On the other hand, cases reversing the trial court avoid any frank declaration that the trial court's determination was "clearly erroneous," and typically these cases refrain from stating in any way, shape, or form what standard of review has been applied. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 239 Ga. 327 ( 236 S.E.2d 672) (1977); and Crawford v. State, 240 Ga. 321 ( 240 S.E.2d 824) (1977). But a close study of Williams v. State, supra, is very instructive.

These facts are indistinguishable from Joseph Williams and, therefore, the trial court erred in denying Corthran's motion to suppress. 239 Ga. 327 (1) ( 236 S.E.2d 672) (1977). 250 Ga. 553, 558 ( 200 S.E.2d 301) (1983).

We conclude that the answer is no. First of all, the sheriff made no promises to induce a confession; Parker was to receive the promised benefit only if he successfully denied the crime, not if he admitted it. Compare OCGA §§ 24-3-50 and 24-3-51; Williams v. State, 239 Ga. 327 ( 236 S.E.2d 672) (1977). Moreover, Parker made no inculpatory statements during the polygraph examination, or, at least, none that were admitted in evidence during the trial.

[15] Our courts have long held that if a negotiated plea agreement is rejected or withdrawn, any admission of guilt made as part of the agreement cannot be used as evidence against the defendant at trial. See Corthran v. State, 268 Ga. 443, 443, 491 S.E.2d 66 (1997) (videotaped statement made as part of a negotiated plea bargain agreement was inadmissible where guilty plea was later withdrawn); Williams v. State, 239 Ga. 327, 327-328 (1), 236 S.E.2d 672 (1977) (reversing defendant’s conviction when he confessed to a crime as part of a later-rejected plea agreement because "a confession induced by the slightest hope of benefit or remotest fear of injury may not be used against a defendant"). For the same reason, such admissions should not be used against the defendant in a probation revocation or first offender resentencing proceeding.

We note that in argument as to sentencing the prosecutor read dicta from Eberhart v. State, 47 Ga. 598, 609-610 (1822). This, of course, occurred prior to our recent criticism of this practice in Hawes v. State, 240 Ga. 327 ( 236 S.E.2d 672) (1977). This practice of inferring, by reading from Eberhart, supra, that one or all members of this court would approve the death penalty, in a case we have not reviewed, is improper and will not be approved.