Opinion
2:21-cv-00155-CMC-MGB
04-08-2021
Darrell Williams, # 219730, Plaintiff, v. Alan Wilson, South Carolina Attorney General, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
MARY GORDON BAKER, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Darrell Williams, a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on the grounds that Defendant Alan Wilson, the South Carolina Attorney General, violated his constitutional right to due process. Under Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2) (D.S.C.), the assigned U.S. Magistrate Judge is authorized to review the Complaint and submit a recommendation to the U.S. District Judge. For the following reasons, the undersigned recommends that this action be summarily dismissed, without prejudice and without issuance or service of process.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiffs Complaint is largely comprised of vague, incomplete allegations. Specifically, Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Wilson violated his due process rights "when the State failed to include issue in final collateral order on denial of post-conviction application." (Dkt. No. 1 at 5.) Plaintiff goes on to explain that,
During collateral review the respondent failed to address constitutionality of recidivist provision, but since respondent controls docket, writes orders, and authorizes assignment of counsel, the entire proceeding is marred by unfair practices of attorney general office handling judiciary functions. Actions by this office violate separation of powers doctrine.(Id. at 5-6.) As a result of Defendant Wilson's alleged actions, Plaintiff asserts that he has been "procedurally barred from addressing claim in federal court" and asks that this Court "allow defaulted issue to be reviewed." (Id. at 6.) This is the extent of Plaintiff s Complaint.
Notwithstanding the cursory, bare nature of these allegations, the undersigned finds adequate context and insight in Plaintiffs previous state and federal actions to complete judicial review here. Of particular relevance, the undersigned looks to Case No. 2:16-cv-02835-CMC-MGB, in which Plaintiff filed his third habeas corpus action before this Court contesting a 2008 criminal conviction and lifetime sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. (See Williams v. Reynolds, Case No. 2:16-cv-02835-CMC-MGB, hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 2835.") Plaintiffs sentence was enhanced under S.C. Code § 17-25-45-otherwise known as South Carolina's "recidivist statute"-which provides,
See Aloe Creme Labs., Inc. v. Francine Co., 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (noting that a federal court may take judicial notice of the contents of its own records, as well as those records and proceedings of other courts); Colonial Penn Ins. Co. v. Coil, 887 F.2d 1236, 1239 (4th Cir. 1989) (same); see also Tisdale v. South Carolina Highway Patrol, No. 0:09-cv-1009-HFF-PJG, 2009 WL 1491409, at *1 n1 (D.S.C. May 27, 2009), aff'd, 347 Fed.Appx. 965 (4th Cir. Aug. 27, 2009) (noting that the court may also take judicial notice of factual information located in postings on government web sites).
Specifically, Plaintiff was convicted of petitlarceny and first degree burglary. (See State v. Williams, Case No. 2008-GS-40-13175 (S.C. Gen. Sessions Sept. 24, 2008), hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 13175.")
[E]xcept in cases in which the death penalty is imposed, upon a conviction for a most serious offense as defined by this section, a person must be sentenced to a term of imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole if that person has either:
(1) one or more prior convictions for:
(a) a most serious offense; or
(b) a federal or out-of-state conviction for an offense that would be classified as a most serious offense under this section; or
(2) two or more prior convictions for:
(a) a serious offense; or
(b) a federal or out-of-state conviction for an offense that would be classified as a serious offense under this section.S.C. Code § 17-25-45(A); see also Muhammad v. Cartledge, No. 2:14-cv-3156 DCN, 2015 WL 3789617, at *5 (D.S.C. June 17, 2015) (noting that S.C. Code § 17-25-45 is "commonly referred to as the 'recidivist statute'"). In his petition for habeas relief, Plaintiff argued, among other things, that S.C. Code § 17-25-45 disproportionately affected black offenders, like him, such that his life sentence without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional ("Ground Four"). (Case No. 2835, Dkt. No. 1 at 10.) Plaintiff had raised this same issue before the Richland County Court of Common Pleas during his post-conviction relief ("PCR") proceedings, but to no avail. (See Williams v. State, Case No. 2013- CP-40-07117, hereinafter referred to as "Case No. 7117.") The PCR court ultimately dismissed Plaintiffs argument on the basis that any claims regarding the constitutionality of S.C. Code § 17- 25-45 were "not appropriate for post-conviction relief, but rather direct appeal."
