result of the conviction that present stringent restraints on physical liberty. Spencer, 523 U.S.at 7; Carafas, 391 U.S.. at 237-38. The petitioner may be considered “in custody” if he is subject to conditions of his sentence, such as supervised release, parole, or community service, that “significantly restrain [his or her] liberty.” Bonserv. Dist. Att'y Monroe Cty., 659 Fed.Appx. 126, 128 (3d cir. 2016) (non-precedential) (quoting Virsnieks v. Smith, 521 F.3d 707, 717 (7th Cir. 2008)). Additionally, collateral consequences are insufficient in and of themselves to maintain the “in custody” requirement of a federal habeas suit. Maleng v. Cook, 490 U.S. 488, 492 (1989). Collateral consequences with negligible effects on a petitioner's physical liberty and movement, by definition, do not severely restrain individual liberty. Bonser, 659 Fed.Appx. at 128 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Virsnieks, 521 F.3d at 718).
A petitioner may not challenge his or her conviction under a sentence that “has fully expired at the time his petition is filed.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491. “‘[O]nce the sentence imposed for a conviction has completely expired, [even] the collateral consequences of that conviction are not themselves sufficient' to satisfy the ‘in custody' requirement of § 2254(a).” Rodland v. Shannon, No. 1:CV-04-0264, 2007 WL 1217852, at *1 (quoting Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492). In Maleng, the Supreme Court found that a prisoner, who challenged his conviction after his sentence had fully expired but was currently incarcerated for a different offense, was not “in custody” for the expired offense and could not seek relief under the expired sentence. 490 U.S. at 492. Liberally construing the complaint due to the petitioner's pro se status and due to the allegations that incorporated an unexpired conviction, the Court interpreted his petition as being brought under an unexpired alternative conviction and not under his expired conviction. Maleng, 490 U.S. at 493-94. However, the Court stressed that it had “never extended [the ‘in custody' requirement] to the situation where a habeas petitioner suffers no present restraint from a conviction.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492. Additionally, the Court reasoned that due to the frequency of habitual offenders, “a contrary ruling would mean that a petitioner whose sentence has completely expired could nonetheless challenge the conviction for which it was imposed at any time [he or she was incarcerated] on federal habeas.” Maleng, 490 U.S. at 492.
It appears that Williams was not in custody for the challenged sentence when he filed his petition as his maximum sentence date expired on August 26, 2020, and he filed his petition on December 28, 2020. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.); (Doc. 1). A search of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate/Parolee Locator indicates that Williams is serving parole on the date of this report and recommendation. Inmate/Parolee Locator, Pa. Dept. of Corrections, http://inmatelocator.cor.pa.gov/#/ParoleeSearchResults (last visited May 24, 2022). A review of Williams's criminal history indicates that he may have been incarcerated at the time of filing for an alternative offense. Commonwealth v. Williams, No. CP-01-CR-0000413-2019 (Adams Cty. Ct. Com. Pl.). Williams was sentenced on December 19, 2019, to six to twenty-four months to run concurrent with his challenged sentence from August 27, 2019. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019; Williams, No. CP-01-CR-0000413-2019. Although Williams was in custody at the time of filing of his petition, Williams must have been incarcerated “under the conviction or sentence under attack at the time his petition was filed.” See Maleng, 490 U.S. at 491.
Here, Williams challenges his conviction and sentence on August 27, 2019. (Doc. 1, at 1); Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). Williams was sentenced on August 27, 2019, to six to twelve months. (Doc. 1, at 1); Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). Additionally, Williams's sentence was to run concurrent with any other sentence he was currently serving. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). It follows that Williams's six-to-twelve-month sentence began on August 27, 2019, and expired no later than August 26, 2020. See Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). Nothing in the record indicates that Williams's sentence expired after his maximum sentence date. Williams filed his petition on December 28, 2020, over four months after his August 27, 2019, conviction had expired. (Doc. 1). Therefore, Williams initiated his petition challenging his conviction and sentence from August 27, 2019, when he was no longer “in custody” for the challenged conviction and sentence. (Doc. 1).
