Nos. 05-08-00376-CR, 05-08-00377-CR
Opinion Filed July 10, 2009. DO NOT PUBLISH. Tex. R. App. P. 47.
On Appeal from Criminal District Court No. 7 Dallas County, Texas, Trial Court Cause No. F07-55622-HY and F07-55623-HY.
Before Justices FITZGERALD, LANG, and FILLMORE. Ricky Williams, Jr., appeals the trial court's judgments convicting him of indecency with a child younger than seventeen years of age, each enhanced by two prior felony convictions. The jury found Williams guilty, the enhancements true, and assessed his punishment at thirty-seven years of imprisonment in each case.
DOUGLAS S. LANG, Justice.
In his sole issue on appeal, Williams argues the evidence is factually insufficient to prove he knew a child was present. We disagree and affirm the trial court's judgments.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On the afternoon of August 5, 2007, A.G., then a fourteen years of age, was in the pool area at her apartment complex. At the pool there were ten or eleven people, mostly children. With A.G. was A.M., her nine-year-old stepsister. Around 3 p.m., A.G. "noticed" Williams standing outside the pool area by the mailboxes. Williams was about fifteen feet from A.G. when she saw him "showing his penis off. . . ." Although A.G. was not looking at Williams directly, she observed Williams looking toward the pool and "messing with" his penis. A.G. was scared. She telephoned the police and her mother. A.G. wanted to leave the pool area, but she was too afraid. A.G. tried to prevent A.M. from seeing Williams. While waiting for her older cousin to escort her home, A.G. reported Williams's actions to Lorraine Ruiz. Ruiz was A.G.'s twenty-year-old neighbor. At the pool that day, Ruiz was supervising her two-year-old daughter and her twelve-year-old stepdaughter. Until that day, Ruiz had not met A.G. After speaking with A.G., Ruiz looked over at Williams, who was standing by the mailboxes. Ruiz recognized Williams because she had seen him standing in the same place earlier. At first, she did not see Williams doing anything. However, when Ruiz looked a second time, she saw Williams standing with "his private part out." Ruiz watched Williams walk over to the garbage dumpster, which was adjacent to the mailboxes. From the pool area, she had a "clear view" of Williams "stroking" his genitals and "looking over at the pool area." For thirty to forty-five minutes, she watched Williams walk back and forth from the mailboxes to the dumpster while repeatedly "pulling out his genitals, putting them back in and pulling them out." When the police arrived, they recognized Williams from the description given by A.G. over the telephone. Officer Quillan detained Williams while Officer Hale interviewed A.G., A.M., and Ruiz. Then, Officers Quillan and Hale transported Williams to the police station. At the police station, Detective Joseph Cordon of the crimes against children unit interviewed A.G., A.M., and Williams. Williams gave the police a written statement. In this statement, Williams denied exposing himself to A.G. and A.M., and stated he had been "flirting" with an adult woman at the pool by "playing" with and "rub[bing]" himself. In two separate indictments, Williams was charged with indecency with a child under seventeen years of age. Because both cases arose from the same incident, they were tried together. In each case, the jury found Williams guilty as charged. II. FACTUAL SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In his sole issue, Williams argues the evidence is factually insufficient to support his convictions because it does not show he knew a child was present when he exposed his genitals. The State responds the evidence is factually sufficient because the jury, as fact-finder, was entitled to infer Williams's knowledge from the testimony of the witnesses . A. Standard of Review
In a factual sufficiency review, an appellate court views all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether the jury's verdict of guilt was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 705 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008); Roberts v. State, 220 S.W.3d 521, 524 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 282 (2007); Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006). Evidence can be factually insufficient in one of two ways: (1) when the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or (2) when the supporting evidence is outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence so as to render the verdict clearly wrong and manifestly unjust. See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705; Roberts, 220 S.W.3d at 524; Goodman v. State, 66 S.W.3d 283, 285-86 (Tex.Crim.App. 2001). It is the function of the jury to resolve any conflicts in the evidence. See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705; see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 36.13, 38.04 (Vernon 2007 1979). The jury is free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence presented by either side. See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 707; Wesbrook v. State, 29 S.W.3d 103, 112 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000). Unless the record clearly reveals a different result is appropriate, an appellate court must defer to the jury's determination concerning what weight to be given to contradictory testimony. Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705. B. Applicable Law
A person commits the offense of indecency with a child if, with a child younger than seventeen years and not the person's spouse, the person, with intent to arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, exposes his genitals, knowing the child is present. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 21.11(a)(2)(A) (Vernon 2003). A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b) (Vernon 2003). A defendant's knowledge "can be inferred from the conduct of, remarks by and circumstances surrounding the acts engaged in by the accused." Turner v. State, 600 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex.Crim.App. 1980); see also Uribe v. State, 7 S.W.3d 294, 295-97 (Tex.App.-Austin 1999, pet. ref'd); Strain v. State, 934 S.W.2d 424, 425 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 1996, no pet.); Wilcox v. State, 672 S.W.2d 12, 13-14 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1984, no pet.). The testimony of a child complainant alone is sufficient to support a conviction for indecency with a child if the child informed any person, other than the defendant, of the alleged offense within one year after the date on which the offense is alleged to have occurred. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a) (Vernon 2005); see also Scott v. State, 202 S.W.3d 405, 408 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2006, pet. ref'd). C. Application of Law to the Facts
Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we conclude the evidence is sufficient to prove Williams knew a child was present when he exposed his genitals. The record shows A.G. testified that school was out for summer and that she and A.M. were "playing with [other] kids." Further, A.G. stated it "seemed like" Williams was looking at her or at the pool area while "walking . . . outside the pool area just showing his penis off. . . ." The distances between Williams and the pool area were short. A.G. testified Williams was about fifteen feet from her. Also, A.G. stated she had to actively "try not to let [A.M.] see" Williams's exposed genitals. A.G.'s testimony alone is sufficient to support Williams' conviction for indecency with a child relating to her because she promptly told the police, her mother, and Ruiz of the alleged offense. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.07(a); Scott, 202 S.W.3d at 408. Ruiz corroborated A.G.'s testimony. Ruiz stated only three of the ten or eleven people in the pool area were adults. Also, she stated Williams was "looking over at the pool area" and that from the pool area to the mailboxes and to the dumpster, she had a "clear view" of Williams standing with "his private part out." Finally, Ruiz testified she watched Williams "pulling out his genitals, putting them back in and pulling them out" for thirty to forty-five minutes. A rational jury could have easily concluded from the circumstances that Williams knew the children were present. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 6.03(b); Turner, 600 S.W.2d at 929. Supported by the testimony offered against Williams and by photographs of the pool area offered into evidence and considered by the jury, it cannot be said that the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak the verdict seems clearly wrong and manifestly unjust; or there is some objective basis in the record that shows the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradict the jury's finding that Williams knew the children were present at the time he committed the offense. See Uribe, 7 S.W.3d at 295-97 (concluding evidence was sufficient where appellant exposed his penis and masturbated in his car while parked next to a car in which a child was a passenger); Strain, 934 S.W.2d at 425 (concluding evidence was sufficient where appellant exposed his penis and masturbated in the doorway of his house while the complainant and other children were in the yard); Wilcox, 672 S.W.2d at 13-14 (concluding evidence was sufficient where appellant stood in front of a gap in a fence and dropped his pants while a group of children played on the other side of the fence). We conclude the evidence was factually sufficient to prove Williams knew a child was present when he exposed his genitals. Williams's sole issue is decided against him. III. CONCLUSION
The evidence is factually sufficient to sustain Williams's convictions. The trial court's judgments are affirmed.