Opinion
No. 05-10-01619-CR
08-28-2012
REVERSE and REMAND;
On Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court
Dallas County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. F08-35025-N
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Moseley, Lang-Miers, and Murphy
Opinion By Justice Moseley
Joshua Williams pleaded guilty to murdering his sister and a jury sentenced him to sixty years' confinement. Asserting three points of error on appeal, Williams claims the trial court erred by admitting two videos during his punishment hearing. The videos showed the police interrogating him in violation of his constitutional and statutory rights. The State concedes error, but argues the error was harmless.
The background of the case and the evidence adduced below are well known to the parties; thus, we do not recite them here in detail. Because all dispositive issues are settled in law, we issue this memorandum opinion. Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(a), 47.4. We sustain Williams' first point of error, do not reach Williams' second and third points of error, and reverse and remand this cause to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.
In his brief, Williams asks this Court to sustain his first point of error and reverse and remand the case for a new punishment hearing, which we are doing. Because Williams would not achieve any greater relief if we considered his second and third issues, we decline to do so. See Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
The jury heard testimony that the Irving Police Department responded to a 911 call about a stabbing at a residence. After arriving at the house, the police found the body of Sara Williams in her bedroom closet. After the police secured the home as a crime scene, Williams attempted to enter Sara's bedroom. When an officer physically stopped Williams from entering the bedroom, Williams attempted to punch the officer. The police arrested Williams for assault of a public servant.
Detective Boyce Wyatt of the Irving Police Department questioned Williams while Williams was in custody. Wyatt testified he advised Williams of his constitutional and statutory rights, including his right to remain silent and not make any statement at all, before he questioned Williams. On appeal, no party asserts Williams did not receive or understand the warnings.
During Wyatt's testimony, the trial court admitted-over Williams' objection-State's Exhibit 2, a video of Wyatt's first interrogation of Williams. (Wyatt interrogated Williams twice.) The video shows Williams telling Wyatt that on the day Sara was murdered, Williams went to the house where she lived and they decided to "hustle" to obtain money to buy drugs. Williams left the house to hustle. When he returned, Sara was not at the house and he went to a nearby park to wait. After some time passed, he returned to the house and found the front door open. He entered the house, looked around, and found Sara's body in her bedroom closet. During the interview, Williams repeated "I did not kill my sister" and said he did not know who killed her. He speculated the "two black dudes" Sara recently met could have killed her. At least three times during the first interrogation, Williams told Wyatt he did not want to talk anymore or he wanted to leave the interrogation room. For example the following exchange occurred between Wyatt and Williams:
Wyatt:Well I didn't say if you can go and I never said you were done. Are you saying you don't wanna talk to me no more?Wyatt ignored Williams' repeated requests to end the interrogation. At the punishment hearing, Wyatt testified that Williams did not invoke his right to remain silent during the first interrogation and it ended when Wyatt decided to take Williams back to the holding area.
Williams:Yeah.
Wyatt: Is that what you're saying? Well, that's pretty terrible.
Williams: Cuz you're blaming this shit on me. I didn't kill my sister, man.
Wyatt:Then why don't you help me figure it out?
Williams: Cuz y'all sit here blaming me both. I just seen my fucking sister dead and y'all blaming me for that bullshit. Come on, man.
Wyatt:Give us another explanation.
Williams: I'm done talking to you.
Wyatt:You're done talking to us.
Williams:Yup.
Wyatt:What if I'm not done talking to you? I'm telling you, Josh, it's a terrible thing but it happened.
Wyatt testified:
Q.
How did that [first] interview terminate?
A. It terminated with taking him back downstairs. The interview was over. It was late and I just took him back downstairs. I ended it- - or he ended it and I ended it. It was - - go ahead.
Q. When I say how did the interview terminate, did you just stop asking him questions or at any time did he invoke or indicate to you that he didn't want to talk to you anymore?
A. He was tired of talking, but he didn't invoke and I took him downstairs. But I did stop questioning him.
Wyatt later conducted a second interrogation, during which Williams confessed to stabbing Sara.
Williams and the State agree the trial court erroneously admitted State's Exhibit 2. We agree. The trial court's error violated Williams' well-established constitutional right, the right to remain silent. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 474 (1966). Thus the sole issue before us is whether the error was harmful. We must reverse the punishment unless we determine "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the . . . punishment." Tex. R. App. P. 44.2(a); see also Clay v. State, 240 S.W.3d 895, 904 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
In its brief, the State inverts the standard for determining whether an error was harmful; the State argues "the record does not show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the admission of State's Exhibit 2 contributed to the appellant's punishment."
