Opinion
C. A. 4:22-1318-HMH-TER
01-19-2023
ANTHONY WILLIAMS, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, DONNIE STONEBREAKER, JR. Respondent.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
THOMAS E. ROGERS, III UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Petitioner, Anthony Williams (“Petitioner/Williams”), is an inmate in the custody of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC). Petitioner, appearing pro se, filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 on April 25, 2022. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment on September 1, 2022, along with a return and supporting memorandum. (ECF Nos. 21 and 22). Because Petitioner is proceeding pro se, he was advised on or about September 2, 2022, pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), that a failure to respond to the Respondent's motion for summary judgment could result in the dismissal of his petition. Petitioner filed a response in opposition on October 27, 2022.
This habeas corpus case was automatically referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 73.02, DSC. Because this is a dispositive motion, this report and recommendation is entered for review by the district judge.
It is recommended that Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted and this action be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations.
I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Petitioner is currently confined in the South Carolina Department of Corrections pursuant to orders of commitment from the Clerk of Court for Richland County. Petitioner was arrested and later pleaded guilty to breaking into a motor vehicle and grand larceny $1000-$5000 for which he received a sentence of five years suspended with three years' probation for each count. Subsequently, the Richland County grand jury indicted Petitioner in May of 2000 for six more charges: two counts of burglary first degree, criminal sexual conduct first degree, grand larceny $1000-$5000, assault and battery of a high and aggravated nature (ABHAN), and failure to stop for a blue light. (ECF Nos. 21-1, 21-2, and 21-3).
Petitioner was represented by John Delgado, Esquire. Petitioner pleaded guilty to all six charges and was sentenced on June 17, 2002, by the Honorable Henry Floyd to an aggregate of forty years, concurrent. (Id.).Petitioner did not file a direct appeal.
PCR Action
On December 10, 2009, Petitioner filed an Application for Post-Conviction Relief (PCR). In his application, Petitioner raised the following claims:
1. Involuntary guilty plea.
2. Ineffective assistance of counsel.(ECF No. 21-3 at 5 of 50). Petitioner was represented by Thomas A. Thomas, Esquire, and he had Petitioner see Dr. Thomas V. Martin, a psychiatrist, in preparation for his PCR hearing. The State made its Return denying the allegations and arguing Petitioner was outside the one-year deadline to file the PCR application. On August 4, 2010, the Honorable Alison Renee Lee, Chief Administrative Judge, signed a Conditional Order of Dismissal finding the application was filed outside the time limit. (ECF No. 21-3 at 16 of 50). Petitioner's attorney filed a return to the Conditional Order of Dismissal on August 18, 2010, (ECF no. 21-3 at 20-22 of 50) arguing Petitioner was mentally ill and, therefore, could not properly and timely file his PCR application. (Id. at 20). The State filed a reply and Petitioner filed a response to the reply. (ECF No. 21-3 at 24-30). A hearing on the State's motion to dismiss due to being barred by the statute of limitations was convened on June 9, 2011, before the Honorable James R. Barber, III. Petitioner, through his attorney, argued that Petitioner had a long history of mental health illness so that his PCR action should not be dismissed as untimely but that he should be able to proceed with his PCR application. The court discussed equitable tolling with the State and PCR counsel and the attorneys made their arguments on why the case should or should not proceed. On August 17, 2011, the Honorable James R. Barber, III, issued an Order denying Petitioner relief and dismissing the PCR application with prejudice. The court found the PCR application was untimely and Petitioner failed to present evidence that he had been suffering from any mental illness that would justify equitable tolling. (ECF No. 21-3 at 31-36). Thus, the court found there was not sufficient reason why the Conditional Order of Dismissal should not become final. (ECF No. 21-3 at 35).
It is noted that counsel for Petitioner presented a letter at the hearing dated July 9, 2009, from Martin Psychiatric Services, PC when arguing that Petitioner's alleged mental health issues affected the voluntariness of his plea as well as the untimeliness of his original PCR application. It is noted that Dr. Martin stated in the letter that “It is my opinion with a reasonable degree of medical and psychiatric certainty that Mr. Williams suffers from a depressive and anxiety condition that manifests as aggressive action-out behavior requiring severe behavioral management.” (ECF No. 21-3 at 34). The court reviewed the documents in conjunction with the original pleadings and responses and found sufficient reason had not been shown why the Conditional Order of Dismissal should not become final.
Petitioner filed a PCR appeal in September 2011. Counsel also filed an explanation pursuant to Rule 243(c) followed by a petition for writ of certiorari raising the following issue:
Did the Lower Court err in dismissing the Petitioner's Application for Post-Conviction Relief?(ECF No. 21-5 at 3 of 8).