It is clear from the allegations in his petition that Williams is challenging his August 27, 2019, conviction and sentence as he references the date and location of the judgment and sentence, the length of his sentence, and the criminal docket number. (Doc. 1, at 1). Thus, Williams has indicated that he is challenging his conviction and sentence that occurred on August 27, 2019. See Rodland, 2007 WL 1217852, at *1 (“[The petitioner] makes it clear in his supporting brief that his true intent is to challenge the validity of the expired . . . conviction, not to challenge the [present] sentence.”). The Court does not see a reason to liberally interpret his petition as being brought under the conviction that he is currently serving, as the Court did in Maleng, because it appears William's “true intent is to challenge the validity of the expired . . . conviction.” Rodland, 2007 WL 1217852, at *1; see also Maleng, 490 U.S. at 49394. Accordingly, this Court cannot provide habeas relief, as it lacks jurisdiction to consider the petition under § 2254(a). See Rodland, 2007 WL 1217852, at *2 (finding that the Court was “without jurisdiction to consider the petition” because the petitioner was “seeking to challenge an expired sentence for which he [was] no longer in custody, and which had expired before he filed the instant petition” even though he was currently serving another sentence for a different conviction).
B. Williams's claims are not cognizable on federal habeas review or ARE NOT ADEQUATELY ALLEGED.
Even if Williams's petition had been filed while he was in custody for his August 27, 2019, conviction, his petition asserts claims that are not cognizable upon habeas review and that are not adequately alleged. (Doc. 1; Doc. 2).
At the outset, the court notes that Williams fails to identify the proper partyrespondent. Williams lists Police officer Kevin R. Winter, “other police officers of the silver spring Township Police Department,” a Walmart store employee corbin Fuller, and the commonwealth of Pennsylvania as Respondents in this case. (Doc. 1, at 1; Doc. 2, at 1). “in federal habeas proceedings, the proper party-respondent is ‘the person who has custody over [the petitioner].” Saunders v. U.S. Parole Comm., 665 Fed.Appx. 133, 135 (3d cir. 2016) (quoting Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.s. 426, 434 (2004)). When a petitioner “challenges a form of ‘custody' other than present physical confinement[, the habeas petitioner] may name as respondent the entity or person who exercises legal control with respect to the challenged ‘custody.'” Saunders, 665 Fed.Appx. at 135 (quoting Rumsfeld, 542 U.s. at 447). Here, Williams has failed to name the proper person or entity who was keeping him in custody and has therefore not named the correct respondent. However, “[w]hen a habeas petitioner incorrectly identifies the party-respondent, the proper course typically is not a with-prejudice dismissal of the petition.” Saunders, 665 Fed.Appx. at 135. As the court discusses infra, Williams's petition fails to state a cognizable claim for habeas review or adequately allege a reviewable claim. Thus, the court recommends dismissal of the petition, but on grounds other than Williams's failure to identify the proper party-respondent. See Meyers v. Tickefoose, No. 1:13-cv-1630, 2013 WL 4607449, at *1 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 29, 2013) (dismissing a habeas petition where the petition named the incorrect party in addition to other shortcomings that warranted dismissal of the petition).
1. Malicious Prosecution
Williams's claim for “malicious prosecution” appears to challenge the probable cause of his arrest. (Doc. 1, at 5). Williams states that he pled guilty to allegedly false charges of theft and that “false assertions” were made in the criminal complaint against him. (Doc. 1, at 5). The Court discusses Williams's claims for false arrest and probable cause infra. However, in so far as Williams seeks to assert a claim for malicious prosecution it “is not cognizable in a habeas proceeding and can only be brought in a civil rights action if [the petitioner's] criminal proceeding is terminated in his favor.” Thomas v. Tice, No. 2:17-cv-1659, 2020 WL 7263545, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 10, 2020). Thus, Williams's claim for malicious prosecution is not cognizable upon habeas review.
To present a claim for malicious prosecution in a civil rights action under § 1983, the party seeking relief must demonstrate that his or her conviction has been “reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” See Kadonsky v. New Jersey, 188 Fed.Appx. 81, 85 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 (1994)).
2. Fourth Amendment Claims
Williams asserts claims of false arrest, illegal search and seizure, and a lack of probable cause. (Doc. 1, at 6-8). The Court construes these claims to be asserted under the Fourth Amendment. U.S. Const. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ....”); see also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 472-74 (1976) (reviewing claims for illegal search and lack of probable cause of the petitioner's home under the Fourth Amendment). “[T]o the extent [Williams's] claim is read as a straightforward false arrest claim, it is non-cognizable in the context of a habeas petition.” Anderson v. Clark, No. 17-3014, 2018 WL 5316027, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 5, 2018).
