Opinion
05-22-00607-CV
07-06-2023
DAVID C. WILLIAMS, Appellant v. TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, RESOURCES EDGE, AND INTELINET SYSTEMS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. DC-21-05250
Before Justices Nowell, Goldstein, and Breedlove
MEMORANDUM OPINION
MARICELA BREEDLOVE, JUSTICE
Pro se appellant David C. Williams appeals the trial court's judgment affirming the decision of the Texas Workforce Commission (TWC)'s appeal tribunal that he was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. Because substantial evidence supports the TWC's ruling, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams was employed at Intelinet Systems, Inc. (Intelinet) as a Systems Engineer from November 2018 until May 2020, when he was terminated for work-related misconduct. After his termination, Williams sought unemployment benefits in an application to the TWC. The TWC initially awarded Williams unemployment benefits on August 21, 2020, but on September 3, 2020, that ruling was challenged by Intelinet and Resourcing Edge, LLC, a payroll and benefits management company that works on behalf of Intelinet.
An appeal hearing was held on December 16, 2020, and the TWC hearing marshal ruled that Williams had been discharged for work-related misconduct and was therefore disqualified from receiving benefits under § 207.044 of the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act. In support of its decision, the TWC appeal tribunal made findings of fact, including as follows:
The employer kept engineers scheduled at 110% capacity. The claimant had a large amount of work to do that was given priority order of completion by his supervisor. The claimant's supervisor asked the claimant to get on a teleconference call on May 22, 2020 so that the claimant could answer questions for a client. The claimant believed he did not have the answers the client was looking for and that the call was less important than other work he had to do. The claimant was discharged after failing to appear for the conference call as requested by his supervisor.
The tribunal determined that the facts of Williams' discharge were similar to the precedent established under TWC appeal no. 3242-CA-75, where the TWC held that the claimant's refusal to follow the supervisor's instructions constituted misconduct connected with the work. Williams appealed to the TWC appeal tribunal, which upheld the denial of benefits.
Williams sought administrative review in the trial court on April 20, 2021. Intelinet, Resourcing Edge, and the TWC (collectively, "appellees") filed a joint motion for summary judgment on the ground that there was substantial evidence to support the TWC's decision. They offered summary judgment evidence through portions of the certified administrative record of the TWC proceedings and through the unsworn declaration of Intelinet Operations Manager Adnan Pajazetovic who was Williams' supervisor. In their motion, appellees put forth evidence that Pajazetovic asked Williams to join a conference call with a client regarding a ticket on which Williams had been working. Williams refused to join the call and sent a message to Pajazetovic, saying "I'm done getting on calls, answering questions, being questioned about my answers, and then nothing happens. Then you want more of our time for the same crap." As a result, Pajazetovic had to ask another engineer to join the call. Intelinet made the decision to terminate Williams' employment the next day.
Williams filed a summary judgment response, arguing that (1) the TWC's ruling was not free from taint and was arbitrary and capricious; (2) the TWC's ruling decision was marked by an abuse of discretion; (3) the TWC's ruling was not supported by substantial evidence; and (4) the TWC's ruling was improper as a matter of law. He specifically argued that the ruling was improper because it was based upon incomplete chat records between himself and Pajazetovic that did not reveal the full story of the conversation regarding the engineering call and that Pajazetovic's unsworn declaration contained perjured testimony. The court granted the motion for summary judgment on May 18, 2022.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review a summary judgment de novo. Knopf v. Gray, 545 S.W.3d 542, 545 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam). We review the evidence presented in the motion and response in the light most favorable to the party against whom the summary judgment was rendered, crediting evidence favorable to that party if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding contrary evidence unless reasonable jurors could not. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009); City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). Summary judgment is proper when there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex.R.Civ.P. 166a(c); Nixon v. Mr. Prop. Mgmt. Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985).
Trial courts review TWC decisions regarding unemployment benefits "by trial de novo based on the substantial evidence rule." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 212.202(a); Collingsworth Gen. Hosp. v. Hunnicutt, 988 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1998). Under this standard, the TWC's ruling carries a presumption of validity, and the party seeking to set aside the decision has the burden of showing that it was not supported by "substantial evidence." Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Spicer v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, 430 S.W.3d 526, 532 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2014, no pet.). "Substantial evidence" is more than a scintilla and less than a preponderance. Terrill v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, No. 05-17-00349-CV, 2018 WL 1616361, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Apr. 4, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.). The evidence in the record may preponderate against the TWC's decision but still amount to substantial evidence. Spicer, 430 S.W.3d at 533. A trial court may grant summary judgment in cases tried under the substantial evidence rule because the only issue before the court is a question of law. Id.
