Opinion
A-14040 A- 14049 7129
10-09-2024
TREMAYNE LEE WILLIAMS, Appellant, v. STATE OF ALASKA, Appellee.
Sharon Barr (opening brief) and Renee McFarland (reply brief), Assistant Public Defenders, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the Superior Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court Nos. 3AN-16-07147 CR & 3AN-19-07088 CR Anchorage, Kevin M. Saxby, Judge.
Sharon Barr (opening brief) and Renee McFarland (reply brief), Assistant Public Defenders, and Terrence Haas, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Michal Stryszak, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Criminal Appeals, Anchorage, and Treg R. Taylor, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Allard, Chief Judge, and Harbison and Terrell, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
TERRELL. JUDGE
In one case, Tremayne Lee Williams pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to felony failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer, providing false information concerning identity, and leaving the scene of an accident. In a second case, a jury found Williams guilty of one count of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (possessing a controlled substance with intent to deliver) and four counts of second-degree weapons misconduct (possessing a firearm during the commission of certain drug offenses). The superior court held a joint sentencing hearing on both cases. None of Williams's convictions merged, and the court imposed a composite sentence of 66 months with 18 months suspended (48 months to serve).
AS 28.35.182(a), AS 11.56.800(a)(1)(B), and AS 28.35.050(b), respectively.
AS 11.71.030(a)(9) and AS 11.61.195(a)(1), respectively.
Williams now appeals, raising three claims: that insufficient evidence supported his convictions in the second case, that his four convictions for second-degree weapons misconduct should have merged, and that his composite sentence was excessive. The State concedes that the four guilty verdicts for second-degree weapons misconduct should have merged into one conviction. We accept this concession of error and we remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings consistent with this decision. Otherwise, we reject Williams's arguments and affirm his convictions and composite sentence.
Underlying facts
2016 case
On June 18, 2016, Anchorage police officers responded to shots fired on McCarrey street. Officers were advised that a motorcycle had left the area. Sometime later, an officer saw a motorcycle matching the description of the motorcycle that had left the area where shots were fired. The officer tried to stop the motorcycle, but the driver continued and hit a police patrol vehicle. From there, the driver attempted to flee on foot but was ultimately stopped by officers. During this initial contact, the driver told officers his name was "Travaugn Bradley." The police arrested the driver and took him to the hospital to receive medical attention for the motorcycle accident. In the ambulance, officers inquired further about his identity, and at that point, the driver told officers that his name was "David Patterson." Officers were not able to correctly identify him as Williams until he was later fingerprinted in jail.
While at the hospital, Williams told officers that he had been in the McCarrey street area at the time shots were fired but that he was the one being shot at. Williams also told officers that he fled from them because "he knew he had warrants." Upon being cleared for release from the hospital by a doctor, Williams again tried to flee from the officers by running out of the hospital room and down the hall. The officers caught up to Williams and eventually handcuffed him after a physical struggle.
Williams ultimately entered into a plea agreement, pursuant to which he pleaded guilty to failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer, providing false information concerning identity, and leaving the scene of an accident. The plea agreement left sentencing open to the court.
2019 case
In 2019, Anchorage police officers received a tip from Russell Weidler that his roommate, Williams, possessed drugs and firearms. Weidler also told officers that he had purchased methamphetamine from Williams. Based on this information, Williams was arrested on an outstanding warrant. Following Williams's arrest, officers executed a search warrant for the bedroom that Weidler indicated belonged to Williams.
While searching the bedroom, officers found a gram scale on the top of a dresser and another gram scale inside of a drawer in the dresser that had "opaque crystalline granulated substance residue on it." Also inside that same dresser drawer was a plastic bag containing "large chunks of another opaque crystalline substance" and a Glock 19 semi-automatic handgun with an extended, loaded magazine. Both the crystalline substance residue on the gram scale and the crystalline substance inside the plastic bag tested positive for methamphetamine in field testing performed at the scene and later in testing at the Alaska Crime Lab. The chunks of methamphetamine were measured at the crime lab and weighed 21.12 grams in total.
