Opinion
2:23-CV-01235-RJC-CRE
04-11-2024
RASHAD M. WILLIAMS, Plaintiff, v. JOHN E. WETZEL, FORMER SEC. PA. DEPT OF CORR.; GEORGE LITTLE, FORMER SEC. PA. DEPT OF CORR.; LAUREL R. HARRY, SEC. PA'S DOCS; ERIC T. ARMEL, FORMER SUPERINTENDENT, SCIF; TINA WALKER, SUPERINTENDENT SCI-FAYETTE; JOSEPH TREMPUS, FORMER DEPUTY SUPT.; MICHAEL TKACS, MARTIN SWITZER, DEPUTY SUPT. C/S; JOSHUA POSKA, MAJOR OF GUARD; MIKE HOWARD, F-BLOCK UNIT MANG.; CAPTAIN NEWMAN, B. A. KING, SERGEANT; CEKADA, CORRECTION OFFICER; ROBERT HAWKINBERRY, MAJOR OF UNIT MANG.; DEBRA HAWKINBERRY, CORRECTIONS CLASSIFICATION PROGRAM MANG.; JOHN DOE 1, RESTRICTED HOUSING UNIT C/O; JOHN DOE 2, RESTRICTED HOUSING UNIT C/O; JOHN DOE 3, RESTRICTED HOUSING UNIT LIEUTENANT; HALKIAS, CORRECTION OFFICER; B. RUDZIEWSKI, HEARING EXAMINER; WINKLEMAN, CORRECTION OFFICER; PEACHECK, CORRECTION OFFICER; LOIS ALLEN, M. BROWN, CORRECTION OFFICER; Defendants,
RASHAD M. WILLIAMS Attorneys of record via electronic filing
RASHAD M. WILLIAMS Attorneys of record via electronic filing
Honorable Robert J. Colville United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Cynthia Reed Eddy, United States Magistrate Judge.
I. RECOMMENDATION
This civil action was initiated pro se by Plaintiff Rashad M. Williams alleging that Defendants who are various officials of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) violated his civil rights in connection with his incarceration at Pennsylvania State Correctional Institution at Fayette (“SCI Fayette”).
Presently pending before the Court is a motion by Plaintiff for a preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order. (ECF No. 44). The motion is fully briefed and ripe for consideration. (ECF Nos. 44, 45, 47, 48). For the reasons below, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order be denied.
II. REPORT
a. Background
Plaintiff is in the custody of the DOC at SCI Fayette. He brings this prisoner civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against various Corrections Officials and several unidentified defendants alleging, inter alia, that Corrections Defendants violated his civil rights by placing him in a Restricted Housing Unit after being exposed to COVID-19 despite testing negative, being strip searched, not being provided legal documents and personal property, and was falsely accused of failing to obey an order and falsified a misconduct against Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks monetary damages, declaratory relief and injunctive relief for, among other things, arranging a transfer to a DOC facility in eastern Pennsylvania and expunge the allegedly fraudulent misconduct.
In his motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order, Plaintiff argues that because he filed grievances and civil actions, he has “experienced retaliation through [the] fraudulent misconduct report” issued on July 3, 2021. (ECF No. 45) at 1. Plaintiff requests the following:
• A temporary restraining order requiring the Defendants to cease retaliation, including “fraudulent cell-searches, unwarranted pat downs, fraudulent write-ups, illegal placement in the RHU, etc, ” (ECF No. 44 at ¶ 6).
Defendants respond that Plaintiff has failed to establish a likelihood of success on the merits and has failed to show that he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is denied. Defendants have not yet filed an answer or responsive motion to Plaintiff's amended complaint, which is due May 1, 2024. (ECF No. 42).
b. Standard of Review
Inmate pro se pleadings, like those filed here, which seek extraordinary, or emergency relief, in the form of injunctions and restraining orders are governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and are judged against exacting legal standards. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has explained:
Four factors govern a district court's decision whether to issue a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will be irreparably injured by denial of the relief, (3) whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and (4) whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest.Gerardi v. Pelullo, 16 F.3d 1363 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting SI Handling Sys., Inc. v. Heisley, 753 F.2d 1244, 1254 (3d Cir. 1985)).
A preliminary injunction is not granted as a matter of right. Kershner v. Mazurkiewicz, 670 F.2d 440, 443 (3d Cir. 1982). It is an extraordinary remedy. Given the extraordinary nature of this form of relief, a motion for preliminary injunction places precise burdens on the moving party. As a threshold matter, “it is a movant's burden to show that the ‘preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm.' ” Emile v. SCI-Pittsburgh, No. CIV A 04-974, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 24, 2006) (quoting Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992)). Thus, when considering such requests, courts are cautioned that:
[A] preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.” Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997) (emphasis deleted). Furthermore, the Court must recognize that ‘an [i]njunction is an equitable remedy which should not be lightly indulged in, but used sparingly and only in a clear and plain case.' Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland Typographical Union #53, 520 F.2d 1220, 1230 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 428 U.S. 909 (1977). As a corollary to the principle that preliminary injunctions should issue only in a clear and plain case, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has observed that “upon an application for a preliminary injunction to doubt is to deny.” Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Braddock, 90 F.2d 924, 927 (3d Cir. 1937).Emile, 2006 WL 2773261, at *6.