We review the trial court's judgment by comparing the TWC decision with the evidence presented to the trial court and the governing law. Id. We determine whether the summary judgment evidence established as a matter of law that substantial evidence existed to support the TWC decision. Id.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Waiver of Evidentiary Challenges on Appeal.
On October 18, 2022, Williams submitted his appellant's brief for filing. In a letter dated the same day, this Court notified Williams that his brief was not filed because the appendix items were not bookmarked and did not comply with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9. The Court permitted Williams to resubmit a corrected electronic brief within three days. Tex. R. App. P 9.4(k).
On October 21, 2022, Williams submitted his first corrected brief. In a letter dated October 28, 2022, the Court notified Williams that his brief failed to meet the following briefing requirements:
1. The table of contents does not indicate the subject matter of each issue or point, or group of issues or points. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(b).
2. It does not contain a concise statement of the case, the course of proceedings, and the trial court's disposition of the case supported by record references. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(d).
3. It does not contain a concise statement of the facts supported by record references. Tex.R.App.P. 38.1(g).
We cautioned Williams that a failure to file an amended brief that complied with the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure within 10 days of the date of the letter "may result in dismissal of this appeal without further notice from the Court. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.8(a)(1), 42.3(b), (c)." On November 4, 2022, Williams filed his second corrected brief. Although Williams made some changes in his corrected brief, he did not correct all deficiencies that we identified in our letter dated October 28, 2022. Williams's status as a pro se litigant does not relieve him of his obligation to comply with the rules of appellate procedure.
In Texas, an individual who is a party to civil litigation has the right to represent himself at trial and on appeal. Tex.R.Civ.P. 7. The right of self-representation carries with it the responsibility to adhere to our rules of appellate procedure. Bolling v. Farmers Branch Indep. Sch. Dist., 315 S.W.3d 893, 895 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). Courts regularly caution pro se litigants that they will not be treated differently than a party who is represented by a licensed attorney. Id. To comply, an appellant must articulate the issues that we are asked to decide. See Steele v. Humphreys, No. 05-19-00988-CV, 2020 WL 6440499, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 3, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.). The brief fails if we must speculate or guess about an appellant's contentions. Id.
Our appellate rules have specific requirements for briefing, including specifically, in this case, rule 38.1. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1. Rule 38.1 requires an appellant to state concisely the complaint that he may have; provide understandable, succinct, and clear argument for why his complaint has merit in fact and law; and cite and apply law that is applicable to the complaint being made along with appropriate record references. See Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f), (h), (i). "Importantly, statements of fact must be supported by direct references to the record that are precise in locating the fact asserted." Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 896. "If record references are not made or are inaccurate, misstated, or misleading, the brief fails." Id. "And, just as importantly, existing legal authority applicable to the facts and the questions we are called on to answer must be accurately cited." Id. "References to legal authority that have nothing to do with the issue to be decided are contrary to the requirement of rule 38.1(i)." Id. "If we are not provided with existing legal authority that can be applied to the facts of the case, the brief fails." Id.
Williams asserts on appeal that the TWC improperly considered certain chat messages between himself and Pajazetovic because they constituted only a partial record of the parties' communication. In support of this argument, Williams cites several rules of evidence from the TWC Appeal Hearing Officer Handbook on Evidence as well as the Texas Rules of Evidence. However, Williams provides no case law or analysis to support the exclusion of that evidence. Without legal analysis or citation to appropriate authority, Williams has failed to preserve this argument for our review. See Steele, 2020 WL 6440499, at *3 (brief lacking legal analysis preserved nothing for review).