Overall, “when a defendant is convicted pursuant to his guilty plea rather than a trial, the validity of that conviction cannot be affected by an alleged Fourth Amendment violation because the conviction does not rest in any way on evidence that may have been improperly seized.” Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306, 321 (1983) (examining Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973)). Fourth Amendment claims following a guilty plea are “irrelevant to the constitutional validity of the conviction” and may not provide a basis for habeas relief. Haring, 462 U.S. at 321-22; see also Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n. 2 (1975) (“A guilty plea . . . simply renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsistent with the valid establishment of factual guilt and which do not stand in the way of conviction, if factual guilty is validity established.”). Thus, a Fourth Amendment claim is not permissible in a habeas proceeding following a guilty plea. See Walling v. Bianco, No. 01-206-GMS, 2002 WL 31005830, at *1 (D. Del. Sept. 4, 2002).
Here, Williams pled guilty to conspiracy to commit retail theft, and his conviction was based upon his guilty plea. Williams, No. CP-21-CR-0000982-2019 (Cumberland Ct. Com. Pl.). Therefore, even if Williams had demonstrated that a Fourth Amendment violation occurred, any violation would not undermine his conviction and the Court is barred from considering his Fourth Amendment claims. See Walling, 2002 WL 31005830, at *2.
3. Illegal Sentence
Williams challenges the legality of his sentence and states that his six-to-twelve-month sentence was to run concurrent with his state prison sentence in violation of the Pennsylvania Parole Act, 61 P.S. 331.21. (Doc. 1, at 9). “Typically, sentencing ‘does not fall within the purview of federal habeas corpus . . . unless an issue of constitutional dimension is implicated in a sentencing argument.'” Witman v. Cameron, No. 16-1814, 2016 WL 3922631, at *4 (E.D. Pa. June 14, 2016) (quoting Fuller v. Dist. Attorney of Fayette Cty., No. 05-1645, 2008 WL 3539905, at *9 (W.D. Pa. Aug. 13, 2008)). Such a challenge is proper “when the petitioner seeks to prevent imprisonment in violation of the Constitution.” Witman, 2016 WL 3922631, at *4 (citing Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 400 (1993)); see also Abney v. DiGuglielmo, No. 060461, 2006 WL 305460, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 8, 2006). A prisoner is only entitled to habeas relief if he is in custody in violation of the United States Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); Estelle, 502 U.S. at 68. “Violations of state law or procedural rules alone are not a sufficient basis for providing federal habeas corpus relief.” Fuller, 2008 WL 3539905, at *9. Therefore, a petitioner may not bring a claim challenging the legality of his sentence “unless an issue of constitutional dimension is implicated in [the] argument.” Fuller, 2008 WL 3539905, at *9
Here, Williams does not challenge the constitutionality of his sentence but instead challenges his sentence under the Pennsylvania Parole Act. (Doc. 1, at 9). Regardless of which section of the Pennsylvania Parole Act Williams brings his claims, the challenge to his sentence is improper as he alleges a violation under Pennsylvania state law and not the United States Constitution. See Fuller, 2008 WL 3539905, at *9 (“Petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief with respect to [his claim challenging the legality of his sentence] as he has failed to allege the denial of any federal constitutional right.”). Thus, Williams's claim alleging an illegal sentence is not a proper federal habeas corpus claim.
4. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
In his petition, Williams does not make an explicit claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. (Doc. 1; Doc. 2). However, liberally construing his petition the Court interprets Williams's petition to include allegations against his PCRA counsel and his trial counsel. (Doc. 1, at 5, 6, 13; Doc. 2, at 2).
First, Williams alludes to an ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding his PCRA counsel stating that his counsel “improperly represented [him] on his PCRA motion.” (Doc. 2, at 2; Doc. 1, at 13). “[I]neffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a proceeding arising under § 2254.” Ridgeway v. Folino, No. 12-5092, 2015 WL 11439084, at*6 (E.D. Pa. June 25, 2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i)). Thus, if Williams intended to bring an ineffective assistance of counsel claim against his PCRA counsel such claims are not cognizable upon habeas review. See Ridgeway, 2015 WL 11439084, at *6.
Next, Williams states that “he pled guilty through his defense counsel's ill-fated advice” and that his defense counsel withheld evidence “that possibly could have exonerated [him].” (Doc. 1, at 5, 6; Doc. 2, at 2). “To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim, a petitioner must show that: (1) counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2) the deficient representation was prejudicial to the petitioner.” Dannerv. Cameron, 955 F.Supp.2d 410, 432 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984)). A reviewing court must “indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689; Jermyn v. Horn, 266 F.3d 257, 282 (3d Cir. 2001); Berryman v. Morton, 100 F.3d 1089, 1094 (3d Cir. 1996). If the circumstances surrounding counsel's actions can be considered “sound trial strategy, the presumption is not rebutted” and “substantial deference is to be accorded [to] counsel's tactical decisions.” Weeks v. Link, No. 4:16-CV-84, 2018 WL 5437749, at *6 (M.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2018) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689); see also United States v. Wiener, 127 F.Supp.2d 645, 648 (M.D. Pa. 2001). Further, a petitioner demonstrates prejudice when “there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Frey v. Fulcomer, 974 F.2d 348, 358 (3d Cir. 1992). However, “[a] court may choose to address the prejudice prong first and reject an ineffective assistance claim solely on the basis that the defendant was not prejudiced.” See Rolan v. Vaughn, 445 F.3d 671, 678 (3d Cir. 2006).