When determining whether the error was harmful, we consider a non-exclusive list of factors to the extent they are relevant: the nature of the error, to what extent it was emphasized by the State, probable collateral implications of the error, and the weight a juror probably would place on the error. See Snowden v. State, 353 S.W.3d 815, 819-20, 821-22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). We "calculate, as nearly as possible, the probable impact of the error on the jury in light of the other evidence. The error was not harmless if there is a reasonable likelihood that it materially affected the jury's deliberations." Neal v. State, 256 S.W.3d 264, 284 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (internal quotations omitted).
The Court of Criminal Appeals previously set out the factors a court should consider in Harris v. State, 790 S.W.2d 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989). The Snowden Court revised the factors.
The State argues admission of State's Exhibit 2 was harmless because Williams did not make any incriminating statements during the first interrogation. Although Williams did not confess to murdering Sara in State's Exhibit 2, by showing the interrogation to the jury, the jury saw Williams lie to the investigating officer about how his sister was killed and who might be responsible for the murder in order to protect his own interests. The jury also saw him reject responsibility for his actions. The video showed Williams failing to cooperate with the police to locate his sister's killer and speculate that "two black dudes" could have committed the crime. Additionally, Wyatt's testimony about the first interrogation included his statement that he "wasn't getting enough emotion" from Williams, he did not believe Williams' statements were truthful, and he did not believe Williams was remorseful.
In its brief, the State concedes, "It is possible that the jury did not look favorably upon" Williams' denial of involvement in his sister's murder and failure to cooperate with the detectives, as shown in State's Exhibit 2." We agree. From viewing State's Exhibit 2 and hearing the related testimony, the jury could have concluded Williams lacked remorse, was not contrite, was a liar, and wasted police resources by failing to cooperate with the investigation-all of which could have caused the jury to impose a longer sentence. See generally Williams v. State, 273 S.W.3d 200, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008); Higgenbotham v. State, 807 S.W.2d 732, 737 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (en banc); Ulloa v. State, No. 05-01-00697-CV, 2002 WL 31489253, at *3 (Tex. App.-Dallas Nov. 8, 2002, pet. dism'd; untimely filed).
The State notes, "The sixty-year sentence was likely based on the gruesome details of the offense rather than appellant's post-arrest behavior. . ." (emphasis added). The argument that Exhibit 2 "likely" did not contribute to the punishment and the admission that it is "possible" the jury did not approve of Williams' denial of responsibility are not exactly arguments that it is "beyond a reasonable doubt" that the error in admitting State's Exhibit 2 did not contribute to Williams' punishment.
Based on the record before us, we are not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury's assessment of punishment would have been the same if the trial court had not erroneously admitted State's Exhibit 2. Thus, the error was not harmless. We sustain Williams' first point of error and remand the cause to the trial court for a new punishment hearing.
Additionally, we are concerned about Wyatt's testimony during the pre-trial hearing where the trial court determined whether Williams' confession was voluntary. Wyatt testified he knowingly disregarded Williams' constitutional rights:
Q.We decline to encourage this approach to interrogations by concluding the error was harmless. See generally Harris, 790 S.W.2d at 587 (asking courts to consider "whether declaring the error harmless would encourage the State to repeat it with impunity.").
At any time did he [Williams] ask that the interview stop?
A. Yes.
Q. Explain that to the Court. A.I know that on the initial interview on that night that he basically said - - I'm sure a few times. I can't number them. - -that, Hey, I don't want to talk anymore; I just want to go downstairs - - or something to that effect. Basically, I'm through talking. Like that. On the initial interview.
Q. Well, he told you that he was done talking, but the interview continued. Is that true?
A. It did.
Q. And explain to the Court why you continued the interview.
A. Just based on experience . . . And I've had people tell me, No, I don't want to talk anymore. And through experience a lot of times when I'm talking to them, it's not that the interview is over. "I don't want to really talk." It's just that I still have things I want to say. So I was pretty zealous in continuing the interview. Because a lot of times they'll ultimately talk with me.
It is also concerning that Wyatt testified at the pre-trial hearing that Williams told Wyatt he was done talking, but testified at the punishment hearing that "he didn't invoke" his right to terminate the questioning.
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JIM MOSELEY
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47
101619F.U05
Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas JUDGMENT
JOSHUA WILLIAMS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
No. 05-10-01619-CR
Appeal from the 195th Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas. (Tr.Ct.No. Cause No. F08-35025-N).
Opinion delivered by Justice Moseley, Justices Lang-Miers and Murphy participating.
Based on the Court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is REVERSED and the cause REMANDED for further proceedings in accordance with this opinion.
Judgment entered August 28, 2012.
JIM MOSELEY
JUSTICE