Williams v. State

Full title: LAWRENCE EDWARD WILLIAMS, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

Court: Court of Appeals of Texas, Tenth District, Waco

Date published: Dec 5, 2007

Nos. 10-06-00341-CR, 10-06-00342-CR (Tex. App. Dec. 5, 2007)

Opinion

Nos. 10-06-00341-CR, 10-06-00342-CR

Opinion delivered and filed December 5, 2007. DO NOT PUBLISH.

Appeal from the 278th District Court Leon County, Texas, Trial Court Nos. CM-06-89 and CM-06-93. Affirmed.

Before Chief Justice GRAY, Justice VANCE, and Justice REYNA.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

FELIPE REYNA, Justice.

A jury convicted Lawrence Edward Williams of aggravated assault against a public servant, for which he received sixty-five years in prison, and evading arrest or detention in a vehicle, for which he received twenty years in prison. On appeal, Williams challenges: (1) the legal sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his aggravated assault conviction; and (2) whether officers possessed a lawful reason for detaining him. We affirm.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Officers Kevin Ellis and Robert Kelly responded to a report involving a stolen truck. When the officers located the truck, Ellis exited his patrol car and approached the truck, which was parked. Williams started the truck and began driving towards Ellis. Ellis ran to avoid getting hit, and a car chase then ensued. At some point, the truck stopped, and Kelly exited his patrol car to approach the truck. Williams suddenly began driving backwards towards Kelly, forcing Kelly to run back to his patrol car. State Trooper Kenneth Lee had also joined the chase and managed to fire several shots into the truck's tires, but Williams continued driving. Williams struck Lee's patrol car twice. The truck ultimately came to rest against the side of Lee's patrol car. Believing that Williams was armed, Lee fired several shots at the truck. Ellis, Kelly, and Texas Ranger Jim Huggins subsequently arrived at the scene. Williams was secured and sent to the hospital for his injuries.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

In his first issue, Williams challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support his aggravated assault conviction, arguing that the evidence does not show that: (1) he intentionally or knowingly placed Ellis in fear of imminent bodily injury; (2) Ellis was in fear of imminent bodily injury; and (3) the truck was used as a deadly weapon.

Standard of Review

Under legal sufficiency review, we determine whether, after viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) (citing Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979)). We do not resolve any conflict of fact or assign credibility to the witnesses, as this was the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735, 740 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999); see also Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 421 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992); Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 843 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991). Inconsistencies in the evidence are resolved in favor of the verdict. Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 406; Matson, 819 S.W.2d at 843.

Analysis

A person commits aggravated assault with a deadly weapon when: (1) he intentionally or knowingly threatens imminent bodily injury; (2) to a person whom he knew was a public servant; (3) while the public servant was lawfully discharging an official duty; and (4) used a deadly weapon during the course of committing the assault. See TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. §§ 22.01(a)(2), 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B), (c) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Williams challenges the first and fourth elements of this offense.

Intentionally or Knowingly Threatened Imminent Bodily Injury

A person acts intentionally "when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause the result." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03 (a) (Vernon 2003). A person acts knowingly "when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or that the circumstances exist," or "he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 6.03 (b) (Vernon 2003). Ellis testified that, as he approached the truck, Williams looked directly at him, started the truck, and began driving "directly at me where I was standing." Ellis began running and sought protection behind his patrol car. Kelly observed the truck driving towards Ellis who was "back peddling to get away" and "screaming stop, don't drive off, stop." Kelly got back in his patrol car. Kelly did not know Williams's intentions, but "Ellis had to take evasive action to get out of the way:"

It looked like to me he [Ellis] felt like he was going to be run over and he got out of the way and was hollering at him.

The truck did not hit Ellis's patrol car, but swerved around it. Williams argues that the record does not show that he intended to threaten Ellis with bodily injury because: (1) Ellis was "screaming stop, don't drive off, stop," so was more concerned with Williams leaving the scene than with Williams threatening Ellis's safety; and (2) Kelly returned to his patrol car, apparently expecting a car chase, instead of drawing his weapon in an attempt to protect Ellis. In reliance on St. Clair v. State and Anderson v. State, the State argues that the record proves Williams's intent to threaten Ellis with imminent bodily injury. In St. Clair, we held that a "rational trier of fact could have found that St. Clair `threatened [Sherman] with imminent bodily injury'" when he drove his vehicle directly towards Officer Sherman:

A person can communicate a threat by conduct as well as by words. According to the evidence, St. Clair turned the Sunbird in Sherman's direction and began accelerating. Sherman testified that he "could hear the engine accelerating and the tires squealing." As Sherman tried to take cover behind the utility pole, St. Clair turned the car in that direction and continued accelerating. St. Clair "came to a skidding stop" about six feet away. Sherman testified that he "was in fear of being struck by the car" as it accelerated toward him.

26 S.W.3d 89, 97 (Tex.App.-Waco 2000, pet. ref'd) (internal citations omitted). In Anderson, Officers Hamilton and Steinberg were attempting to secure Anderson when Anderson placed his vehicle in reverse, striking Hamilton in the knee and forcing Steinberg to "jump out of the way to avoid being hit." 11 S.W.3d 369, 371 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). Noting that "[a]iming a deadly weapon at a supposed victim is sufficient evidence of a threat," the Houston Court held that, "a rational juror could have concluded that appellant aimed the car and reversed into Hamilton; thus, the evidence was legally sufficient to establish the threat necessary for aggravated assault." Id. at 375-76. As in St. Clair and Anderson, Williams looked directly at Ellis and aimed the truck in Ellis's direction. Ellis testified that Williams accelerated and smoke emitted from the truck as it drove towards him. Although Williams swerved and did not hit Ellis's patrol car, Ellis testified that he thought Williams was "fixing to run me over right here on this parking lot." Accordingly, we cannot say that the evidence is legally insufficient to show that Williams threatened Ellis with imminent bodily injury. See St. Clair, 26 S.W.3d at 97; see also Anderson, 11 S.W.3d at 376.