The South Carolina Supreme Court transferred the case to the South Carolina Court of Appeals. (ECF No. 21-7). On July 17, 2014, the South Carolina Court of Appeals issued its order denying and dismissing the PCR appeal. (ECF No. 21-8). The remittitur was issued on August 15, 2014, and filed with the Richland County Clerk of Court on August 18, 2014. (ECF No. 21-9).
Habeas Petition
Petitioner filed his Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus with a Houston v. Lack delivery date of April 20, 2022. (ECF Nos. 1 and 1-1). In the habeas petition, Petitioner raises four grounds of ineffective assistance of plea counsel.
Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The federal court is charged with liberally construing the complaints filed by pro se litigants, to allow them to fully develop potentially meritorious cases. See Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972). The court's function, however, is not to decide issues of fact, but to decide whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleadings to allege facts which set forth a federal claim, Weller v. Dep't of Social Servs., 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990), nor can the court assume the existence of a genuine issue of material fact where none exists. If none can be shown, the motion should be granted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c).
The moving party bears the burden of showing that summary judgment is proper. Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Summary judgment is proper if the non-moving party fails to establish an essential element of any cause of action upon which the non-moving party has the burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. 317. Once the moving party has brought into question whether there is a genuine dispute for trial on a material element of the non-moving party's claims, the non-moving party bears the burden of coming forward with specific facts which show a genuine dispute for trial. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e); Matsushita Electrical Industrial Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). The non-moving party must come forward with enough evidence, beyond a mere scintilla, upon which the fact finder could reasonably find for it. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). The facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom must be viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Shealy v. Winston, 929 F.2d 1009, 1011 (4th Cir. 1991). However, the non-moving party may not rely on beliefs, conjecture, speculation, or conclusory allegations to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Barber v. Hosp. Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 874-75 (4th Cir. 1992). The evidence relied on must meet “the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at a trial on the merits.” Mitchell v. Data General Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1316 (4th Cir. 1993).
To show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists, a party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 324 (Rule 56(e) permits a proper summary judgment motion to be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials listed in Rule 56(c), except the mere pleadings themselves). Rather, the party must present evidence supporting his or her position through “depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with ... affidavits, if any.” Id. at 322; see also Cray Communications, Inc. v. Novatel Computer Systems, Inc., 33 F.3d 390 (4th Cir. 1994); Orsi v. Kickwood, 999 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1993); Local Rules 7.04, 7.05, D.S.C.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Since Petitioner filed his petition after the effective date of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), review of his claims is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended. Lindh v. Murphy, 117 S.Ct. 2059 (1997); Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615 (4th Cir. 1998); Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998). That statute now reads:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim--(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
To a large extent, the amendment of § 2254 shifts the focus of habeas review to the state court application of Supreme Court law. See O'Brien v. DuBois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998) (“the AEDPA amendments to section 2254 exalt the role that a state court's decision plays in a habeas proceeding by specifically directing the habeas court to make the state court decision the cynosure of federal review.”). Further, the facts determined by the state court to which this standard is applied are presumed to be correct unless rebutted by the Petitioner by clear and convincing evidence. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
The United States Supreme Court has addressed procedure under § 2254(d). See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495 (2000). In considering a state court's interpretation of federal law, this court must separately analyze the “contrary to” and “unreasonable application” phrases of § 2254(d)(1). Ultimately, a federal habeas court must determine whether “the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.” Id. at 1521.
The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. The AEDPA substantially modified procedures for consideration of habeas corpus petitions of state inmates in the federal courts.
DISCUSSION AS TO STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Respondent asserts that the Petitioner's claims must be dismissed as untimely.
The applicable law is as follows: The AEDPA became effective on April 24, 1996. The AEDPA substantially modified procedures for consideration of habeas corpus petitions of state inmates in the federal courts. One of those changes was the amendment of 28 U.S.C. § 2244 to establish a one-year statute of limitations for filing habeas petitions. Subsection (d) of the statute now reads:
Prior to this amendment there was no statute of limitations. Habeas Rule 9(a) allowed dismissal only where the state could show it had been prejudiced by a delay in filing. Duarte v. Hershberger, 947 F.Supp. 146, 148, n.2 (D.N.J. 1996).
Respondent asserts that the records are not provided to the court in accordance with SCDC regulations.
(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of-
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.
(2) The time during which a “properly filed” application for State post- conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection. (Emphasis added).
As stated under the procedural history, Petitioner did not file a direct appeal after pleading guilty and being sentenced in 2002. Petitioner filed his PCR application on December 9, 2009, well after the one-year statute of limitations had expired. The PCR application was dismissed as untimely. The PCR appeal was denied by the South Carolina Court of Appeals on July 17, 2014, and the remittitur filed on August 15, 2014, in Richland County. Petitioner did not file this habeas petition until April 20, 2022, Houston v. Lack delivery date. Thus, this petition is clearly outside the statute of limitations. Accordingly, the instant petition is time-barred and should be dismissed.
