Opinion
No. 258, 2001
Decided: January 15, 2002
Superior Court Sussex County in Cr.A. Nos. VS99-10-0344-01; VS99-10-0587-01, 0588-01. Def. ID No. 9905004722.
Affirmed
Unpublished Opinion is below.
BRUCE WILLIAMS, Defendant Below, Appellant, v. STATE OF DELAWARE, Plaintiff Below, Appellee. No. 258, 2001 Supreme Court of the State of Delaware. Decided: January 15, 2002
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice, HOLLAND and BERGER, Justices.
Randy J. Holland, Justice:
ORDER
This 15th day of January 2002, upon consideration of the appellant's opening brief and the appellee's motion to affirm pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 25(a), it appears to the Court that:
(1) In February 2000, Williams pled guilty in the Superior Court to two counts of Driving under the Influence of Alcohol (fourth offense) and to one count of Driving while License was Suspended or Revoked. The Superior Court sentenced Williams to a total of six years at Level V incarceration, suspended after one year, for a total of five years at Level III probation.
(2) On May 17, 2001, Williams was charged with violation of probation ("VOP"). The VOP hearing was scheduled for the following week, and Williams was advised to contact his attorney if he intended on having legal representation at the hearing.
(3) Williams appeared pro se at the May 25 VOP hearing. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Superior Court adjudged Williams guilty of VOP and sentenced him to a total of five years at Level V, suspended after successful completion of the Key Program, for one year at Level IV Crest, suspended upon successful completion, for 18 months at Level III Crest Aftercare, and one year at Level III probation.
(4) In his opening brief on appeal, Williams complains that he was not represented by legal counsel at the VOP hearing. Williams also complains that his VOP sentence is excessive. Williams asks to be released to probation so that he can return to work.
(5) There is no absolute right to the appointment of counsel at a VOP proceeding. The United States Supreme Court has held, however, that counsel should be provided in cases where the probationer raises `a timely and colorable claim (i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and that the reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.'
Jones v. State, 560 A.2d 1056 (Del. 1989).
Id. at 1058 (quoting Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973)).
(6) In this case, Williams readily admitted at the VOP hearing that he had missed ten probation appointments and had recently been convicted of a new criminal offense. His reasons in mitigation of the missed probation appointments, i.e., that he did not have transportation to the appointments and did not have access to a telephone, were not complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present. Under these circumstances, the Superior Court was not obligated to appoint counsel to represent Williams. Moreover, after hearing and rejecting Williams' request that he be allowed to remain on probation so that he could keep his job, the Superior Court acted well within its discretion when sentencing Williams to serve a total of five years at Level V, suspended after successful completion of the Key and Crest Programs, for Crest Aftercare and probation.
On May 18, 2001, Jones pled guilty in the Court of Common Pleas to Driving while License was Suspended/Revoked and was sentenced to 60 days at Level V followed by one year at Level I probation. State v. Williams, No. MS01-05-0992 (Del. CCP May 18, 2001).
(7) It is manifest on the face of Williams' opening brief that this appeal is without merit. The issues raised are clearly controlled by settled Delaware law, and to the extent the issues on appeal implicate the exercise of judicial discretion, there was no abuse of discretion.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the State's motion to affirm is GRANTED. The judgment of the Superior Court is AFFIRMED.