Opinion
No. 21670.
April 7, 1952.
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT, CARROLL COUNTY, JAMES S. ROONEY, J.
Chas. L. Graham, Christian F. Stipp, Carrollton, for appellant.
John Franken, Carrollton, for respondent.
This action was instituted in the Circuit Court and seeks to recover judgment for $500 against the administrator of the estate of Richard F. Cook, deceased, loaned before the latter's death to his guardian, and represented by the guardian's unsecured promissory note, payable on demand. The petition alleged that the claim is an equitable lien against all the assets of the estate of the deceased, since the proceeds were necessary and were used for the support and maintenance of the ward. The court gave judgment to the plaintiff and against the defendant administrator for $500, with interest, declared the same a lien on all the assets in the hands of the administrator, ordered the claim to be assigned to the fifth class of demands against the said estate, and ordered the judgment certified to the Probate Court of Carroll County, Missouri, for such classification. Plaintiff had dismissed as to all the defendants except the former guardian, the administrator and Jennie Vaughan, the sister and sole heir of the deceased.
Prior to the institution of this suit plaintiff filed his claim in the Probate Court, where it was allowed, and afterwards the allowance was set aside, the claim withdrawn and this proceeding was then filed in the Circuit Court. Defendant Jennie Vaughan has appealed.
The pertinent allegations of the petition are that Richard F. Cook died vested with an interest in certain described real estate under the will of his predeceased wife; that on October 18, 1948, he was declared a person of unsound mind and defendant Wade W. Maupin was then appointed and qualified as guardian of his person and estate; that for the purpose of necessary support and maintenance of said ward, the guardian, on December 8, 1948, borrowed from the plaintiff $500, there being no other funds available for such purposes; that all of the funds so borrowed were expended for such necessaries of the ward; that the guardian executed and delivered his promissory demand note to the plaintiff for the said sum of $500; that on December 26, 1948, Richard F. Cook died intestate, whereupon, on December 31, 1948, said Wade W. Maupin was appointed and qualified as administrator of the estate of Richard F. Cook, deceased; that demand has been made of the administrator for payment of the note; that no part of the same has been paid and the principal sum of the note is now due and unpaid. The prayer asked for judgment against the administrator for $500, with interest and costs, for an adjudication that if the personal estate of the deceased be insufficient to pay the said amount, that the real estate described be sold to satisfy the judgment.
Jennie Vaughan filed a motion to dismiss the petition as failing to state a claim on which relief could be granted and for the reason that the note was unauthorized under the law. This motion was overruled. The joint answer of Wade W. Maupin, as guardian and administrator, was in the nature of a general denial. Jennie Vaughan then filed her separate answer, pleading again the insufficiency of the petition to state a cause of action as against any of the defendants, and alleging that there was sufficient available property for the maintenance of the ward after the guardian was appointed; that the giving of the note and the borrowing of the amount thereof from the plaintiff were without authority of law and void.
After the filing of this action and before trial, it was decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri in an action brought by Jennie Vaughan, that certain heirs and devisees of Lockie A. Cook, deceased wife of Richard F. Cook, (being the defendants dismissed in the present action), took no interest in the real estate disposed of by her will, and that the same was vested in Richard F. Cook. This is the same real estate as described in the petition herein. Vaughan v. Compton, 361 Mo. 467, 235 S.W.2d 328.
The trial court in the present case found that the real estate was vested in Richard F. Cook at his death; that he had been adjudged insane; that Wade W. Maupin had been appointed his guardian; that said Cook died intestate, leaving defendant Jennie Vaughan as his sole heir; that prior to the death of Richard F. Cook, and on December 8, 1948, there being no other funds available for necessary support, medical care and maintenance, defendant Wade W. Maupin, guardian, did borrow the sum of $500 from the plaintiff for said purposes, for which the guardian gave the note described, and spent the proceeds thereof for the support and maintenance of Richard F. Cook, by reason of which said claim is, in equity, a lien against all of the assets belonging to his estate. It was further adjudged that the plaintiff have and recover of the defendant administrator $500, with interest at six percent per annum, and that said claim be assigned to the fifth class of demands. It was further ordered that the judgment be certified to the Probate Court of Carroll County, Missouri, for classification against the estate of Richard F. Cook, deceased.
In her motion for new trial defendant Vaughan again asserted that the petition failed to state a cause of action and alleged that the judgment was against the law and the evidence. This motion was overruled.
There is no dispute that the real estate in question was the property of Richard F. Cook at his death; that he had been declared insane and his guardian was appointed, as pleaded; that the plaintiff had furnished $500 for the support and maintenance of the ward; that the guardian gave to plaintiff his unsecured promissory note for $500 to cover the $500 loaned, payable on demand; that no application was ever made to the Probate Court for an order to make such a loan or to give the note therefor, and that no such order was made on the note no payments have been made on the note and no demand was made of the guardian for payment; that the ward died December 26, 1948, intestate, the guardianship terminated and on December 31, 1948, Wade W. Maupin was appointed administrator of the estate of Richard F. Cook, deceased, to whom Wade W. Maupin, guardian, turned over all of the assets of said guardianship estate; that defendant Jennie Vaughan is the sister and sole heir of Richard F. Cook, deceased.