Placed in Fear of Imminent Bodily Injury

Williams presents three arguments supporting his contention that the record does not show that Ellis was in fear of imminent bodily injury. First, Williams relies on the fact that Ellis testified that the truck was not being used as a deadly weapon. Defense counsel asked Ellis about the shots fired by Lee during the pursuit and whether Ellis had observed the truck being used as a deadly weapon prior to the shooting. Ellis replied, "No." On redirect, Ellis testified that the truck could have run over him, caused serious bodily injury or death, and was being used as a deadly weapon at the time it was being driven towards him. The State argues that Ellis's response to the defense's question addressed the end of the chase, not the point in time when Williams aimed the truck at Ellis. Regardless of the context in which Ellis answered, as the sole judge of the weight and credibility of witness testimony, the jury bore the burden of resolving any inconsistencies in Ellis's testimony and was entitled to do so either for or against Williams. See Wyatt v. State, 23 S.W.3d 18, 30 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000); see alsoCooks v. State, 844 S.W.2d 697, 708 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992). Second, Williams argues that he drove around Ellis's patrol car, rather than hitting it, in an attempt to get around the patrol car and not hit Ellis. However, the fact that Williams aimed the truck in Ellis's direction is sufficient. See St. Clair, 26 S.W.3d at 97; see also Anderson, 11 S.W.3d at 376. Third, Williams argues that Ellis was more concerned with getting Williams to "stop" than with his own safety. Ellis specifically testified that he was in fear for his life and explained why he did not draw his weapon or react further:

At the time I was trying to get out of the line of a vehicle fixing to run me over. And I knew, you know, hitting the vehicle or anything else was not going to stop it before it ran me over.

The fact that Ellis may have been trying to prevent Williams from leaving the scene does not vitiate any fear or concern he may have felt. The evidence is legally sufficient to show that Ellis was placed in fear of imminent bodily injury.

Used a Deadly Weapon During the Course of Committing the Assault

A deadly weapon constitutes "anything that in the manner of its use or intended use is capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07 (17)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2007). Again relying on Ellis's testimony that he did not witness the truck being used as a deadly weapon, Williams argues that the evidence does not support a deadly weapon finding. As previously stated, it was up to the jury to resolve any inconsistencies in Ellis's testimony. See Wyatt, 23 S.W.3d at 30; see alsoCooks, 844 S.W.2d at 708. Both Ellis and Kelly testified that a vehicle can be used as a deadly weapon. A rational trier of fact could have found that the truck was, in the manner in which Williams operated it, "capable of causing death or serious bodily injury." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 1.07 (17)(B); St. Clair, 26 S.W.3d at 97. In summary, the evidence is legally sufficient to support Williams's conviction for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon on a public servant. We overrule Williams's first issue.

LAWFUL REASON FOR DETENTION

In his second issue, Williams argues that his evading conviction should be overturned because the officers did not have a lawful reason to detain him. A person evades arrest or detention when: (1) he intentionally flees; (2) from a person he knows is a peace officer; (3) the peace officer is lawfully attempting to arrest or detain the person; and (4) the person "uses a vehicle while . . . in flight." TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 38.04 (a), (b) (Vernon 2003). Williams challenges the fourth element of this offense, arguing that Leonard Ridenour, the truck's owner, gave him permission to drive the truck,¹ no crime had occurred, there existed no reason to detain him, and he could not be charged with unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, of which he was acquitted.² This argument ignores the fact that a police officer is justified in detaining a vehicle reported as stolen. See Mount v. State, 217 S.W.3d 716, 728-30 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (officer "justified in searching for and stopping a vehicle that was similar to the vehicle described by the caller" as stolen); see also Brown v. State, 986 S.W.2d 50, 51, 53-54 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1999, no pet.) (officers justified in detaining driver of vehicle listed on the officers' "hot sheet"). Ridenour reported the truck stolen. Dispatch notified Kelly and Ellis of this report. Kelly spoke directly with Ridenour. When Kelly and Ellis located the truck, Ellis observed that the license plate matched that of the truck reported as stolen. That the information may have been erroneous does not mean that Kelly and Ellis lacked a lawful reason to detain Williams. See Mount, 217 S.W.3d at 728 ("An investigatory detention or an arrest is not invalid merely because an officer relies upon reasonably trustworthy information that later proves to be erroneous"). Moreover, "even if the initial attempt at detention is unlawful, the suspect may be stopped or arrested for criminal acts which he commits while attempting to avoid the officer." Pickens v. State, 159 S.W.3d 272, 274 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2005, no pet.) (citing Blount v. State, 965 S.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. ref'd)); see Bell v. State, 233 S.W.3d 583, 587-88 (Tex.App.-Waco 2007, no pet. h.). According to Kelly, Ellis, and Lee, Williams drove through stop signs, blew through intersections, traveled at a high rate of speed, and ran over a street sign. Lee even observed Williams aiming the truck at pedestrians. Even if the officers possessed no lawful reason to detain Williams prior to the car chase, a lawful reason arose once Williams violated the traffic laws while attempting to evade the officers. See Pickens, 159 S.W.3d at 274; see also Bell, 233 S.W.3d at 587-88. Accordingly, we overrule Williams's second issue. Because we overrule Williams's two issues, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.