Harris v. State, 22 Ala. App. 121, 113 So. 318 (1927); Foster v. State, 37 Ala. App. 213, 66 So.2d 204 (1953)." Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987).

(R. 468). The Criminal Court of Appeals relied on Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), in reaching its decision. In that case, the trial court gave an almost identical jury charge.

SHORES, Justice. Upon preliminary consideration, we granted the petition for the writ of certiorari to determine whether the opinion of the Court of Criminal Appeals in this case conflicts with the opinion in Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987). Specifically, we granted the writ to determine whether the trial court erred to reversal in its oral charge to the jury, when it stated:

The defendants contend that a jury instruction to reconcile all the testimony and to weigh the testimony of different witnesses differently only if such reconciliation is not possible requires that a juror initially take all the testimony of all the witnesses as true. They contend that such an instruction is "functionally identical" to an instruction to presume that the witnesses are testifying truthfully, which would have prevented the jury from disbelieving any testimony that was not contradicted. Under Alabama law, there is no presumption that a witness is testifying truthfully. Ex parte Holifield, 562 So.2d 254, 255 (Ala. 1990); Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987). Neither Musgrove nor Rogers objected to the jury charges at issue during trial and they have not previously raised the issue on appellate review.

We agree that the trial court, however inadvertently, did comment on the evidence in its charge to the jury and that it erred in doing so. The trial court's summary of only the State's evidence amounted to a factual determination, which properly is left for the jury to decide without judicial advice on what facts should be found; furthermore, the trial court's delivery of its summation of only the State's evidence could reasonably have been taken to advocate the State's version of the evidence. Ala. Code 1975, § 12-16-11; Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987); Jones v. State, 488 So.2d 48 (Ala.Cr.App. 1986); Pease v. City of Montgomery, 333 So.2d 221 (Ala.Cr.App. 1976). Moreover, the charge was effectively a general affirmative charge, which stated, in effect, that if the jury believed the State's evidence, then it should convict Brown. See, e.g., Austin v. State, 555 So.2d 324 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989).

The appellant argues that this charge violates the rule of evidence in Alabama that "there is no presumption that a witness is telling the truth." Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987). He further argues that the trial court's instructions to the jury that it should seek to reconcile the testimony of the witnesses suggests that the jury should initially take this testimony as true and thereby effectively charges the jury to believe all of the State's witnesses.

Although the instruction was error, see Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987), the error was harmless because all witnesses, including the appellant who testified in his own behalf, benefitted from the erroneous presumption, see Williams v. State, 538 So.2d 1250, 1253 (Ala.Cr.App. 1988), and "the court's charge in its entirety stated the correct principles of law with regard to the credibility of witnesses," Weaver v. State, 568 So.2d 309, 312 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989); accord Touart v. State, 562 So.2d 625, 627 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989). Because the erroneous instruction constituted harmless error, neither trial counsel's failure to object nor appellate counsel's failure to raise the issue on appeal prejudiced the appellant.

(R. 1115) Initially, we agree that this isolated statement is error, because there is no such presumption in Alabama and such an instruction "is a derogation of the jury's exclusive right to determine the credibility of witnesses." Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987). See also Williams v. State, 538 So.2d 1250 (Ala.Crim.App. 1988).

The appellant contends the trial judge's charge on this matter was reversible error. As the appellant correctly points out, there is no presumption of truthfulness in Alabama, and such an instruction "is a derogation of the jury's exclusive right to determine the credibility of witnesses," Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Crim.App. 1987). However, any error in giving a charge such as the one quoted above may be harmless, as it is in this case, when the court's oral charge is viewed in its entirety.

Harris v. State, 22 Ala. App. 121, 113 So. 318 (1927); Foster v. State, 37 Ala. App. 213, 66 So.2d 204 (1953)." Williams v. State, 520 So.2d 179, 181 (Ala.Cr.App. 1987). Our review of the record, however, reveals that this error does not require reversal of appellant's conviction.