It follows that, here, the defendant had the right to be present at these bench conferences discussing whether a potential juror would be struck for cause. See Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 165 (3), 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016) (recognizing that, although defendant was present when juror asked to be excused for hardship and when trial court announced it had excused juror for that reason, defendant had a right to be present during the bench conference at which juror’s excusal was discussed); Smith , supra, 298 Ga. at 409 (2), 782 S.E.2d 269 (recognizing that, although defendant was present for the factual development of the reason for juror’s removal, he had a right to be present when counsel presented legal argument and trial court excused juror); Heywood , supra, 292 Ga. at 773-775 (3), 743 S.E.2d 12 (exclusion of defendant from bench conference discussion of whether to replace prospective jurors was improper); Ramirez v. State , 345 Ga. App. 611, 616 (2), 814 S.E.2d 751 (2018) (recognizing defendant’s right to be present at a bench conference where the topic of striking a potential juror was discussed); Gillespie , supra, 333 Ga. App. at 568-569 (1) (a), 774 S.E.2d 255 (improper
As such, Fordham "clearly had a constitutional right to be present during the proceedings at which one of the jurors trying his case was removed." Id. ; see also Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 165 (3), 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016) (although defendant was present when juror asked to be excused for hardship and when court announced that juror was excused for that reason, he had a right to be present during the bench conference at which juror’s excusal was discussed); Ramirez v. State , 345 Ga. App. 611, 616 (2), 814 S.E.2d 751 (2018) (recognizing a defendant’s right to be present at a bench conference where the topic of striking a potential juror is discussed). Nevertheless, a defendant is free to waive this right, either personally or through counsel.
"Acquiescence, which is a tacit consent to acts or conditions, may occur when counsel makes no objection and a defendant remains silent after he or she is made aware of the proceedings occurring in his or her absence." Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 166 (3), 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016) (citation and punctuation omitted). Here, where Bernier was present before, during, and after all of these bench conferences took place, saw jurors being questioned and on two occasions excused, and voiced no objection, we conclude that he acquiesced to counsel’s waiver of his presence.
As to the two conferences that affected the jury composition, Pruitt correctly asserts that he had the right to be present. See Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 165 (3), 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016) ; Burney v. State , 299 Ga. 813, 819 (3) (b), 792 S.E.2d 354 (2016) ) (right to be present extends to proceedings at which jury composition is addressed); Zamora v. State , 291 Ga. 512, 518 (7) (b), 731 S.E.2d 658 (2012) (accord). However, the fact that the right [to be present] existed in these circumstances does not end the analysis, as a defendant is free to waive this right, either personally or by counsel.
Even assuming, dubiously, that Williams had a right to be present at these discussions of a witness’s attorney-client privileged information, "in failing to voice any objection during the trial proceedings to [his] absence" at the conference in chambers, Williams "clearly acquiesced in [his] trial counsel’s waiver of [his] right to be present" at that conference. See Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 166 (3), 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016) (concluding that defendant acquiesced to trial counsel’s waiver of her right to be present at a bench conference where defendant remained silent after being informed that conference had occurred in her absence and of the nature of the discussions); Murphy v. State , 299 Ga. 238, 241 (2), 787 S.E.2d 721 (2016) ("Acquiescence may occur when counsel makes no objection and a defendant remains silent after he or she is made aware of the proceedings occurring in his or her absence."). Thus, this contention is without merit.
Assuming without deciding that Mohamed had a right to be present at these discussions, "in failing to voice any objection during the trial proceedings to [his] absence at the bench conference, ... [Mohamed] clearly acquiesced in [his] trial counsel’s waiver of [his] right to be present at that bench conference." Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 166 (3), 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016) (concluding that defendant acquiesced to trial counsel’s waiver of her right to be present at a bench conference where defendant remained silent after being informed that conference had occurred in her absence and of the nature of the discussions). Thus, this contention is without merit.
Goodrum's counsel did not object to Goodrum's absence from the discussion about the juror's removal, but counsel's waiver of Goodrum's asserted right to be present is binding on Goodrum only if it was made at his express direction or in open court in his presence or if he acquiesced to the waiver. See Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 165, 794 S.E.2d 127. Because the first two options clearly were not satisfied, we examine if Goodrum acquiesced to the waiver.
From this evidence, a reasonable jury was authorized to conclude that Ellington possessed a firearm and was the person who shot and killed Fulton—i.e., that he committed the relevant acts; that he did so with malice aforethought—i.e., the requisite intent; and that he did so with knowledge that Meshiah was present and heard the act. See OCGA §§ 16-5-1 (a), (b) ; 16-15-70 (d) (2); 16-11-133 (b); Young v. State , 305 Ga. 92, 94, 823 S.E.2d 774 (2019) ; Cochran v. State , 305 Ga. 827, 830, 828 S.E.2d 338 (2019) ; Williams v. State , 300 Ga. 161, 163-164, 794 S.E.2d 127 (2016). Moreover, to the extent Ellington relies on certain inconsistencies across the various witnesses’ testimony about the night of the crimes, the resolution of any such conflicts or inconsistencies in the evidence is for the jury, and we will not reweigh that evidence on appeal.