Next to the dresser was a closet. Inside the closet, officers found a "Bushmaster AR-15" rifle, an "off-brand .22 caliber rifle" made to look like a submachine gun, and an "SKS or AK style rifle" with an illegally sawed-off barrel. All three rifles had loaded magazines. During the search of the bedroom, police also found a passport and other forms of government-issued identification belonging to at least one other person, "Charlie Lewis." And during the search of the bathroom, the police found prescription bottles that appeared to belong to Williams and one other person.
Williams was charged with one count of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance (for possessing methamphetamine with intent to deliver) and four counts of second-degree weapons misconduct (for possessing four firearms during the commission of the controlled substance offense).
At trial, the State presented the evidence of methamphetamine, scales, and firearms in the bedroom that it had collected pursuant to the search warrant. Weidler testified that Williams owned the house in question, that the searched bedroom was not Weidler's bedroom, and that he had purchased methamphetamine from Williams before. The State also presented evidence that the police had found prescription medicine with Williams's name on it in the bathroom connected to the bedroom, and that Williams had posted pictures on social media that appeared to have been taken in that same bathroom.
A police officer testified that one dose of the methamphetamine found in the bedroom could range "anywhere" between one-fifth and one-half a gram, depending on how it was being ingested. Based on this, the officer testified that twenty-one grams of methamphetamine (the quantity recovered) would yield "about a hundred" doses, "give or take."
The officer further testified that the amount of methamphetamine found in the bedroom would sell for "probably two grand," and that it was not common for methamphetamine users to buy in bulk. However, on cross-examination the officer admitted that in his police report, he had previously stated that an ounce (or approximately twenty-eight grams) of methamphetamine costs around $500 on the street (but further explained that his police report described the cost of purchasing one ounce of methamphetamine wholesale, while his direct testimony described the retail value of the individual doses that could be sold from the one ounce). The officer also testified that it is "pretty common to find other people's IDs in people's rooms, especially if [they]'re distributing," and that "sometimes they get held as . . . collateral" or are used as fake identification.
In his defense, Williams argued he "did not have exclusive control of" the bedroom, noting that during the police's search, the State also recovered a passport that belonged to "Charles Lewis."
The jury returned guilty verdicts on all counts.
Why we conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support convictions for third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and second-degree weapons misconduct
First, Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions in the 2019 case.
When we review the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal, we are required to view the evidence, and all reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to upholding the verdict. The evidence is sufficient if "a reasonable fact-finder could have concluded that the State's case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Johnson v. State, 188 P.3d 700, 702 (Alaska App. 2008).
Id.
With respect to his conviction for third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance, Williams first argues that there was insufficient evidence that the bedroom where the methamphetamine was found was his and therefore that he possessed the methamphetamine. Williams argues that Weidler was not a credible witness, noting that Weidler was addicted to drugs at the time of the investigation, that Weidler had reasons to lie or even to set up Williams due to his drug use, and that Weidler was inconsistent in his testimony about when Williams last sold him methamphetamine. And Williams argues that the passport photo of "Charlie Lewis" and other government-issued identification found in the room cast doubt on whether the room belonged to him.
But Weidler's testimony that Williams was his roommate and that the bedroom was not Weidler's was corroborated by medication found in the connecting bathroom and photographs Williams uploaded to social media that appeared to be taken in this bathroom. And a police officer explained that it was common for drug dealers to possess others' identification either as collateral or to use as fake identification. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that Williams possessed the methamphetamine.
Williams next argues that there was insufficient evidence that he intended to deliver the methamphetamine. Williams again argues that Weidler's testimony was unreliable. Further, he points to the inconsistency in the police officer's evaluations of the value of the methamphetamine, the lack of evidence of heavy foot traffic to and from the apartment, and the fact that the police found no baggies, utensils, or gloves to handle the methamphetamine, or ledgers in the bedroom.
