We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Onyiah as the nonmoving party and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor. See Williams v. UPS , 963 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2020). Summary judgment should be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
King's remaining arguments essentially boil down to an assertion that GALB's stated reasons for terminating him are false, which is a recognized method of proving pretext. See Appellant Br. 54-56; Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2020) (stating one way to show pretext "is by demonstrating that the employer's stated reason for the termination is false"); Phillips, 547 F.3d at 913 ("An employee may prove pretext by demonstrating that the employer's proffered reason has no basis in fact ...." (citation omitted)). "Plaintiffs taking this path must show ‘both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.’ "
Commonly, plaintiffs show pretext by showing that the employer's stated reason is false, or through the disparate treatment of similarly situated employees. Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 808-09 (8th Cir. 2020). When proving a reason is pretext by showing that the employer's reason is false, the plaintiff must also show that discrimination was the real reason for the adverse action.
Finally, while Plaintiff does not address this point in her briefing, at all, the Court construes Plaintiff's Response to Defendant's Statement of Material Facts, see, e.g., Doc. [49] ¶ 145, and Plaintiff's own Additional Statement of Material Facts, Doc. [50] ¶¶ 39-46, as an attempt to also argue pretext by presenting evidence that NCU treated Plaintiff and other similarly-situated employees of the same age and race in the same manner. Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2020) (explaining pretext may be shown by presenting evidence that the employer “treated similarly-situated employees in a disparate manner” which is a “rigorous” standard). Plaintiff points to NCU's treatment of Vera Billingsley, Barbara Foster, and Bridget Elliot.
See Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2020). “There are multiple ways
To establish pretext, a plaintiff must both discredit an employer's asserted reason for termination and show that the circumstances permit drawing the reasonable inference that the real reason for terminating the plaintiff was unlawful discrimination. Twymon v. Wells Fargo & Co., 462 F.3d 925, 935 (8th Cir. 2006); Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2020). Plaintiff have fallen well short of satisfying their burden of proof as to either.
(Filing 84-4, Simmons Decl. ¶¶ 9(c), 9(d) & Attch. E). Nor has Jerabek convinced the court that her age more likely motivated the Defendant's adverse employment actions. Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2020) (plaintiffs seeking to show pretext in this way must show “both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” (citation omitted)).
Where no direct evidence of discrimination is present, a plaintiff must satisfy her burden of proving intentional discrimination by using the familiar burden-shifting framework announced in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), for both § 1981 and Title VII claims. Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 2020) (§ 1981 claim); Shirrell v. St. Francis Med. Ctr., 793 F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2015) (Title VII claim). Under that framework, the plaintiff “must first establish a prima facie case of discrimination.”
"Although we view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, we do not credit mere allegations, unsupported by specific facts or evidence." Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc. , 963 F.3d 803, 807 (8th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). A.
The Eighth Circuit has repeatedly held that without additional evidence of retaliatory animus, an interval of more than two months is too long to support an inference of causation. Onyiah, 5 F.4th at 930; Lissick v. Andersen Corp., 996 F.3d 876, 883 (8th Cir. 2021); Williams v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 963 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2020). Additionally, timing alone is insufficient to establish a causal connection if a plaintiff engages in intervening unprotected conduct.