The PCR court's final order explained that Plaintiff "had a full opportunity to argue [] the constitutionality of the statute ... at trial and on appeal," and that "[t]he public interest in finality of judgments requires that litigation must eventually come to an end." (Case No. 7117.) To be clear, Plaintiff did raise several arguments regarding the constitutionality of the recidivist statute as it was applied in his criminal case during his trial and on appeal; he did not, however, raise any arguments regarding the discriminatory impact on black offenders as alleged in his PCR proceedings and subsequent habeas action. As a result, the PCR court did not consider or decide the constitutionality of the recidivist statute in the context of racial disparity.
Accordingly, on May 24, 2017, the undersigned issued a report and recommendation in Case No. 2835, finding that Plaintiffs argument regarding the discriminatory application of S.C. Code § 17-25-45 was procedurally defaulted:
While the PCR court's order does not appear to address the specific claim set forth in Ground Four, the order does indicate that claims related to the constitutionality of § 17-25-45 were direct appeal issues.
Simply put, the time for raising Ground Four in state court was during trial, and Petitioner did not do so. Raising the claim before the PCR court-when the issue was one for direct appeal-does not render the claim exhausted.(Case No. 2835, Dkt. No. 35 at 19.) In his objections to the report and recommendation, Plaintiff argued that the PCR court's "total failure" to discuss the racial implications of S.C. Code § 17-25-45 necessitated discovery and further analysis on the merits. (Case No. 2835, Dkt. No. 57 at 16-20.) The assigned U.S. District Judge rejected this argument, however, and adopted the undersigned's conclusion:
While Petitioner raised this issue during his PCR hearing, he admitted he did not raise the issue at trial. . . . Because Petitioner did not raise the issue at trial, it was not preserved for appellate review and not considered on appeal. See State v. Dunbar, 587 S.E.2d 691, 693 (S.C. 2003) ("Issues not raised and ruled upon in the trial court will
not be considered on appeal.")- Therefore, this ground was not exhausted and is procedurally barred.(Case No. 2835, Dkt. No. 60 at 9-10.) The Court dismissed Plaintiffs § 2254 petition with prejudice, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed his subsequent appeal on October 19, 2018. (Case No. 2835, Dkt. Nos. 60, 80.) The U.S. Supreme Court then denied Plaintiffs petition for a writ of certiorari on April 1, 2019. (Case No. 2835, Dkt. No. 83.)
The Court reiterated that although Plaintiff may have raised certain constitutional challenges to S.C. Code §17- 25-45 at trial (i.e., cruel and unusual punishment), he did not present the argument regarding sentencing disparity. (See Case No. 2835, Dkt. No. 60 at 9 n.4, emphasizing that "challenging the constitutionality of the statute as it was applied in Petitioner's criminal case is different from alleging racial disparity in sentencing, as he does in the instant petition.")
Viewing the instant Complaint against the backdrop of Case Nos. -7117 and -2835, it appears Plaintiff is claiming that his right to due process was violated when the PCR court declined to consider his argument regarding the discriminatory impact of S.C. Code § 17-25-45-thereby rendering the issue procedurally defaulted for purposes of his subsequent habeas action-and seeking this Court's reconsideration of the same. Still unclear, however, is why Plaintiff attributes this procedural default to Defendant Wilson.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the pro se Complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996), including 28 U.S.C. § 1915 and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. This Complaint has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit, and is also governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the court to review a complaint filed by a prisoner that seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.
To protect against possible abuses, the court must dismiss any prisoner complaints, or portions of complaints, that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B), 1915A(b). A complaint is frivolous if it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact. Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992). Indeed, a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed sua sponte "at any time" under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)). Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989). The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that the statute "is designed largely to discourage the filing of, and waste of judicial and private resources upon, baseless lawsuits." Id. at 326.
