Opinion
Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-1621
04-16-2020
MORRIS A. WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. ERIC TICE, et al., Respondents.
Judge David S. Cercone
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the petition for a writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 3) filed by state prisoner Morris A. Williams ("Petitioner") under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Federal district courts have a pre-service duty to screen and summarily dismiss habeas petitions that plainly show the petitioner is not entitled to relief. See Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the Court dismiss the petition with prejudice because the claims he brings in it are untimely under the applicable one-year statute of limitations, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). It is further recommended that the Court deny a certificate of appealability.
II. REPORT
A. Relevant Background
The following background is from information contained in the petition and the attached exhibits, as well as the public record, of which the Court takes judicial notice, including: (1) the decisions issued by the Superior Court of Pennsylvania in Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1920 WDA 2013, 2014 WL 10919654, *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. June 9, 2014) ("Williams I") and Commonwealth v. Williams, No. 1197 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1568782, *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Apr. 11, 2019) ("Williams II"); (2) the dockets of Petitioner's state-court criminal cases before the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County at CP-02-CR-7597-1987 and CP-02-CR-8029-1987 (which were consolidated for trial and which are referred to as "Criminal Case No. 1") and CP-02-CR-8406-1987 (which is the case at issue in this habeas action and which is referred to as "Criminal Case No. 2"); and, (3) the federal habeas case Petitioner filed with this Court in 1998 in Williams v. Sobina, 2:98-cv-491.
1. Criminal Case No. 1
In November 1987, Petitioner was tried in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in Criminal Case No. 1. A jury convicted him of second-degree murder and robbery, and on January 6, 1988 the court sentenced him to a term of life imprisonment for the second-degree murder conviction and a concurrent term of 10 to 20 years for the robbery conviction. The Superior Court of Pennsylvania affirmed his judgment of sentence on December 28, 1988. Williams I, No. 1920 WDA 2013, 2014 WL 10919654 at *1.
Petitioner initiated a federal habeas case with this Court in March 1998 and it was docketed at Williams v. Sobina, 2:98-cv-491. In the petition for a writ of habeas corpus he filed in that case (the "1998 Habeas Petition"), Petitioner challenged the validity of his convictions in Criminal Case No. 1. On March 31, 1998, this Court dismissed all of Petitioner's claims because he filed them outside of the applicable one-year statute of limitations, which is codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) and which is discussed in more detail below, and closed the case.
2. Criminal Case No. 2
In December 1987, Petitioner was convicted of robbery in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County in Criminal Case No. 2. The court sentenced him to a term of 7 ½ to 15 years of imprisonment, to be served consecutively to his other sentences. See Williams II, No. 1197 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1568782 at *1. This is the judgment of sentence that Petitioner challenges in the habeas action now before this Court.
The Superior Court affirmed Petitioner's judgment of sentence in Criminal Case No. 2 on December 19, 1988. He had 30 days to file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. Pa.R.A.P. 1113(a). He did not file one. Accordingly, his judgment of sentence became final under both state and federal law on January 18, 1989. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9545(b)(3) and Williams II, No. 1197 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1568782 at *2; 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A) and Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U.S. 134, 149-50 (2012).
In October 2015, Petitioner filed in Criminal Case No. 2 his first petition for relief under Pennsylvania's Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA"), 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9541 et seq. Williams II, No. 1197 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1568782 at *2. On April 2, 2018, the Court of Common Pleas issued an order in which it notified Petitioner that it intended to deny the PCRA petition without a hearing. (Pet's Ex. 1, ECF No. 3-1 at 1). On July 11, 2018, it issued its final order denying the PCRA petition. Williams II, No. 1197 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1568782 at *1. The Superior Court affirmed in Williams II, which it decided on April 11, 2019. It held that Petitioner's claims were untimely under the PCRA's one-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied a petition for allowance of appeal on October 1, 2019. (Pet's Ex. 3, ECF No. 3-3 at 1).
There was a delay in the disposition of Petitioner's PCRA case because the Court of Common Pleas initially denied the PCRA petition without first appointing Petitioner the counsel to which he was entitled under state law. Williams II, No. 1197 WDA 2018, 2019 WL 1568782 at *2. It appointed counsel for him in May 2017, and that counsel subsequently filed a petition to withdraw and a no-merit letter. Id. In its April 2, 2018 order, the Court of Common Pleas granted counsel's motion for leave to withdraw. Id. (See also Pet's Ex. 1, ECF No. 3-1 at 1).
