Opinion
3:24-cv-1661-S-BN
07-16-2024
JAY WILLIAMS, #2300216, Plaintiff, v. U.S. COURT, Defendant.
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
DAVID L. HORAN UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Plaintiff Jay Williams, incarcerated at the Navarro County jail, filed a pro se civil complaint against Defendant U.S. Court, alleging “harm by way of trespass of defamation of character” and that the defendant “refused to protect [his] religious beliefs”; “refused to provide lawyers”; “refused to contact lawyers”; “refused to free U.S.A. citizens who are in forced slavery”; and “refused to prosecute treason and other criminal act.” Dkt. No. 3 (cleaned up).
The presiding United States district judge referred the complaint to the undersigned United States magistrate judge for pretrial management under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and a standing order of reference.
The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) requires that, where a plaintiff is imprisoned or detained pending trial and seeks relief from a governmental entity or employee, a district court must, on initial screening, identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, that “is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).
Under this obligation, the Court construes the complaint has alleging claims against federal judges and/or judicial employees acting at the direction of those judges and recommends that the complaint be summarily dismissed under the PLRA for the following reasons.
“[A] judge generally has absolute immunity from suits for damages.” Davis v. Tarrant Cnty., Tex., 565 F.3d 214, 221 (5th Cir. 2009) (citing Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 9-10 (1991)).
“Judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just the ultimate assessment of damages.” Id. (citing Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citing, in turn, Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985))).
There are only two circumstances under which judicial immunity may be overcome. “First, a judge is not immune from liability for nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge's judicial capacity.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 11 (citations omitted). “Second, a judge is not immune for actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” Id. (citations omitted). Allegations of bad faith or malice are not sufficient to overcome judicial immunity. Id. Id.; see also Clay v. Allen, 242 F.3d 679, 682 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Court [employees] ‘have absolute immunity from actions for damages arising from acts they are specifically required to do under court order or at a judge's discretion.'” (quoting Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010, 1013 (5th Cir. Unit A June 1981))); Mitchell v. McBryde, 944 F.2d 229, 230-31 (5th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he judge's law clerk, when assisting the judge in carrying out the former's judicial functions, is likewise entitled to absolute immunity.” (citations omitted)).
Because Williams alleges no facts that could demonstrate that judicial immunity can be overcome, the complaint must be dismissed.
Recommendation
The Court should dismiss the complaint with prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
A copy of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions, and recommendation must file specific written objections within 14 days after being served with a copy. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); FED. R. CIV. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions, and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).