As to failure to state a claim, a complaint filed in federal court must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). In order to satisfy this standard, a plaintiff must do more than make conclusory statements. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (explaining that the court need not accept as true a complaint's legal conclusions). Rather, the complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" See Id. (quoting Bell Ail. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). When "it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations," Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984), the complaint fails to state a claim.
Pro se complaints are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). A federal court is therefore charged with liberally construing a complaint filed by a pro se litigant to allow the development of a potentially meritorious case. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). Nonetheless, the requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure to allege facts that set forth a cognizable claim under Rule 8(a)(2). See Wetter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 901 F.2d 387, 390-91 (4th Cir. 1990); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 684 (outlining pleading requirements under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for "all civil actions"). Such is the case here.
DISCUSSION
I. Plaintiff Cannot Invoke 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to Appeal the PCR Court's Order of Dismissal
As suggested above, Plaintiffs Complaint essentially attempts to repackage his collateral claims regarding the discriminatory impact of S.C. Code § 17-25-45 as a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Indeed, the apparent goals of the instant pleading are for Plaintiff to challenge the PCR court's rejection-and, in turn, the subsequent procedural default-of this argument and to seek this Court's reconsideration of the same. It is well-established, however, that an inmate may not "appeal" an unfavorable decision by means of a § 1983 action. Duren v. Hood, No. 2:17-cv-1127- JMC-MGB, 2018 WL 3687977, at *7 (D.S.C. July 2, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 3660094 (D.S.C. Aug. 2, 2018). To the extent Plaintiff is displeased with the results of his PCR proceedings or his later habeas petition, this Court has explained:
Plaintiffs allegations about his displeasure ... are not properly raised in this case because they are more appropriate for argument on appeal. Neither a subsequent § 1983 claim, a mandamus action, a writ of prohibition, nor a habeas corpus petition may be used as a substitute for an appeal when the litigant is unhappy with the result in prior litigation. See Holsey v. Bass, 519 F.Supp. 395, 413 (D. Md. 1981) (§ 1983 claim expressing unhappiness with the outcome of prior litigation is frivolous and not a substitute for appeal).See Id. at 7-8; see also Mitchell v. McFadden, No. 5:17-cv-00105-BHH-KDW, 2017 WL 1380648, at *5 (D.S.C. Mar. 6, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 1374519 (D.S.C. Apr. 17, 2017).
This is especially true where, as here, the plaintiffs displeasure is primarily aimed at a state court's decision. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, a "party losing in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court." Am. Reliable Insure. Co. v. Stillwell, 336 F.3d 311, 316 (4th Cir. 2003) (citing Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)); see also Exxon Mobile Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005) (explaining that the doctrine prevents a federal court from asserting jurisdiction in cases brought by state court litigants dissatisfied with state court judgments and "inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments"). This general rule "extends not only to issues actually decided by a state court but also to those that are 'inextricably intertwined with questions ruled upon by a state court.'" See Boyd v. Simmons, No. 6:18-cv-576-BHH-JDA, 2018 WL 4999804, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 14, 2018), adopted, 2018 WL 4356579 (D.S.C. Sept. 13, 2018) (referencing Plyler v. Moore, 129 F.3d 728, 731 (4th Cir. 1997)). An issue is "inextricably intertwined" with a state court decision "if in order to grant the federal plaintiff the relief sought, the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered or must take action that would render the judgment ineffectual." Jordahl v. Democratic Party of Virginia, 122 F.3d 192, 202 (4th Cir. 1997).