3. Petitioner's 2019 Rule 60(b) Motion in Williams v. Sobina , 2:98-cv-491
In October 2019, Petitioner filed a motion with this Court in his 1998 federal habeas case at Williams v. Sobina, 2:98-cv-491, which had been closed for more than 20 years. He purported to bring his motion under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. He challenged the judgments of sentences imposed by the Court of Common Pleas in both Criminal Case No. 1 and Criminal Case No. 2. As relief, Petitioner sought an order from this Court that vacated his sentences in both cases and directed that he be immediately released from custody.
When a state prisoner files a Rule 60(b) motion in a federal habeas case, the district court must first evaluate whether the motion is actually an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524 (2005). That is because the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"), codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), mandates that before a state prisoner may file a second or successive habeas petition in which he challenges a judgment of sentence that he previously challenged in a federal habeas action, he must first obtain an order from the appropriate court of appeals authorizing the district court to consider the application. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). See, e.g., Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320, 330-31 (2010). AEDPA's allocation of "gatekeeping" responsibilities to the courts of appeals has divested district courts of jurisdiction over habeas applications that are second or successive. See, e.g., Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007). A state prisoner cannot avoid AEDPA's second or successive gatekeeping mechanism by raising habeas claims in a filing that he designates as a Rule 60(b) motion. BRIAN R. MEANS, FEDERAL HABEAS MANUAL § 11:42, Westlaw (database updated May 2019) (a habeas petitioner "is not permitted to circumvent AEDPA's second or successive petition requirements simply by labeling the petition or motion as something other than what it is.").
On December 9, 2019, the undersigned issued a Report and Recommendation in which it was recommended that the Court dismiss Petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion. It was explained that to the extent that Petitioner's motion challenged his judgment of sentence in Criminal Case No. 1, the motion was in actuality an unauthorized second or successive habeas petition because he had already challenged that judgment of sentence in his 1998 Habeas Petition. Since the Court of Appeals had not authorized Petitioner to file another federal habeas petition in order to attack that judgment of sentence, this Court lacked jurisdiction to consider any claims challenging it. To the extent that Petitioner was challenging the judgment of sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 2, which he had not challenged in his 1998 Habeas Petition, he could not do so by way of a Rule 60(b) Motion filed in a closed habeas case. The Court subsequently adopted the Report and Recommendation as the Opinion of the Court and dismissed Petitioner's motion.
4. The Pending Habeas Petition
On or around December 26, 2019, Petitioner filed the habeas petition now pending before the Court at this civil action number (2:19-cv-1621). (ECF No. 3). In it, he challenges his judgment of sentence in Criminal Case No. 2. He raises errors of state law, which are not cognizable in a federal habeas case. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a); see, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67-68 (1991). However, he also claims that his judgment of sentence was imposed in violation of federal constitutional rights, primarily because, he contends, the Court of Common Pleas lacked jurisdiction over him.
B. Discussion
To the extent that Petitioner is raising any cognizable habeas claim, those claims are untimely. AEDPA requires, with a few exceptions that do not apply here, that a state prisoner file his federal habeas claims within one year of the date the petitioner's judgment of sentence became final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). State prisoners such as Petitioner, whose judgment of sentence became final prior to AEDPA's effective date of April 24, 1996, had one year from that date—until on or before April 23, 1997—to file a timely habeas petition. Burns v. Morton, 134 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). Therefore, Petitioner filed the claims in the petition now pending before this Court more than 22 years after AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations expired.
Another provision of AEDPA's statute of limitations, set forth at § 2244(d)(1)(D), does commence the one-year limitations period on "the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." There are no grounds to apply that provision here. The only alleged "newly discovered facts" that Petitioner cites is a copy of the order issued by the Court of Common Pleas on July 11, 2018 denying his PCRA petition in Criminal Case No. 2. The caption of that order contains the docket numbers for Criminal Case No. 1. (Pet's Ex. 2, ECF No. 3-1 at 2). Petitioner argues that this evidences a "cover up" on the part of the Commonwealth to hide the "true facts of his robbery conviction. (ECF No. 3 at 5). His argument has no merit whatsoever. If the order Petitioner references was issued in Criminal Case No. 2, then the captions merely contains a typographical error. In any event, the purported "newly discovered facts" do not support a cognizable claim for federal habeas relief. Additionally, although the date the order was entered is irrelevant to this proceeding, this Court notes that both the docket sheet for Criminal Case No. 2 and the Superior Court's decision in Williams II indicate that Court of Common Pleas denied the PCRA petition filed in that case on July 11, 2018.