Williams also complains that the TWC should not have considered an unsworn declaration submitted by Pajazetovic. He cites the Texas Penal Code in support of his argument and contends that the declaration constituted perjury. However, Williams provides no case law or analysis to support the exclusion of that evidence or anything in the record to support a finding that the declaration was perjured. Without legal analysis or citation to appropriate authority, Williams has failed to preserve this argument for our review. See id. Other than the chat message log and Pajazetovic's declaration, Williams does not object to the remainder of the evidence and testimony considered by the TWC.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his first issue, Williams argues that there was factually insufficient evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. As acknowledged by Williams in his brief, "portions of the administrative record with a declaration can constitute more than a scintilla of evidence and require granting summary judgment under the substantial evidence standard of review." Uranga v. Texas Workforce Comm'n, 319 S.W.3d 787 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2010, no pet.); see also Olivarez v. Aluminum Corp. of America, 693 S.W.2d 931, 932 (Tex. 1985). The record in this case meets that standard and contains more than a scintilla of evidence in support of the TWC's decision.
Section 207.044(a) of TUCA provides that "[a]n individual is disqualified for benefits if the individual was discharged for misconduct connected with the individual's last work." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 207.044. "Misconduct" is defined by the Texas Unemployment Compensation Act to include the "violation of a policy or rule adopted to ensure the orderly work and the safety of employees." Tex. Lab. Code Ann. § 201.012(a) (West 2015). Insubordination is misconduct. Anderson v. Tex. Workforce Comm'n, No. 05-02-01595-CV, 2003 WL 21350082, at *2 (Tex. App.-Dallas June 5, 2003, pet. denied).
The TWC considered testimony from both Williams and his supervisor, along with a chain of messages in which Williams noted "I am done getting on calls, answering questions, being questioned about my answers, and then nothing happens. Then you want more of our time for the same crap." Pajazetovic testified that Williams was fired because he refused to participate in a required client call without permission. Although Williams' version of events is different than that of Pajazetovic's, this Court cannot reweigh the testimony of the witnesses and instead must defer to the credibility determinations made by the TWC. See Firemen's and Policemen's Civil Serv. Comm'n v. Brinkmeyer, 662 S.W.2d 953, 956 (Tex. 1984). The reason for Williams' termination, however, was a question for the Commission as the primary factfinder and not the trial court. Johnson v. Texas Workforce Comm'n, No. 05-15-01183-CV, 2017 WL 462344, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Jan. 31, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The only question before the trial court was whether the summary judgment evidence established as a matter of law that substantial evidence existed to support the TWC's decision, not whether there was some evidence to the contrary. See Spicer, 430 S.W.3d at 532-33. Even if the evidence had preponderated against the TWC's decision, we have concluded that there was more than a scintilla, and thus "substantial evidence," to support the TWC's decision. See id. We conclude that Williams did not meet his burden to show that the TWC's decision was not supported by "substantial evidence." Collingsworth Gen. Hosp., 988 S.W.2d at 708; Spicer, 430 S.W.3d at 532-33.
Because there is substantial evidence in the record to support the TWC's decision, and because Williams failed to properly preserve his challenges to the legitimacy of some of the items of evidence considered by the TWC for our review, we overrule Williams' first issue. See id.
C. Miscarriage of Justice
Williams argues in his second issue that there was a miscarriage of justice because the decision of the TWC was based on perjury and lies. In support of this argument, Williams cites United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.725 (1993). He reiterates his evidentiary complaints regarding the partial chat records and unsworn declaration of Pajazetovic, discussed in more detail above.
Although Williams cites Olano and several provisions of the Texas Penal Code in support of his second issue, he fails to identify or apply the law to any fact that might support his complaint. Because the argument section fails to provide clear, concise statements of Williams' legal arguments, we cannot ascertain how this legal authority is relevant to an issue to be decided in this appeal. See Bolling, 315 S.W.3d at 897. Williams cites no other legal authority in support of his argument. Without legal analysis or citation to appropriate authority, Williams has preserved nothing for our review. See Steele, 2020 WL 6440499, at *3. Williams' second issue is therefore waived for inadequate briefing. See In re N.E.B., 251 S.W.3d 211, 212 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.) ("When a party fails to adequately brief a complaint, he waives the issue on appeal.").
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court's judgment.
JUDGMENT
Justices Nowell and Goldstein participating.
In accordance with this Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
It is ORDERED that appellee TEXAS WORKFORCE COMMISSION, RESOURCES EDGE, AND INTELINET SYSTEMS recover their costs of this appeal from appellant DAVID C. WILLIAMS.