This doctrine derives from two U.S. Supreme Court cases, Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923) and D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
Here, Plaintiffs only request for relief is that this Court consider the procedurally defaulted issue of whether S.C. Code § 17-25-45 disproportionately affects black offenders at sentencing. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) In order to grant this relief, however, the Court would have to override, or otherwise find invalid, the PCR court's determination that constitutional challenges to the recidivist statute- including Plaintiffs argument regarding racial disparity-should have been raised at Plaintiffs underlying criminal trial and/or on appeal and are therefore precluded from further judicial review. This is precisely the type of impermissible "appellate review" barred under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See, e.g., McQune v. Hutto, No. 2:17-cv-1747-RMG, 2017 WL 3868796, at *2 (D.S.C. Sept. 5, 2017) (dismissing pro se complaint in part because plaintiff challenged state court's denial of his PCR application in violation of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine); Bell v. South Carolina, No. 2:17-cv-2176-TMC, 2018 WL 263817 (D.S.C. Jan. 2, 2018), aff'd, 724 Fed.Appx. 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (same); see also Stanfield v. Charleston Cty. Court, No. 2:15-cv-0756-PMD-MGB, 2015 WL 4929186, *5 (D.S.C. Aug. 18, 2015) ("Despite Plaintiffs strenuous attempts to distinguish his cause of action as a violation of constitutional law as opposed to an attack on a state court judgment, Plaintiff has no claim independent of the adverse state-court decisions."). Thus, because this Court lacks jurisdiction to review the judicial decisions rendered in Plaintiffs PCR action and grant Plaintiff the relief he seeks, his Complaint is subject to summary dismissal.
The only relief explicitly sought in Plaintiff's Complaint is this Court's reconsideration of his argument regarding the discriminatory impact of S.C. Code § 17-25-45. (Dkt. No. 1 at 6.) However, to the extent Plaintiff intended for this relief to implicitly encompass speedier release from custody based on the purported unconstitutional application of the recidivist statute to his sentence, the undersigned notes that any such relief is unavailable under § 1983. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-90 (1973) (finding that habeas corpus is the exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release, even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983).
II. Defendant Wilson Is Not Liable Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Notwithstanding this Court's lack of jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims in the instant case, the undersigned notes that Plaintiffs Complaint is also subject to dismissal because Defendant Wilson is not liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. At the outset, the Complaint seems to be premised on the misconception that Defendant Wilson violated Plaintiffs constitutional rights because he was somehow responsible for the PCR court's refusal to consider the discriminatory impact of S.C. Code § 17-25-45. (Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) Defendant Wilson, however, is the chief prosecuting officer of the State; although he has the authority to supervise and facilitate the prosecution of criminal cases, he does not, as Attorney General, have any authority over the State judges tasked with deciding them. See S.C. Const, art V (delineating the roles and responsibilities of the Justices and judges of the South Carolina Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Circuit Court, and the State's law enforcement officials, prosecutors, administrative officers and Attorney General). Thus, to the extent Plaintiff is attempting to impute liability based on some sort of separation-of-powers violation, any such claim is misguided.
In any event, there is no indication that Defendant Wilson was personally involved in Plaintiff s PCR proceedings in the first instance. It is well-established that a person acting under color of state law can be held liable under § 1983 only if he or she was personally involved in the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional rights. Wilcox v. Brown, 877 F.3d 161, 170 (4th Cir. 2017). Accordingly, the doctrines of vicarious liability and respondeat superior generally are not applicable in § 1983 actions. See Polk Cnty. v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 325 (1981) (noting that "Section 1983 will not support a claim based on a respondeat superior theory of liability"); Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 ("Because vicarious liability is inapplicable to ... § 1983 suits, a plaintiff must plead that each Government-official defendant, through the official's own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.").
