Opinion
No. 05-04-00915-CV
Opinion issued August 24, 2005.
On Appeal from the 255 th Judicial District Court, Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. 78-18524-S.
Affirmed.
Before Justices WRIGHT, BRIDGES, and FITZGERALD.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant, Bobby Joe Williams, appeals the trial court's denial of his motion for entry of a qualified domestic relations order and/or a clarification of previously rendered divorce decree between Margaret Williams and himself. In his sole issue, Appellant contends the trial court erred in failing to clarify the final divorce decree. The facts are known to the parties so we do not recite them in any detail. Because all dispositive issues are clearly settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion pursuant to rule 47.1 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure. Tex.R.App.P. 47.1. We affirm.
Appellant contends that language found on page 6, paragraph 5 of the 1979 final decree of divorce between Appellee, Margaret Williams, and himself is ambiguous and does not qualify as a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO). He asserts the decree does not state whether the retirement pay benefit is to be determined as of the date of divorce or the date of retirement, and, therefore, the decree requires clarification.
The challenged language of the divorce decree is as follows:
MARGARET WILLIAMS is awarded the following property:
. . .
5. That portion of Petitioner's retirement at Coca-Cola Bottling Co., determined by dividing 101 by the number of months upon which Petitioner's retirement pay is based times the amount of the retirement pay.
101 ---------- × Monthly retirement benefit Number of months upon which retirement is based
As with other written instruments, whether a divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of law. Shanks v. Treadway, 110 S.W.3d 444, 447 (Tex. 2003) (citing Coker v. Coker, 650 S.W.2d 391, 394 (Tex. 1983)). If the written instrument is so worded that it can be given a certain or definite legal meaning or interpretation, then it is not ambiguous and the court will construe the contract as a matter of law. Coker, 650 S.W.2d at 393.
In this case, Appellee was awarded as her property a fraction of Appellant's monthly retirement benefit. The fraction is determined by dividing the numerator 101 by the number of months upon which Appellant's retirement is based, a number determinable at the date of his retirement. The denominator, the number of months upon which Appellant's retirement is based is a specific number calculable by Appellant's employer. The meaning of both the numerator and the denominator is certain. The divorce decree is unambiguous as to Appellee's portion of the Coca-Cola retirement benefit.
The district court cannot change the substantive division of property made in the original decree. Shanks, 110 S.W.3d at 449. Because the original decree in this case is unambiguous, the trial court had no authority to enter an order altering or modifying the original disposition of property. Id. Appellant's remedy for a substantive error of law by the trial court was by direct appeal, and he cannot now collaterally attack the judgment. Id. We overrule Appellant's sole issue.
We affirm the trial court's judgment.