One Council member visited two stores, brought back one example of a more "tame" device, and testified that about half the inventory consisted of devices designed or marketed as useful primarily for the stimulation of genital organs. See Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494, 495 (4) ( 277 S.E.2d 781) (1981). Chamblee Visuals freely presented evidence and made statements in support of its application.

In this case, however, the attorney whose assistance the defendant sought was not a member of the bar of this state, and neither the attorney nor the defendant had a constitutional right to demand that the attorney be allowed to represent the defendant in this case. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494 (2) ( 277 S.E.2d 781) (1981). It was, rather, a matter governed by the trial court's sound exercise of discretion, which will not be disturbed on appeal unless abused.

Most of the authority the prosecutor cites are examples where the trial court was justified in denying admission of counsel pro hac vice, or was justified in removing out-of-jurisdiction counsel. For example, see Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494; 277 S.E.2d 781 (1981) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying pro hac vice motion where the out-of-state lawyer could not prove admission to the bar of his claimed home state of Texas), and State v. Kavanaugh, 52 N.J. 7; 243 A.2d 225 (1968) (egregious conduct of counsel admitted pro hac vice justified removal in the interests of the integrity of the judicial process). See also Thomas v. Cassidy, 249 F.2d 91, 92 (CA 4, 1957) (the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying pro hac vice motion where the out-of-state lawyer had been "guilty of unlawyerlike conduct in connection with the case in which he wished to appear and which was being prosecuted by his sister as plaintiff"), and Ross v. Reda, 510 F.2d 1172, 1173 (CA 6, 1975) (the trial court was justified in refusing admission pro hac vice where the out-of-state lawyer affirmatively refused to limit his out-of-court statements concerning the case while it was pending).

At the opening of the trial, appellant's counsel requested that an attorney admitted to practice in Colorado be permitted to appear in the trial as a co-counsel for appellant. The first enumeration of error in this appeal is that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion in determining whether to permit out-of-state counsel to participate. Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494 (2) ( 277 S.E.2d 781) (1981), established the discretion of a trial court in circumstances such as those in this case. Appellant does not question the existence of such discretion in the trial court, but argues that the trial court in the present case failed to exercise any discretion at all.

See Stancil v. State, 155 Ga. App. 731 (6) ( 272 S.E.2d 511) (1980), cert. den., Stancil v. Georgia, 451 U.S. 975 (1981). See also Dyke v. State, 232 Ga. 817, 826 ( 209 S.E.2d 166) (1974); Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494 (8) ( 277 S.E.2d 781) (1981), and cits. 2.

A foundation for this testimony was laid whether his testimony be characterized as that of an expert or non-expert. See Williams v. State, 157 Ga. App. 494, 496 (4) ( 277 S.E.2d 781). We find no merit in this complaint.