There is no contention that the proceeds of the loan were used or retained by the guardian or administrator for his personal use. It is admitted that no effort was made during the guardianship to mortgage the real estate or to sell any personal property to obtain funds to maintain and support the ward, although it was shown that an order was made for the guardian to sell the real estate for that purpose, which order was never carried out because the ward died eleven days thereafter. It is disputed that there was insufficient personal property in the ward's estate for his support and maintenance at the time $500 was borrowed from the plaintiff. There was evidence that $100 of the loan had been advanced by plaintiff for the ward's support before the guardianship, and that $400 was later's sent by him to the guardian at the latter's solicitation. Upon the last remittance plaintiff requested the two last advancements be "considered loans", and the guardian sent him the note in question. If the petition does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action it is unnecessary that the evidence be further reviewed.
Defendant Jennie Vaughan contends, in substance, that it appears on the face of the petition that no cause of action is stated against her and no judgment against her was prayed nor rendered; that no cause of action is stated against Wade W. Maupin, guardian, since he was long since discharged as such, and the estate closed; that no cause of action is stated against Wade W. Maupin, administrator, because the claim is based on the note sued on, and that a guardian cannot bind either his ward's estate by contract, nor his ward's administrator thereby; that there is no statutory law authorizing a guardian of an insane ward to borrow money for the ward on the unsecured promissory note of the guardian, much less to do so without any order or approval of the Probate Court.
A guardian of an insane person is a creature of the statutes. Whatever authority, powers or duties that are vested in such a guardian are those and only those which are contained in the statutes of his creation. Scott v. Royston, 223 Mo. 568, 609, 123 S.W. 454, 466; Greever v. Barker, 316 Mo. 308, 289 S.W. 586. The statutes to which the plaintiff in this case must look for the validity of the claim or promissory note, which is the basis of this action, are those contained in Chapter 458, RSMo 1949, V.A.M.S. Certain sections therein contained define and circumscribe the authority of the guardian to obtain funds necessary for the support and maintenance of the ward when the personal property on hand is insufficient, and prescribe the manner in which that may be done. See discussion of these sections in our opinion in First National Bank of Carrollton v. Vaughan, Mo.App., 248 S.W.2d 677, a companion case herewith and filed this date. There is no provision in any of those statutes nor elsewhere which authorize a guardian of an insane ward, with or without an order of the Probate Court, to obligate the estate of the ward for any sum borrowed on the unsecured promissory note of the guardian.
Hence the note and the indebtedness in this case are without any authority of law and are void. Since the transaction did not, therefore, constitute a valid claim against the estate of the ward, it cannot, for the same reason, be a valid claim against the administrator of the ward's estate after death.
But the plaintiff asserts that the petition states a cause in equity since the petition avers that the money was borrowed because necessary for the care and maintenance, medical and hospital expense of the ward, and was so used, and, therefore, is an equitable lien on all the assets of the estate of Richard F. Cook, deceased. As was pointed out in First National Bank of Carrollton v. Vaughan, supra, equity follows the law, and courts of equity have no authority to disregard plain provisions of the statutes, nor to unsettle rights of parties clearly established by law. Aetna Ins. Co. v. O'Malley, 342 Mo. 800, 816, 118 S.W.2d 3; Straube v. Bowling Green Gas Co., 360 Mo. 132, 142, 227 S.W.2d 666, 18 A.L.R.2d 1335; 19 Am.Jur. p. 314. It is true there are cases where relief was granted in equitable proceedings against the administrators of the estates of deceased insane persons, wherein certain procedural requirements of the statutes had not or could not be complied with under the guardianship, and where the estate of the ward had been benefited by transactions otherwise lawful, such as sale or mortgage of real estate, to the loss of the claimant, but no such case has been cited to us nor have we been able to find any wherein the claim arose out of a transaction, the very nature of which was wholly unauthorized by the plain provisions of the governing statutes. A party dealing with a guardian of an insane person is charged with knowledge of the authority of the guardian in the premises. He may not be charged with knowledge of defects not shown of record, but, in the absence of fraud, he must know if the guardian is authorized by law to enter into a transaction of the nature attempted. Phillips v. Phoenix Trust Co., 332 Mo. 327, 332, 58 S.W.2d 318; Continental Casualty Co. v. Pleitsch, Mo.App. 111 S.W.2d 956, 959.
It is our conclusion that the petition in this case fails to state facts sufficient to state a cause of action and should be dismissed. It is, therefore, not necessary to discuss the other points raised on this appeal. The judgment and decree are reversed and plaintiff's petition dismissed.
All concur.