As discussed below, we have since held that merger claims are claims that convictions (as well as the resulting sentences) are void and thus cannot be raised in a free-standing motion to vacate void sentence. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 192–194, 695 S.E.2d 244 (2010). These decisions are consistent with the line of this Court's cases, pointed to by Appellant, that hold flatly that merger claims cannot be waived because a conviction that merges as a matter of law or fact with another conviction is void, and any resulting sentence is void and illegal, which means that they may be challenged in any proper proceeding.

See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193-194 (695 S.E.2d 244) (2010); Frazier v. State, 302 Ga.App. 346, 348-349 (691 S.E.2d 247) (2010).

A post-conviction motion seeking to vacate an allegedly void conviction is not a valid procedure in a criminal case, and any appeal from the denial or dismissal of such a motion must be dismissed. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193 (695 S.E.2d 244) (2010); Roberts v. State, 286 Ga. 532, 532 (690 S.E.2d 150) (2010). Thus, to the extent Odianose's motion sought to challenge the armed robbery conviction, this appeal must be dismissed.

This merger claim is a challenge to his convictions, not his sentence, and thus does not state a valid void-sentence claim. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193-194 (695 S.E.2d 244) (2010) (defendant's "claim of failure to merge . . . is a challenge to his criminal conviction"); Gholston v. State, 327 Ga.App. 790, 791 (761 S.E.2d 189) (2014) (defendant's claim that his convictions should have merged "is a claim challenging his convictions and not a claim that his resulting sentence was void"). Furthermore, to the extent Wright's motion could be construed as seeking to vacate or modify his convictions, his appeal is subject to dismissal.

If Munye’s motion cannot be construed as one of these alternative filings, his direct appeal from the denial of his motion to vacate his convictions is subject to dismissal. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192 , 194 (695 SE2d 244 ) (2010); Harper, 286 Ga. at 218 (2); Jones v. State, 322 Ga. App. 269 , 272 (1) (745 SE2d 1 ) (2013). Of the alternative filings listed above, Munye’s sole argument is that his motion should have been construed as a timely motion in arrest of judgment under OCGA § 17-9-61.7 However, his motion to vacate his conviction as void cannot be construed asa motion in arrest of judgment or other alternative motion attacking his underlying conviction in light of OCGA § 40-13-33 (a).

As his sole enumeration, Rogers argues that the counts should have merged for sentencing because they constituted a single course of conduct and thus were not separately punishable. Although this argument appears to be well taken, we are constrained to dismiss Rogers's appeal pursuant to the Supreme Court of Georgia's decision in Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 194, 695 S.E.2d 244 (2010), which held that a claim that a defendant's convictions merged under OCGA § 16–1–7(a) is a claim challenging a conviction and not a claim that the resulting sentence is void. OCGA § 16–1–7(a) provides:

The trial court erred in granting the motion. 284 Ga. 162 ( 664 SE2d 220) (2008), overruled in part by Harper, supra, and Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192 ( 695 SE2d 244) (2010). Supra.

Lockhart's claims in his motion to correct void judgment challenged his convictions, not his sentence. See Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193-194 (695 S.E.2d 244) (2010). A challenge to a criminal conviction “may be considered only in a traditionally recognized proceeding to challenge a criminal conviction,” including a petition for habeas corpus. See Nazario v. State, 293 Ga. 480, 488 (2) (d) (746 S.E.2d 109) (2013); see also OCGA § 9-14-40 et seq.

That may be correct. See Malcolm v. State, 263 Ga. 369, 373-374, (434 S.E.2d 479) (1993) (holding that a guilty verdict for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon did not merge into a corresponding felony murder verdict that was vacated by operation of law); Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162, 162, (664 S.E.2d 220) (2008) (holding that guilty verdicts for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony do not merge), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192, 193, (695 S.E.2d 244) (2010). However, the State failed to raise this merger error by cross-appeal (and also did not raise it at the sentencing hearing).

Furthermore, “possession of a firearm by a convicted felon does not merge into a conviction for malice murder.” Chester v. State, 284 Ga. 162 , 162 (1) (664 SE2d 220 ) (2008), overruled on other grounds by Williams v. State, 287 Ga. 192 , 194 (695 SE2d 244 ) (2010), and Harper v. State, 286 Ga. 216 , 218 (1) (686 SE2d 786 ) (2009). In this regard, rather than purporting to merge the possession of a firearm by a convicted felon count into the felony murder and malice murder counts, the trial court should have instead merged the felon-in-possession count into the count relating to the use of a firearm by a convicted felon during the commission of another felony See Jones v. State, 318 Ga.App. 105 (6) (733 SE2d 407 ) (2012).