Even construing Plaintiffs claims liberally, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to raise any coherent allegations indicating that Defendant Wilson was personally involved in his underlying criminal case or PCR proceedings. At most, Plaintiffs Complaint alleges a very vague, if not unintelligible, claim against Defendant Wilson in his supervisory capacity over the Attorney General's Office. (See Dkt. No. 1 at 5-6.) Although respondeat superior does not apply to § 1983 actions, supervisory liability may be found if the plaintiff can demonstrate that the supervisory official's inaction amounted to deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of the unconstitutional actions of that official's subordinates. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1984), cert, denied, 470 U.S. 1035 (1985). This burden, however, cannot ordinarily be satisfied by highlighting a single incident, as Plaintiff has done herein. Brown v. Poplin, No. 3:10-cv-565, 2011 WL 5119476, at *10 (W.D. N.C. Oct. 27, 2011). Thus, the undersigned finds that Plaintiff has failed to allege any factual allegations that would subj ect Defendant Wilson to liability in the instant case. See Garner v. Cohen, No. 2:16-cv-561-TLW-MGB, 2016 WL 9175627, at *4 (D.S.C. Sept. 1, 2016), adopted, 2017 WL 2645754 (D.S.C. June 20, 2017) (finding complaint's "vague references to [pro se] Plaintiffs rights being violated, absent any specific facts or allegations against the Defendants, [were] wholly insufficient to state any sort of plausible claim").
The undersigned has not found any evidence in the relevant state court records to suggest that Defendant Wilson personally participated in Plaintiff's underlying criminal case or the subsequent PCR proceedings.
Although Plaintiff's Complaint does not seek monetary damages, the undersigned notes that any such requests would also be precluded by the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. Prosecutors, when acting within the scope of their duties, are entitled to absolute immunity from personal liability under 42 U.S.C § 1983 for alleged civil rights violations committed in the course of "activities intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process." Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); Dababnah v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 468 (4th Cir. 2000). Notably, this prosecutorial immunity extends to post-conviction proceedings. See Rice v. Nat'l Sec. Council, 244 F.Supp.2d 594, 602 (D.S.C. 2001), aff'dsub nom. Rice v. Mills, 46 Fed.Appx. 212 (4th Cir. 2002). Thus, although Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendant Wilson was personally involved in his criminal case or PCR proceedings, any such involvement would be intricately related to the criminal judicial process and protected from damages under the doctrine of prosecutorial immunity. See, e.g., Howell v. Gustafson, No. 5:17-cv-1297-JFA-TER, 2017 WL 9289375, at *6-7 (D.S.C. June 27, 2017), adopted, 2017 WL 3887159 (D.S.C. Sept. 6, 2017) (finding Attorney General Alan Wilson immune from damages suit under § 1983 based on actions taken during plaintiffs post-conviction relief proceedings); Baccus v. Stirling, No. 8:18-cv-1880-JFA-JDA, 2018 WL 8332581, at *5 (D.S.C. Oct. 15, 2018), adopted, 2019 WL 978866 (D.S.C. Feb. 28, 2019), aff'd, 776 Fed.Appx. 142 (4th Cir. 2019) (same).
CONCLUSION
In light of the foregoing, the undersigned is of the opinion that Plaintiff cannot cure the jurisdictional defects identified above (supra pp. 6-8) by amending his Complaint at this time. See Domino Sugar Corp. v. Sugar Workers Local Union 392 of United Food and Commercial Workers Int'l Union, 10 F.3d 1064 (4th Cir. 1993). Accordingly, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court decline to give Plaintiff leave to amend his Complaint and DISMISS this action against Defendant Wilson without prejudice and without issuance and service of process.
"[Dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be without prejudice because the court, having determined that it lacks jurisdiction over the action, is incapable of reaching a disposition on the merits of the underlying claims." See S. Walk at Broadlands Homeowner's Ass'n, Inc. v. OpenBand at Broadlands, LLC, 713 F.3d 175, 185 (4th Cir. 2013);see also Norton v. Columbus Cty. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 736 Fed.Appx. 406, 407 (4th Cir. 2018) (noting that a dismissal based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine should be issued without prejudice).
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
The parties' attention is directed to an important notice on the following page.
Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation
The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. "[I]n the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must 'only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.'" Diamond v. Colonial Life & Ace. Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 72 advisory committee's note).
Specific written objections must be filed within fourteen (14) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (d). Filing by mail pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:
Robin L. Blume, Clerk
United States District Court
Post Office Box 835
Charleston, South Carolina 29402
Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Thomas v. Am, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Wright v. Collins, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984).