Errors made during the PCRA proceeding are not cognizable in a federal habeas action. As the Court of Appeals has explained:
The federal courts are authorized to provide collateral relief where a petitioner is in state custody or under a federal sentence imposed in violation of the Constitution or the laws or treaties of the United States. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254, 2255. Thus, the federal role in reviewing an application for habeas corpus is limited to evaluating what occurred in the state or federal proceedings that actually led to the petitioner's conviction; what occurred in the petitioner's collateral proceeding does not enter into the habeas calculation.Hassine v. Zimmerman, 160 F.3d 941, 954 (3d Cir. 1998) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). See also Lambert v. Blackwell, 387 F.3d 210, 247 (3d Cir. 2004) ("[A]lleged errors in collateral proceedings are not a proper basis for habeas relief from the original conviction.").
In Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631 (2010), the Supreme Court held that a petitioner is entitled to equitable tolling of AEDPA's statute of limitations only if he shows that: (1) he has been pursuing his rights diligently; and (2) some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way and prevented timely filing. See also Ross v. Varano, 712 F.3d 784, 798-804 (3d Cir. 2013); United States v. Thomas, 713 F.3d 165, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2013); Munchinski v. Wilson, 694 F.3d 308, 329-32 (3d Cir, 2012). "This conjunctive standard requires showing both elements before we will permit tolling." Sistrunk v. Rozum, 674 F.3d 181, 190 (3d Cir. 2012) (emphasis in original). The Court of Appeals has further instructed that:
"[t]here are no bright lines in determining whether equitable tolling is warranted in a given case." Pabon v. Mahanoy, 654 F.3d 385, 399 (3d Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, "courts must be sparing in their use of equitable tolling," Seitzinger v. Reading Hosp. & Medical Ctr., 165 F.3d 236, 239 (3d Cir. 1999), and should do so "only when the principles of equity would make the right application of a limitation period unfair." Miller [v. New Jersey State Dept. of Corr.], 145 F.3d [616, 618 (3d Cir. 1998)].Id.
There are no grounds to apply equitable tolling in this case. Petitioner may not have understood the implications of waiting so long to file a federal habeas corpus petition challenging the judgment of sentence imposed in Criminal Case No. 2, but it is well established that a petitioner's "lack of legal knowledge or legal training does not alone justify equitable tolling." Ross, 712 F.3d at 799-800 (citing Brown v. Shannon, 322 F.3d 768, 774 (3d Cir. 2003) and Doe v. Menefee, 391 F.3d 147, 177 (2d Cir. 2004)).
Finally, in McQuiggin v. Perkins, 569 U.S. 383 (2013), the Supreme Court recognized that the actual innocence gateway to federal habeas review developed in Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298 (1995) extends to cases where a petitioner's claims would otherwise be barred by the expiration of the one-year statute of limitations prescribed by AEDPA. It explained, however, that the "actual innocence" exception applies only to a "severely confined category" of cases, namely, those matters where the petitioner produces "new evidence" that "shows 'it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted [the petitioner].'" Id. at 395 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 329) (bracketed text added in McQuiggin). The Supreme Court also cautioned that "tenable actual-innocence gateway pleas are rare[,]" id. at 386, and that "[t]he gateway should open only when a petition presents 'evidence of innocence so strong that a court cannot have confidence in the outcome of the trial unless the court is also satisfied that the trial was free of nonharmless constitutional error.'" Id. at 401 (quoting Schlup, 513 U.S. at 316). This case is not one of those rare cases where the actual-innocence gateway would apply.
Based upon all of the foregoing, the claims Petitioner brings in his pending petition for a writ of habeas corpus are untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations and the Court should dismiss the petition for that reason.
C. Certificate of Appealability
AEDPA codified standards governing the issuance of a certificate of appealability for appellate review of a district court's disposition of a habeas petition. It provides that "[a] certificate of appealability may issue...only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). "When the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim, a [certificate of appealability] should issue when the prisoner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling." Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). Applying that standard here, jurists of reason would not find it debatable whether Petitioner's claims should be denied as untimely. Accordingly, a certificate of appealability should be denied.
III. CONCLUSION
It is respectfully recommended that the Court summarily dismiss the petition for a writ of habeas corpus because the claims Petitioner raised in it are untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations. It is further recommended that the Court deny a certificate of appealability.
Pursuant to the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72.D.2 of the Local Civil Rules, Petitioner is allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of this Order to file objections to this Report and Recommendation. Failure to do so will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n.7 (3d Cir. 2011). Date: April 16, 2020
/s/_________
PATRICIA L. DODGE
United States Magistrate Judge