But the inference that Williams was intending to deliver the methamphetamine was supported by Weidler's testimony that he had purchased methamphetamine from Williams, by the large amount of methamphetamine that was in the bedroom, by the scales in the bedroom, by the identification cards of another person, and by the four loaded firearms in the vicinity of the methamphetamine. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude that the State presented sufficient evidence that Williams intended to deliver the methamphetamine. We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Williams's conviction for third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.
Williams also challenges his convictions for second-degree weapons misconduct. In order to find Williams guilty of second-degree weapons misconduct, the jury had to find that Williams committed third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance while possessing a firearm and that his "possession of the firearm aided, advanced, or furthered the commission of the drug offense." Williams argues that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable juror to find that his possession of the four firearms in the bedroom aided, advanced, or furthered his commission of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.
Murray v. State, 54 P.3d 821, 824 (Alaska App. 2002).
Williams had a loaded handgun in the same dresser drawer as the chunks of methamphetamine and the scale with methamphetamine residue. A juror could reasonably conclude that Williams kept the handgun in the dresser drawer "so that this weapon would be handy in the event that trouble arose during a [drug] transaction."This inference is further supported by the three rifles in the closet next to the dresser. All of the firearms were loaded, one was modified to look like a submachine gun, and another was illegally sawed off. We conclude that a reasonable juror could conclude that Williams possessed these firearms and that this possession aided, advanced, or furthered his commission of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance.
Gates v. State, 2015 WL 4387384, at *4 (Alaska App. July 15, 2015) (unpublished).
See Murray, 54 P.3d at 824 (providing the following factors that "might be relevant" "in deciding whether a firearm was possessed in furtherance of a drug offense: (1) the type of drug activity conducted, (2) the accessibility of the firearm, (3) the type of firearm, (4) whether the firearm was stolen, (5) the status of the defendant's possession (legitimate or illegal), (6) whether the firearm was loaded, (7) the proximity of the firearm to drugs or drug profits, and (8) the time and circumstances under which the gun was found").
We therefore conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support Williams's convictions for second-degree weapons misconduct.
Why we accept the State's concession that the four guilty verdicts for second-degree weapons misconduct should have merged
Second, Williams argues that the four second-degree weapons misconduct convictions should have merged and that only one conviction and sentence should have been imposed.
As we have explained, in the 2019 case, the State charged Williams with four counts of second-degree weapons misconduct, one for each of the four firearms that were in his room, and the jury found Williams guilty on each count. The superior court subsequently entered convictions and sentenced Williams to concurrent 1-year terms for each conviction.
In Ziegler v. State, we concluded that multiple convictions for second-degree weapons misconduct that are based on the same underlying drug offense should merge. This is because the second-degree weapons misconduct statute "emphasizes the relationship between the firearms and the underlying drug-trafficking crime, rather than the individual firearms themselves." The State therefore concedes error, and we conclude that this concession is well-founded.
Ziegler v. State, 2015 WL 5309203, at *6 (Alaska App. Sept. 9, 2015) (unpublished).
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Lindsay, 985 F.2d 666, 673 (2d Cir. 1993)).
See Marks v. State, 496 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Alaska 1972) (requiring an appellate court to independently assess whether a concession of error "is supported by the record on appeal and has legal foundation").
On remand, the superior court should merge the four second-degree weapons misconduct verdicts into a single conviction and modify the judgment to reflect only one conviction for second-degree weapons misconduct. Moreover, Williams's sentences for the convictions were completely concurrent to one another, and our review of the record indicates that Williams's sentencing was not otherwise impacted by entry of separate convictions. Therefore, we conclude that resentencing is not necessary here.
See Smith v. State, 426 P.3d 1162, 1168 (Alaska App. 2018).
Why we conclude Williams's sentence is not excessive
Finally, Williams argues that the composite sentence the superior court imposed for the two cases is excessive.
