Rather, "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Id .See also Williams v. State , 529 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988). [28] Aside from bald assertions, Warren has presented no evidence from the record establishing that an actual conflict of interest existed that adversely affected counsel's performance.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States guarantees the right of a defendant in a criminal case to the effective assistance of counsel. Williams v. State, 529 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ind.Ct.App. 1987) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)). Included within the Sixth Amendment is the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties to other defendants.
Id. Included within the Sixth Amendment is the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties to other defendants. Williams v. State, 529 N.E. 2d 1313, 1315 (Ind.Ct.App. 1988). In order to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment due to a conflict, a defendant who failed to raise an objection at trial must demonstrate: (1) that trial counsel had an actual conflict of interest; and (2) that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance.
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel includes the right to representation by an attorney who does not owe conflicting duties to other defendants. Williams v. State , 529 N.E.2d 1313, 1315 (Ind. Ct. App. 1988) (citing Holloway v. Arkansas , 435 U.S. 475, 481, 98 S.Ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d 426 (1978) ). However, joint representation of codefendants is not a per se violation of the constitutional guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
While not every case of dual or, as here, successive representation creates a conflict of interest, any divergence of interests between the defendants requires separate counsel. See Williams v. State (1988), Ind. App., 529 N.E.2d 1313, 1316. Holleman directs this Court to decisions in which such breaches of assistance resulted in a determination that actual prejudice would be presumed.
Failure to raise the issue of inadequacy of counsel on appeal generally waives that issue for post-conviction relief purposes unless the issue rises to the level of fundamental error. Williams v. State (1988), Ind. App., 529 N.E.2d 1313, 1315. Fundamental error is defined as blatant error denying petitioner "fundamental due process." Terry v. State (1984), Ind., 465 N.E.2d 1085. Without analyzing the merits, the alleged errors do not impress us as being "blatant.