Where, in the course of a plea colloquy, the defendant raises the possibility of a defense, "the potential prejudice is considered apparent and a further inquiry by the trial court is necessary." Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988) (citing State v. Kendrick, 336 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1976)). If the trial court does not conduct an adequate inquiry with regard to the asserted defense, the defendant has demonstrated prejudice and is entitled to a writ of certiorari and remand for further inquiry into the factual basis for the plea. See Williams, 534 So.2d at 931; Farley v. City of Tallahassee, 243 So.2d 161, 162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1971) (state must establish every element of the crime charged independently of any admission or confession of the defendant).
The trial court was therefore required at the plea hearing to determine whether there was a factual basis for the minimum-mandatory sentence. Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929 (Fla. 1988). The requirement that a trial court ascertain the factual basis for a guilty plea is intended to preclude an unwitting admission of guilt for a crime the defendant did not in fact commit. Shannon v. State, 406 So.2d 87, 88 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981).
A trial court should not accept a guilty plea where the allegations, if proven, would not establish the commission of the crime to which the defendant is pleading guilty. See, e.g., Williams v. State, 534 So. 2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Waugh v. State, 388 So. 2d 253 (Fla. 2d DCA 1980); Estes v. State, 294 So. 2d 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1974). In like fashion, rule 8.520(c) seeks to ensure that a trial court will not terminate a parent's parental rights, based upon a voluntary surrender, unless the allegations of the petition would, if proven, establish a legally sufficient basis for termination of parental rights.
Absent prejudice or manifest injustice, which has not been shown to exist here, an imperfect plea colloquy does not create reversible error. See Freber v. State, 638 So.2d 140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1994); Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). AFFIRMED.
We conclude that the remaining claims were also properly denied as they were either without merit or the defendant failed to demonstrate or even allege prejudice. See United States v. Novaton, 271 F.3d 968, 1010-1011 (11th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1120, 122 S.Ct. 2345, 153 L.Ed.2d 173 (2002); Herring v. State, 730 So.2d 1264, 1267 (Fla. 1998), cert. denied, 527 U.S. 1003, 119 S.Ct. 2337, 144 L.Ed.2d 235 (1999); Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Affirmed.
A defendant cannot even plead to an offense until the State has proffered proof of each element of the crime. See Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). Can he preclude a proper judicial statutory interpretation at trial, an interpretation which would make the difference between a second degree felony and a first degree felony, by non-argument? We have learned by experience that whether something can be a weapon under a particular statute is a question of law to be determined by the court.
In all, although the plea colloquy fell short of the requirements set out in rule 3.172, the judgment and sentence should not be invalidated on collateral review, as Appellant has not proved prejudice or manifest injustice. Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Panno. Therefore, the judgment and sentence are affirmed.
The record, therefore, amply demonstrates sufficient evidence on each element of the charge. Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Gust v. State, 558 So.2d 450 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990). Defendant next argues that his sentence and conviction should be vacated because the trial court incorrectly informed the defendant of his possible mandatory sentence.
Id., at 273. See also State v. Kendrick, 336 So.2d 353 (Fla. 1976); State v. Lyles, 316 So.2d 277 (Fla. 1975); Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988); Eisaman v. State, 440 So.2d 470 (Fla. 5th DCA 1983); Monroe v. State, 318 So.2d 571 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); Thacker v. State, 313 So.2d 426 (Fla. 2d DCA 1975), cert. denied, 327 So.2d 35 (Fla. 1976). In Kendrick, the court noted:
Generally, the rule "may be complied with by receiving evidence, testimony, a proffer of evidence, statements by counsel or the defendant, or reference to the record sufficient to satisfy the court that there is evidence to convict on each element of the charge." Williams v. State, 534 So.2d 929, 930 (Fla. 4th DCA 1988). If, however, the court fails to make a complete inquiry or to receive a complete proffer, its failure will not generally result in reversal without a corresponding showing of prejudice. Id. The trial court below denied appellant's post-conviction motions without a hearing and referred to his plea, waiver and consent form, and the plea and sentence transcript.