Opinion
Crim. File No. 00-349(1) (PAM/JGL)
April 11, 2002
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Petitioner Alonzo Williams' Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The crux of Williams' Motion is that he was represented by ineffective counsel who failed to inform him that he was pleading guilty to an offense involving crack cocaine. Williams, therefore, argues that his guilty plea was not intelligently made and that his sentence should be vacated. For the following reasons, the Court denies the Motion.
Williams has also filed a Motion to Compel Response or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment and a Motion for Oral Argument. Because the Government has responded to Williams' § 2255 Motion, the Court denies as moot Williams' Motion to compel a response from the Government or for summary judgment. Williams' Motion for Oral Arguments is merely a request for oral argument pursuant to Local Rule 7.1(b)(2)(E). In this case, there is no need for any further hearings in this matter. Accordingly, the Court denies Williams' request for oral argument.
Initially, it is important to note that an evidentiary hearing in a § 2255 motion is not needed where the facts are undisputed or where any dispute that exists can be resolved on the basis of the trial record. Hampton v. Wyrick, 588 F.2d 632, 634 (8th Cir. 1978). Because the previous proceedings at issue were before this Court, an evidentiary hearing is not necessary in this case.
A guilty plea is valid so long as it was a voluntary and intelligent choice made by the defendant. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 56 (1985). A defendant who pleads guilty based on the advice of counsel may attack the voluntary and intelligent character of the plea only by showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and that counsel's error resulted in prejudice. Id. at 57-58. In order to satisfy the prejudice prong, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he or she would have not pled guilty and would have insisted going to trial. Id. at 59. A presumption exists that counsel's representation was sufficient. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690 (1984).
Williams asserts that he was not informed by his counsel that he was pleading guilty to an offense involving crack cocaine. This bald assertion, however, is not supported by the record. The Plea Agreement, signed by Williams, specified that Williams was responsible for "cocaine base." (Plea Agreement at 1.) At the Rule 11 proceeding, Williams acknowledged that his Base Offense Level was 32 based on the amount of "crack cocaine" to which he was pleading guilty. (Plea Tr. at 6.) He also confirmed throughout the Rule 11 proceeding that he was involved in a conspiracy to possess or sell "cocaine base," he knew that the sale of this "cocaine base" violated the law, the plea itself involved "cocaine base," and that his involvement with "cocaine base" violated federal law. (See id. at 19-20.) When questioned further, Williams acknowledged that he had spoken with his attorney and understood that because of the amount of "crack cocaine" involved, he had violated federal law. (Id. at 20-21.) The record clearly evidences that Williams had notice of the true nature of the crime charged against him.
Williams has no other meritorious argument that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. In fact, Williams was effectively represented by each of his numerous defense counsel. Prior to the Rule 11 proceedings, Williams' counsel took aggressive defense measures, including filing extensive pretrial motions. Counsel also made arrangements to obtain a proffer agreement with the Government to earn a downward departure for Williams. Counsel then negotiated a Plea Agreement with the Government, which provided Williams with a three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, the dismissal of the four remaining counts of the indictment, and an applicable sentencing range of 140 to 175 months. Further, the Government was persuaded by Williams' counsel to refrain from filing a motion for enhancement based on Williams' prior narcotics convictions.
At the Rule 11 proceedings, the Court confirmed that defense counsel had answered all of Williams' questions and that Williams was satisfied with his counsel's representation. The Court then determined that Williams had sufficiently conferred with his attorney about, adequately reviewed, and agreed to the Plea Agreement.
Following the Rule 11 proceedings, Williams' counsel objected to portions of the Presentence Report ("PSR") that would have raised Williams' sentencing range to 262 to 327 months. Counsel was able to persuade the Court to reject the PSR's recommendation for the enhanced career offender guidelines and to accept the guideline range agreed to in the Plea Agreement. Further, the Court was persuaded by counsel to impose the lowest sentence within that guideline range. Additionally, absent the Plea Agreement, on the first count alone, Williams was subject to a statutory minimum term of imprisonment for ten years. Had Williams been convicted on each count in the indictment, he could have been sentenced to more than 30 years of imprisonment. The 140-month imprisonment term agreed to in the Plea Agreement was significantly less than the likely sentence Williams would have received had he been convicted.
The Court finds that Williams has failed to show that his counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Thus, it is unnecessary to evaluate whether Williams was prejudiced by the representation. Accordingly, based on all the files, records and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that
1. Petitioner's Motion to Vacate, Set Aside or Correct Sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (Clerk Doc. No. 111) is DENIED;
2. Petitioner's Motion to Compel or in the Alternative for a Summary Judgment (Clerk Doc. No. 116) is DENIED as moot; and
3. Petitioner's request for oral argument is DENIED.