Williams v. Tennien

6 Citing cases

  1. Shutt v. Schwartz

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 52385 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    Therefore, it was this unforeseen event which broke the causal connection between the accident and decedent's death. However, if the "intervening act is a natural and foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by defendant", such act will not break the causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's injury " (Williams v. Tennien, 294 AD2d 841, 842 [4th Dept. 2002]). It cannot be said as a matter of law that decedent's acts to attempt to repair his vehicle while it was stranded in the middle of the expressway were so unforeseen or extraordinary as to be a superceding cause of his death (accord Williams v. Tennien, 294 AD2d 841 [4th Dept. 2002]; Betancourt v. Manhattan Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 195 AD2d 246 [1st Dept. 1994]; McMorrow v. Trimper, 149 AD2d 971 [4th Dept. 1989], affd. 74 NY2d 830).

  2. Shutt v. Schwartz

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 34004 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2007)

    Therefore, it was this unforeseen event which broke the causal connection between the accident and decedent's death. However, if the "intervening act is a natural and foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by defendant", such act will not break the causal connection between defendant's acts and plaintiff's injury" ( Williams v. Tennien, 294 AD2d 841, 842 [4th Dept. 2002]). It cannot be said as a matter of law that decedent's acts to attempt to repair his vehicle while it was stranded in the middle of the expressway were so unforeseen or extraordinary as to be a superceding cause of his death (accord Williams v. Tennien, 294 AD2d 841 [4th Dept. 2002]; Betancourt v. Manhattan Ford Lincoln Mercury, Inc., 195 AD2d 246 [1st Dept. 1994]; McMorrow v. Trimper, 149 AD2d 971 [4th Dept. 1989], affd. 74 NY2d 830).

  3. Haymon v. Pettit

    2007 N.Y. Slip Op. 9071 (N.Y. 2007)   Cited 69 times
    Holding that baseball stadium owner owed no duty to a non-patron who was struck by a vehicle while chasing a foul ball into a street adjacent to the stadium, even though the stadium had a policy of providing free tickets to persons who retrieved foul balls outside the stadium, because the stadium could not control the public street and the dangers inherent in the street existed independent of the policy

    ( Caldwell v Village of Is. Park, 304 NY 268; Noeller v County of Erie, 145 AD2d 919; Curcio v City of New York, 275 NY 20; Genrich v Guary, 298 AD2d 919; Morbillo v Board of Educ. of Mt. Sinai School Dist, 269 AD2d 506; Joslyn v Village of Sylvan Beach, 256 AD2d 1166; Collentine v City of New York, 279 NY 119; Fritz v City of Buffalo, 277 NY 710; Nunez v Recreation Rooms Settlement, 229 AD2d 359; Bongiorno v Wechter Fuel Oil Co., 30 AD2d 858, 26 NY2d 950.) III. Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. failed to meet its burden of establishing that its conduct was not a proximate cause of the accident. ( Mason v U.E.S.S. Leasing Corp., 96 NY2d 875; Gordon v Eastern Ry. Supply, 82 NY2d 555; Rotz v City of New York, 143 AD2d 301; Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 NY2d 308; Fuller v Marcello, 17 AD3d 1017; Townsley v State of New York, 6 Misc 2d 557; Cruz v City of New York, 218 AD2d 546; Williams v Tennien, 294 AD2d 841; McMorrow v Trimper, 149 AD2d 971, 74 NY2d 830; Alami v Volkswagen of Am., 97 NY2d 281.) Roemer Wallens Mineaux, LLP, Albany ( Matthew J. Kelly and Amanda Davis Twinam of counsel), for respondent. I. Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc. did not owe plaintiff infant a duty of care. ( Hamilton v Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 96 NY2d 222; Lauer v City of New York, 95 NY2d 95; Pulka v Edelman, 40 NY2d 781; Palka v Servicemaster Mgt. Servs. Corp., 83 NY2d 579; Tobin v Grossman, 24 NY2d 609; Johnson v Jamaica Hosp., 62 NY2d 523; Maheshwari v City of New York, 2 NY3d 288; Akins v Glens Falls City School Dist, 53 NY2d 325; D'Amico v Christie, 71 NY2d 76; Purdy v Public Adm'r of County of Westchester, 72 NY2d 1.) II. Auburn Community Non-Profit Baseball Association, Inc.'s alleged negligence was not a proximate cause of plaintiff infant's injuries.

  4. Viglietta v. Asbestos Corp.

    2024 N.Y. Slip Op. 2624 (N.Y. App. Div. 2024)

    Hedman advertised its product as being "non-asbestos" and safer than "straight asbestos," and argued at trial that its warnings were adequate. Under those circumstances, we conclude as a matter of law that the alleged failure of decedent's employer was not an act that "is of such an extraordinary nature or so attenuates [Hedman's] negligence from the ultimate injury that responsibility for the injury may not be reasonably attributed to [Hedman]" (Williams v Tennien, 294 A.D.2d 841, 842 [4th Dept 2002]; see Kush v City of Buffalo, 59 N.Y.2d 26, 33 [1983]; Derdiarian v Felix Contr. Corp., 51 N.Y.2d 308, 316 [1980], rearg denied 52 N.Y.2d 784 [1980]). We have reviewed Hedman's remaining contentions and conclude that none warrants modification or reversal of the judgment.

  5. Kuligowski v. One Niagara, LLC

    177 A.D.3d 1266 (N.Y. App. Div. 2019)   Cited 6 times

    Plaintiff's deposition testimony, which defendants submitted in support of their respective motion and cross motion, established that his job on the day of the accident was to supervise the transport of the air conditioner and its components to the area where that equipment was to be installed and that he picked the piece of duct work up to avoid creating a dangerous situation on the public roadway onto which it had fallen. Given that plaintiff's job required him to ensure that the transport of the materials was done safely and efficiently, it was reasonably foreseeable that he would take it upon himself to pick up a loose piece of duct work that had fallen to the ground (seeGardner v. Perrine, 101 A.D.3d 1587, 1587–1588, 957 N.Y.S.2d 776 [4th Dept. 2012] ; Williams v. Tennien, 294 A.D.2d 841, 842, 741 N.Y.S.2d 365 [4th Dept. 2002] ). We also reject defendants' contentions on their respective appeals that the court erred in denying their respective motion and cross motion to the extent that they sought dismissal of the Labor Law § 241(6) cause of action insofar as that cause of action is predicated on alleged violations of 12 NYCRR 23–9.8(e), (h), and (j).

  6. Calandra v. Marnell

    16 A.D.3d 1125 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005)   Cited 4 times

    We reject that contention. Even assuming, arguendo, that plaintiff was not injured until she fell to the ground after exiting the vehicle, we nevertheless conclude that there is a triable issue of fact whether plaintiff's fall was "a natural and foreseeable consequence of a circumstance created by defendant" ( Kush v. City of Buffalo, 59 NY2d 26, 33; see McMorrow v. Trimper, 149 AD2d 971, affd 74 NY2d 830; Matter of Farm Family Cas. Ins. Co. [Trapani], 301 AD2d 740, 741-742; Williams v. Tennien, 294 AD2d 841).