In the case of Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2000), the Fourth Circuit aggregated time periods to conclude that a federal habeas petition was time barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). In Harris, the Fourth Circuit stated:
Thus, for Harris, the one-year limitation period imposed by §2244(d) commenced on April 24, 1996. Ten-and-one-half months later, on March 12, 1997, Harris filed his petition for state post-conviction review, which suspended the running of the one-year limitation period. This petition remained “pending” in state courts until January 7, 1998, when the Maryland Court of Appeals denied Harris' application for leave to appeal the denial of his petition. At this point, the clock began running again on the one-year limitation period, expiring one-and-one-half months later, in February 1998. Harris did not file his federal habeas petition until July 22, 1998, six months after his one-year period had expired. Therefore, the petition was time-barred under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d).Harris, 209 F.3d at 327.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the federal one year statute of limitations can be subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases. Holland v. Florida, 560 U.S. 631, 130 S.Ct. 2549, 2552-2554, 2560-2562 (2010); see also Rouse v. Lee, 314 F.3d 698, 704 (4th Cir.2003) (citing Harris v. Hutchinson, 209 F.3d 325, 330 (0 Cir.2000)). Circumstances will rarely warrant equitable tolling, however, and a Petitioner carries the burden of showing that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Harris, 209 F.3d at 330; see also Marengo v. Conway, 342 F.Supp.2d 222, 230 (S.D.N.Y.2004); Miranda v. Castro, 292 F.3d 1063, 1066 (9th Cir.2002). Further, equitable tolling applies only in the rare and exceptional circumstance, and is limited to “extraordinary circumstances” preventing a prisoner from filing a timely petition. Warren v. Garvin, 219 F.3d 111, 113 (2d Cir.2000); Marengo, 342 F.Supp.2d at 230. “[T]he party seeking equitable tolling must [also] have acted with reasonable diligence throughout the period he seeks to toll.” Marengo, 342 F.Supp.2d at 230 (quoting Warren, 219 F.3d at 113); see also Holland, 130 S.Ct. at 2562 (“ ‘Petitioner is ‘entitled to equitable tolling' only if he shows ‘(1) that he has been pursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinary circumstance stood in his way” and prevented timely filing.”) (quoting Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418, 125 S.Ct. 1807, 161 L.Ed.2d 669 (2005)).
In his petition, Petitioner responded to question on the timeliness of the petition as follows, quoted verbatim:
The applicant contends that he could not meet the one year statute limitation d[ue] to a serious mental health background that he been dealing with over last (22) years during his housing in SCDC and the Petitioner was “insane at the time of the crime and the petition was incompetence enter a guilty plea and the petitioner is been aid by the hep of Jailhouse lawyer Jerome Ling . . . skills in the law. The petitioner ask the Federal Court to review this 6th and 14th claims, and the Petitioner thereby Request by the grace and mercy to renew 28 U.S.C. 2254 Writ of Habeas, that was not timely filed.”(ECF No. 1 at 13-14).
Respondent argues that Petitioner fails his burden to show why he failed to comply with the AEDPA one-year statute of limitations. Further, he asserts that a public search of his inmate records indicates Petitioner has “worked steadily in prison since 2002,” and “received outside medical treatment a few times” but “does not show what he was treated for.” (ECF No. 21 at 12). Respondent asserts that “Petitioner participated in his PCR and has recollection of the hearing.” Id.
An attachment to Respondent's motion is the lone medical record regarding Petitioner's mental condition. That attachment is a letter dated July 9, 2009, from Thomas Martin, M.D., to Petitioner's PCR counsel indicating that Petitioner suffers from “a depressive and anxiety condition that manifests as aggressive acting-out behavior. . . [he] has responded well to psychotropic medication and regular intense mental health counseling. . .” (ECF No. 21-3 at 29). This medical record was before the state court in Petitioner's counseled PCR which was dismissed as untimely. Id.
Petitioner filed a response to the motion for summary judgment but did not address the statute of limitations argument or provide the court with any records or evidence that he is entitled to equitable tolling. Petitioner has not demonstrated that he pursued his rights diligently or that some extraordinary circumstances stood in his way to prevent him from timely filing his federal habeas petition. Accordingly, it is recommended that the petition be dismissed as barred by the statute of limitations, and Respondent's motion for summary judgment be granted.
Since the undersigned finds this action is time barred by the one-year statute of limitations, the issues raised in the habeas petition will not be addressed on the merits.
CONCLUSION
For the above stated reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that Respondent's motion for summary judgment (ECF No. 22) be GRANTED, and the petition be dismissed without an evidentiary hearing.
The parties' attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.