In the 2016 case, Williams was convicted of failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer, providing false information concerning identity, and leaving the scene of an accident. Williams faced sentencing under Senate Bill 91, a comprehensive criminal law reform bill passed in 2016. The presumptive range for felony failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer was a fully suspended term of imprisonment of 0 to 18 months. But Williams had eleven prior cases resulting in misdemeanor convictions, including misdemeanor failure to stop at the direction of a peace officer and providing false information. This history established the aggravating factors under AS 12.55.155(c)(21) (repeated history of similar offenses) and AS 12.55.155(c)(31) (five or more prior misdemeanor convictions). Williams therefore faced a sentence of up to 5 years for the felony failure to stop conviction.And, because Williams had past criminal convictions for conduct similar to his other two convictions, providing false information concerning identity and leaving the scene of an accident, he faced a sentence of up to 1 year for each of those convictions.
AS 28.35.182(a), AS 11.56.800(a)(1)(B), and AS 28.35.050(b), respectively.
Former AS 12.55.125(e)(1) (2016).
AS 12.55.155(c)(21) ("the defendant has a criminal history of repeated instances of conduct violative of criminal laws, whether punishable as felonies or misdemeanors, similar in nature to the offense for which the defendant is being sentenced under this section").
AS 12.55.155(c)(31) ("the defendant's criminal history includes convictions for five or more crimes in this or another jurisdiction that are class A misdemeanors under the law of this state").
See former AS 12.55.125(e) (2016).
Former AS 12.55.135(a)(1)(C) (2016).
In the 2019 case, Williams was convicted of third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and second-degree weapons misconduct. Williams faced sentencing under House Bill 49, the 2019 statute that repealed many provisions of Senate Bill 91. The presumptive range for both third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and second-degree weapons misconduct was 1 to 3 years. By the time the sentencing hearing was held, Williams had accumulated additional misdemeanor convictions. As in the 2016 case, the aggravator under AS 12.55.155(c)(31) for five or more prior misdemeanors applied. For each of these convictions, Williams faced up to 10 years.
AS 11.71.030(a)(9) and AS 11.61.195(a)(1), respectively.
AS 12.55.125(d)(1).
See AS 12.55.125(d).
The superior court found that Williams had "average" prospects for rehabilitation and that rehabilitation and deterrence were the two most relevant sentencing factors. In the 2016 case, it sentenced Williams to 12 months for felony failure to stop, 3 months for providing false information concerning identity, and 3 months for leaving the scene of an accident, with all time to be served consecutively. In the 2019 case, it sentenced Williams to 36 months with 18 months suspended (18 months to serve) for third-degree misconduct involving a controlled substance and to 12 months for each count of second-degree weapons misconduct, with the time for the four weapons misconduct convictions to be served concurrently to each other but consecutively to the controlled substance conviction. The sentences in the 2016 and 2019 cases were to be served entirely consecutively, for a composite sentence of 66 months with 18 months suspended (48 months to serve).
Because the sentences for the weapons misconduct convictions were imposed concurrently, our remand for merger of the counts does not affect the composite sentence, and we are able on this record to evaluate whether the composite sentence was excessive.
When we review an excessive sentence claim, we independently examine the record to determine whether the sentence is clearly mistaken. The "clearly mistaken" standard contemplates that different reasonable judges, confronted with identical facts, will differ on what constitutes an appropriate sentence, and that a reviewing court will not modify a sentence that falls within a permissible range of reasonable sentences.
McClain v. State, 519 P.2d 811, 813-14 (Alaska 1974).
Erickson v. State, 950 P.2d 580, 586 (Alaska App. 1997).
We have independently reviewed the sentencing record in this case. Given Williams's criminal history, we conclude that the composite sentence imposed here is not clearly mistaken.
Conclusion
We REMAND for the superior court to merge the four verdicts of second-degree weapons misconduct into one conviction and to modify the judgment to reflect this merger. Otherwise, the judgment of the superior court is AFFIRMED.