Opinion
2018-UP-166
04-18-2018
Thomas A. Williams, Appellant, v. State of South Carolina, Respondent. Appellate Case No. 2016-000424
Robert Jamison Tinsley, Jr., and Clarence Rauch Wise, both of Greenwood, for Appellant. Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, for Respondent.
THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.
Submitted March 1, 2018
Appeal From Greenwood County Donald B. Hocker, Circuit Court Judge
Robert Jamison Tinsley, Jr., and Clarence Rauch Wise, both of Greenwood, for Appellant.
Attorney General Alan McCrory Wilson and Assistant Attorney General Mark Reynolds Farthing, both of Columbia; and Solicitor David Matthew Stumbo, of Greenwood, for Respondent.
PER CURIAM:
Affirmed pursuant to Rule 220(b), SCACR, and the following authorities: S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2950(A) (2018) ("A person who drives a motor vehicle in this [s]tate is considered to have given consent to chemical tests of the person's breath, blood, or urine for the purpose of determining the presence of alcohol, drugs, or the combination of alcohol and drugs, if arrested for an offense arising out of acts alleged to have been committed while the person was driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of alcohol and drugs."); S.C. Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Nelson, 364 S.C. 514, 522, 613 S.E.2d 544, 548 (Ct. App. 2005) ("The implied consent laws are driven by public policy considerations. The State has a strong interest in maintaining safe highways and roads. One way to accomplish this goal is to enact laws directed at minimizing drunk driving."); State v. Jansen, 305 S.C. 320, 322, 408 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1991) ("[I]t is well established in this [s]tate that one who is arrested for DUI impliedly consents to a breathalyzer test, and that revocation of that consent is constitutionally admissible as prosecutorial evidence at the trial pursuant to that arrest."); State v. Morgan, 352 S.C. 359, 365, 574 S.E.2d 203, 206 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the legislative intent whenever possible."); id. at 365-66, 574 S.E.2d at 206 ("All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of the statute.").
We decide this case without oral argument pursuant to Rule 215, SCACR.
HUFF, GEATHERS, and MCDONALD, JJ., concur.