Accordingly, for an inmate to sustain his burden of proof that he is entitled to a preliminary injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, he must demonstrate both a reasonable likelihood of success on the merits and that he will be irreparably harmed if the requested relief is not granted. Abu-Jamal v. Price, 154 F.3d 128, 133 (3d Cir. 1998). If the movant fails to carry this burden on either of these elements, the motion should be denied since a party seeking such relief must “demonstrate both a likelihood of success on the merits and the probability of irreparable harm if relief is not granted.” Hohe v. Casey, 868 F.2d 69, 72 (3d Cir. 1989).
These limitations on the power of courts to enter injunctions in a correctional context are further underscored by statute. Specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the authority of courts to enjoin the exercise of discretion by prison officials, and provides that:
Prospective relief in any civil action with respect to prison conditions shall extend no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right of a particular plaintiff or plaintiffs. The court shall not grant or approve any prospective relief unless the court finds that such relief is narrowly drawn, extends no further than necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right, and is the least intrusive means necessary to correct the violation of the Federal right. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief.18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A).
With respect to preliminary injunctions sought by inmates, courts are also instructed that:
Preliminary injunctive relief must be narrowly drawn, extend no further than necessary to correct the harm the court finds requires preliminary relief, and be the least intrusive means necessary to correct that harm. The court shall give substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the operation of a criminal justice system caused by the preliminary relief and shall respect the principles of comity . . . in tailoring any preliminary relief....18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(2).
Furthermore, it is well settled that “[t]he purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to decide the issues on the merits.” Anderson v. Davila, 125 F.3d 148, 156 (3d Cir. 1997). Therefore, in a case such as this, where the inmate-“Plaintiff's request for immediate relief in his motion for preliminary injunction necessarily seeks resolution of one of the ultimate issues presented in [the] . . . Complaint, ... [the] Plaintiff cannot demonstrate that he will suffer irreparable harm if he is not granted a preliminary injunction, because the ultimate issue presented will be decided either by this Court or at trial.” Messner v. Bunner, No. CIV.A. 07-112, 2009 WL 1406986, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 19, 2009).
c. Discussion
Judged against these exacting standards, Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief fails. Plaintiff must show the irreparable harm he will suffer “cannot be redressed by a legal or an equitable remedy following trial.” Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797, 801 (3d Cir. 1989) (“The preliminary injunction must be the only way of protecting the plaintiff from harm”). While the Court does not in any way diminish Plaintiff's complaints, he has not established that he will suffer irreparable injury if he is not granted the injunctive relief, as the relief he seeks directly relates to and is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the ultimate issues in this lawsuit.
In his amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his constitutional rights by retaliating against him by fabricating a misconduct and placing him in the RHU for an unspecified amount of time, and did not provide him with his legal materials or personal property because he filed grievances and a lawsuit against DOC officials, and he seeks the Court to declare those actions unconstitutional and to transfer Plaintiff to a DOC facility in eastern Pennsylvania and to expunge the allegedly fraudulent misconduct. In his motion for injunctive relief, he asks the Court to enjoin Defendants from engaging in future conduct that he alleges is retaliatory, including performing “fraudulent cell-searches, unwarranted pat downs, fraudulent write-ups, [and] illegal placement in the RHU.” (ECF No. 44 at 1). Plaintiff fails to articulate a presently existing threat of irreparable injury and instead seeks an injunction for speculative future harm or based on past harm that he outlines in his amended complaint. Holiday Inns of Am., Inc. v. B & B Corp., 409 F.2d 614, 618 (3d Cir. 1969) (a preliminary injunction “may not be used simply to eliminate the possibility of a remote future injury.”); Fisher v. Goord, 981 F.Supp. 140, 168 (W.D.N.Y. 1997) (“A preliminary injunction cannot be issued based on past harm.”). Likewise, ruling on the motion for preliminary injunctive relief might be perceived as speaking in some way to the ultimate issues in this case. In such instances, the Court should refrain from prematurely granting such relief. The ultimate issues regarding Plaintiff's First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights will either be decided on a dispositive motion, or at trial. Accordingly, at this stage of the proceedings, Plaintiff has not established that he will suffer irreparable harm if his motion is denied.
Further, the Court notes that Defendants' interest and the public interest in penological order could be adversely affected if the Court began dictating the treatment for Plaintiff, who is one inmate out of thousands in the state prison system. Therefore, consideration of “whether granting preliminary relief will result in even greater harm to the nonmoving party; and . . . whether granting the preliminary relief will be in the public interest,” Gerardi, 16 F.3d at 1373, also weighs heavily against Plaintiff in this case, especially where Plaintiff is seeking for the Court to enjoin the DOC from engaging in safety measures like cell searches or “pat downs” or from disciplining inmates. Accordingly, granting this extraordinary relief could harm the public's interest and the interests of the opposing parties.
As a result, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order be denied.
d. Conclusion
Based on the above, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's motion for preliminary injunction/temporary restraining order (ECF No. 44) be denied.
Therefore, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72, and the Local Rules for Magistrates, unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge, the parties have until April 29, 2024 to object to this report and recommendation. Unless otherwise ordered by the District Judge, responses to objections are due fourteen days after the service of the objections. Failure to file timely objections will waive any appellate rights. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011).