Opinion
13-CV-0331 (JFB) (AYS)
07-17-2017
ORDER
:
Before the Court is a Report and Recommendation dated June 16, 2017 (the "R&R," ECF No. 27) from Magistrate Judge Anne Shields recommending that the Court dismiss this action for failure to prosecute pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b). The R&R instructed that any objections to the R&R be submitted within fourteen (14) days of service of the R&R, which was effected by Judge Shields by publication via the Court's Electronic Filing System. (See id. at 5.) The date for filing any objections has since expired, and plaintiff has not filed any objection to the R&R. For the reasons set forth below, the Court adopts the thorough and well-reasoned R&R in its entirety and dismisses plaintiff's complaint with prejudice.
Where there are no objections, the Court may adopt the report and recommendation without de novo review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985) ("It does not appear that Congress intended to require district court review of a magistrate's factual or legal conclusions, under a de novo or any other standard, when neither party objects to those findings."); see also Mario v. P & C Food Mkts., Inc., 313 F.3d 758, 766 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Where parties receive clear notice of the consequences, failure timely to object to a magistrate's report and recommendation operates as a waiver of further judicial review of the magistrate's decision."); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(3) (requiring de novo review after objections). However, because the failure to file timely objections is not jurisdictional, a district judge may still excuse the failure to object in a timely manner and exercise its discretion to decide the case on the merits to, for example, prevent plain error. See Cephas v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[B]ecause the waiver rule is non jurisdictional, we 'may excuse the default in the interests of justice."' (quoting Thomas, 474 U.S. at 155)).
Although plaintiff has waived any objection to the R&R and thus de novo review is not required, the Court has conducted a de novo review of the R&R in an abundance of caution. Rule 41(b) authorizes a district court to "dismiss a complaint for failure to comply with a court order, treating the noncompliance as a failure to prosecute." Simmons v. Abruzzo, 49 F.3d 83, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Link v. Wabash R.R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 633 (1962)); see Lucas v. Miles, 84 F.3d 532, 535 (2d Cir. 1996) ("[D]ismissal [pursuant to Rule 41(b)] is a harsh remedy and is appropriate only in extreme situations."); Wynder v. McMahon, 360 F.3d 73, 79 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Rule [41(b)] is intended to serve as a rarely employed, but useful, tool of judicial administration available to district courts in managing their specific cases and general caseload."). Moreover, it is well-settled that a district court "may act sua sponte to dismiss a suit for failure to prosecute." Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 44 (1991) (citing Link, 370 U.S. at 630); see also Le Sane v. Hall's Sec. Analyst, Inc., 239 F.3d 206, 209 (2d Cir. 2001) ("Although the text of Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) expressly addresses only the case in which a defendant moves for dismissal of an action, it is unquestioned that Rule 41(b) also gives the district court authority to dismiss a plaintiff's case sua sponte for failure to prosecute.").
Courts have repeatedly found that "[d]ismissal of an action is warranted when a litigant, whether represented or instead proceeding pro se, fails to comply with legitimate court directives." Yulle v. Barkley, No. 9:05-CV-0802, 2007 WL 2156644, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. July 25, 2007) (citations omitted). A district court contemplating dismissal of a plaintiff's claim for failure to prosecute and/or to comply with a court order pursuant to Rule 41(b) must consider:
1) the duration of plaintiff's failures or non-compliance; 2) whether plaintiff had notice that such conduct would result in dismissal; 3) whether prejudice to the defendant is likely to result; 4) whether the court balanced its interest in managing its docket against plaintiff's interest in receiving an opportunity to be heard; and 5) whether the court adequately considered the efficacy of a sanction less draconian than dismissal.Baffa v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette Sec. Corp., 222 F.3d 52, 63 (2d Cir. 2000). In deciding whether dismissal is appropriate, "[g]enerally, no one factor is dispositive." Nita v. Conn. Dep't of Env. Prot., 16 F.3d 482, 485 (2d Cir. 1994); see Peart v. City of New York, 992 F.2d 458, 461(2d Cir. 1993) ("'[D]ismissal for want of prosecution is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial judge [and] the judge's undoubtedly wide latitude is conditioned by certain minimal requirements.'") (quoting Merker v. Rice, 649 F.2d 171, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1981)).
Here, plaintiff has not made an appearance in this matter since February 2014. (See ECF No. 25 at 2 (defendants note they have not had any contact with plaintiff since receiving a signed return receipt by plaintiff on February 3, 2014).) Plaintiff has failed to comply with multiple orders that a joint status report be submitted, including Magistrate Judge Shields' September 12, 2016 Order in which plaintiff was cautioned that failure to respond to the order may result in dismissal of his case pursuant to Rule 41. Defendants served a copy of that Order on October 20, 2016. (See ECF No. 26-1.) Despite that warning, plaintiff failed to file a status report, nor has he otherwise communicated with Judge Shields, with this Court, or with defendants. Plaintiff's failure to comply with multiple orders and to otherwise communicate with the Court is prejudicial to defendants, who bear the costs and burdens of having this open civil litigation, and also contributes to calendar congestion. In short, having conducted a review of the full record and the applicable law, and having reviewed the R&R de novo, the Court adopts the analysis and recommendation contained in the well-reasoned and thorough R&R in their entirety.
The Court dismisses this action with prejudice pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Clerk of the Court shall close this case. The Court certifies pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this Order would not be taken in good faith and therefore in forma pauperis status is denied for the purpose of any appeal. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).
SO ORDERED.
/s/_________
Joseph F. Bianco
United States District Judge Dated: July 17, 2017
Central Islip, New York