Williams has failed to allege a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his trial counsel. (Doc. 1, at 5, 6; Doc. 2, at 2). Williams merely states that his attorney provided him with “ill-fated advice” and withheld evidence from him. (Doc. 1, at 5, 6; Doc. 2, at 2). “Due process requires that a guilty plea be knowing, voluntary, and intelligent.” See Norwood v. Overlander, No. CV 20-2425, 2020 WL 8678164, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 29, 2020), report and recommendation adopted, No. CV 20-2425-KSM, 2021 WL 794937 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 2, 2021) (citing Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969)). However, “[a] habeas petitioner challenging the voluntary nature of his or her guilty plea faces a heavy burden . . .[t]he representations of the defendant, his [or her] lawyer, and the prosecutor at [a plea] hearing, as well as any findings made by the judge accepting the plea, constitute a formidable barrier in any subsequent collateral proceeding.'” Norwood, 2020 WL 8678164, at *5 (citing Zilich v.Reid, 36 F.3d 317, 320 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63 73-74 (1977)))
Williams's blanket statements of “ill-fated advice” do not indicate that his guilty plea was unconstitutional. See U.S. v. Greenslade, No. 1:CR-04-405-052009, 2009 WL 1507290, at *2 (M.D. Pa. May 28, 2009) (in applying Strickland the Court noted that “we require more than Defendant's assertion that his guilty plea was invalid” to determine if his counsel provided ineffective assistance). Further, Williams's claim that evidence was withheld from him that “could have exonerated [him]” is conclusory and vague as Williams fails to state what evidence was withheld and the Court cannot determine if this evidence would have influenced his guilty plea or the outcome of his case. (Doc. 2, at 2); see Kirk v. Meyer, 279 F.Supp.2d 617, 622 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (“It is well settled within the Third Circuit that vague and conclusory allegations are insufficient to establish ineffective assistance of counsel.”); see also Zettlemoyer v. Fulcomer, 923 F.2d 284, 298 (3d Cir. 1991) (finding that the defendant could not “meet his burden to show that counsel made errors so serious that his representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness based on vague and conclusory allegations that some unspecified and speculative testimony might have established his defense”). Such allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that Williams's trial counsel's representation was unreasonable. Therefore, Williams's ineffective assistance of counsel claims must fail as they are vague and conclusory.
5. State Law Claims
Williams asserts state law claims of negligence and conspiracy that are not cognizable on federal habeas review. (Doc. 2, at 1). “[F]ederal habeas corpus relief does not lie for errors of state law.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67 (quoting Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780 (1990)) “[I]t is not the province of a federal habeas court to reexamine state-court determinations on statelaw questions.” Estelle, 502 U.S. at 67-68; see alsoPulley, 465 U.S. at 41 (“A federal court may not issue the writ on the basis of a perceived error of state law.”); Engle, 456 U.S. at 120 n.19 (“If a state prisoner alleges no deprivation of a federal right, § 2254 is simply inapplicable.”).
Federal habeas review is limited to claims based “on the ground that [a petitioner] is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Williams's claims of negligence and conspiracy sound in state law and are thus improper in a habeas petition.
Further, Williams's claims for negligence and conspiracy are not supported by ANY factual allegations for the Court to assess his claims. (Doc. 2, at 2); see Simmms v. Carroll, 432 F.Supp.2d 443, 444 (D. Del. 2006) (quoting Mayberry v. Petsock, 821 F.2d 179, at 185 (3d Cir. 1987)) (“‘[B]ald assertions and conclusory allegations' do not provide a court with sufficient information to permit a proper assessment of habeas claims, and a habeas court cannot speculate about claims.”).
IV. Recommendation
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that Williams's petition (Doc. 1) be DENIED and DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and that the Clerk of Court be directed to CLOSE THIS CASE.
NOTICE
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the undersigned has entered the foregoing Report and Recommendation dated August 5, 2022. Any party may obtain a review of the Report and Recommendation pursuant to Rule 72.3, which provides:
Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.